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A b stract
This thesis investigates how introducing bounded rationality to a range of theoretical 
microeconomic situations can help explain empirical results.
Biased Screening and Coarse Inform ation: A decision maker must choose 
one of two projects. Each project has an identically independently distributed value 
which is observed by an agent, but only a coarse signal can be communicated to the 
decision maker. Despite the symmetric setup, agents optimally partition the possible 
realisations of value differently to minimise the error cost in the decision stage. This 
is generalised to a screening process, where projects are grouped exogenously and 
different thresholds can be used to assess projects in different groups. A project in a 
minority group has a lower probability of being chosen, an insight which is related to 
the literature on categories and discrimination.
E ndogenous A nalogy Classes: An Analogy Equilibrium (Jehiel, 2005) involves 
players bundling nodes at which their opponent moves into analogy classes. The 
robustness of analogy classes is examined when players form their analogy classes 
endogenously, so are more likely to form analogies over nodes in which their opponent’s 
behaviour is similar and when suboptimal actions would not prove very costly. These 
ideas are applied in a generalised Centipede game. Pure strategy equilibria involving 
passing may survive refinement in some long games, but mixed strategy equilibria can 
be dramatically more robust. In the most cooperative, robust equilibrium players pass 
for many nodes and mix at the end of the game.
C om m on Value M ulti-U nit A uctions: The implications of using different 
multi-unit auction mechanisms are investigated when bidders have multi-unit demand 
and a common valuation V m for the m th object they win. Revenue equivalence holds 
across many auction formats when bidders have constant or increasing marginal utility 
for additional units. When bidders have diminishing marginal utility however, an 
almost common-values problem means that inefficient first-price auctions are expected 
to raise the most revenue. Bounded rationality is important in explaining empirics and 
reinforces some of the theoretical results.
Disclaim er: I, Michael Lockhart Armitage, confirm that the work presented is 
my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this 
has been indicated in the thesis. Parts 1 and 2 are new, whereas Part 3 is an improved 
and extended adaptation of a thesis which was previously submitted for my MPhil
qualification. The differences are discussed irtfdetail at the start of Part 3 on page 113.
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C hapter 1
General Introduction
This thesis investigates how introducing bounded rationality to a range of theoretical 
microeconomic situations can help explain empirical results and is divided into three 
parts. This first part introduces bounded rationality into a decision problem, by 
considering how a decision maker might optimally screen projects to choose one that 
maximises expected utility. The second investigates how bounded rationality might 
lead to players forming analogies about how their opponents will move, which could 
overcome the finite horizon paradox that arises in a generalised Centipede game. The 
third part develops a theoretical model of common value auctions in which bidders have 
multi-unit demand. Bounded rationality helps to explain empirical and experimental 
studies (multi-unit auctions are often complex) as well as reinforcing some of the 
theoretical results.
The first part of the thesis investigates how a decision maker might optimally screen 
projects to maximise expected utility. The screening heuristic is initially motivated as 
a coarse communication mechanism, where separate agents have private information 
which they summarise into simple recommendations for the decision maker. Screening 
is best motivated early in a search process, where communication, processing or infor­
mation acquisition constraints generate coarse information and it is not yet optimal 
to use a more accurate, but costly, procedure involving sequential search or pairwise 
comparisons. Optimisation is motivated by learning as the screening problem is re­
peated over time. Despite the symmetry of the situation, it can be shown that, it is 
optimal to introduce bias (or asymmetry) into the screening process and this result can 
be generalised to the case of partially asymmetric screening (or communication). In 
this case the decision maker can identify which group a project is in using an econom­
ically irrelevant characteristic, and assesses projects in different groups using different 
thresholds. In the optimal partially asymmetric screen, projects in the majority group
9
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face a higher threshold but are chosen in preference to projects in the minority group 
in the decision stage. Overall, the probability of a project in a minority group being 
chosen is lower than if it were a member of the majority group. These insights are 
related to some models from the economic theory of discrimination, where the use 
of biased screening tests is typical, as well as being used to explain recent empirical 
results on resume screening.
An Analogy Equilibrium (Jehiel, 2005) involves players bundling nodes at which 
their opponent moves into analogy classes; players form beliefs consistent with the 
opponent’s average behaviour in each analogy class and respond optimally to these 
beliefs. The second part of this thesis seeks to refine this approach, motivated by the 
idea that players form their analogy classes endogenously after observing past histories 
of the game. It is argued that players are less likely to form analogy classes over nodes 
in w’hich the opponent’s behaviour is very different, and that they form analogies more 
carefully when suboptimal actions could prove very costly. These motivations lead to 
two approaches to refine analogy classes, requiring that they be robust. Firstly, re­
finement could restrict the variation of behaviour permitted within an analogy class, 
which is based on the consistency between a player’s analogy-based expectations and 
the beliefs he would hold if the analogy class were as fine as possible.1 An alternative 
approach is to measure the suboptimality of a player’s actions resulting from an anal­
ogy class. It is shown that these approaches lead to similar restrictions on behavioural 
strategies when they are applied formally to a class of timing games with complete and 
perfect information, such as Rosenthal’s (1981) Centipede game. Generally pure stra t­
egy analogy-based expectations equilibria involving passing will survive refinement in 
long enough games, but mixed strategy equilibria can be dramatically more robust. 
This leads to an intuitive solution to the finite horizon problem: an equilibrium con­
sists of players passing for a given number of nodes and then mixing towards the end 
of the game.
This third part of the thesis explores the implications for efficiency and expected 
revenue of using different multi-unit auction mechanisms when bidders have multi- 
unit demand and a common valuation V rn for the m th object they win. Bounded 
rationality helps to explain some related empirical and experimental results (multi­
unit auctions are often complex) as well as reinforcing some of the theoretical results 
developed. When bidders have constant or increasing marginal valuations, the dis­
criminatory, Vickrey and uniform price auctions have an equilibrium in which bidders 
submit flat demand curves. Empirically, however, bidders submit downward sloping
'T h ese  equal the o p p o n en t’s actual behavioural strategies.
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demand curves, which can be explained by decreasing marginal valuations.2 In this 
case, the discriminatory and Vickrey auctions decompose into asymmetric single-unit 
auctions, so insights from the analysis of asymmetric auctions can be applied. In fact, 
although the Vickrey and uniform price auctions are efficient, the asymmetry creates 
an implicit almost common values problem so they generate low revenue. These the­
oretical results are compared to some empirical results from experimental economics 
and treasury auctions. While some of the empirical results might be explained by 
introducing more units and bidders, others, such as overbidding on a first unit, can 
only be explained by introducing bounded rationality, which seems reasonable as the 
complexity and uncertainty of the situation make it harder to condition on winning 
and to calculate optimal bidding strategies. Even if most bidders are able to fully 
comprehend the multi-unit auction, the presence of a few smaller bidders who are 
boundedly rational may introduce supply uncertainty.
Therefore in every part bounded rationality is related to the way categories or 
analogies can influence players’ beliefs. In the first part, screening is analysed using a 
model in which information acquisition constraints cause projects to be evaluated using 
coarse categories. In the second, players form endogenous analogy-based expectations 
of their opponent’s behaviour. Finally, the third part shows that although introducing 
decreasing marginal valuations explains some empirical results, the analogy that the 
opponent does not base his actions on his private information can explain overbidding, 
and the analogy with the case of an even division of the units can reinforce some of 
the theoretical results on low bid equilibria in uniform price auctions.
"Even if payoffs are constan t, decreasing m arginal valuations could be m otivated  im plic itly  as the  
reduced form of reciprocity considerations or risk aversion.
P art I
Asym m etric Communication and 
Biased Screening
12
C hapter 2
Introduction
The following thesis investigates how a decision maker might optimally screen projects 
to maximise expected utility.1 The screening heuristic is initially motivated as a coarse 
communication mechanism, where separate agents have private information which they 
summarise into simple recommendations for the decision maker. The private informa­
tion takes the form of a project value - although these are identically independently 
distributed, the thesis will show that it is optimal for agents to use different thresholds 
to partition these distributions, so they communicate different information to help the 
decision maker choose a project.2
The screening heuristic is best motivated early in a search process, where com­
munication or information acquisition constraints generate coarse information, and it 
is not yet optimal to use a more accurate (but costly) procedure involving sequential 
search or pairwise comparisons. Therefore there are three key elements to this model: 
information is coarse, communication (or screening) is simultaneous and given these 
limitations, the decision maker and agents learn to optimise over time.
Coarse information could arise from constraints on communication, memory, 
processing ability or information acquisition. In the model presented here, the true 
information is represented by a one-dimensional random variable such as quality or 
p r v d u c t iv i t y Coarse information is represented by a simple, discrete signal, for ex­
ample that the realisation is either low or high, or sell, buy or hold. Many papers 
in the economics of discrimination assume that workers either pass or fail a test or
‘E xcep t where specified, screening  refers to  a sim ultaneous testin g  procedure, rather than  the usual 
econom ic defin ition  o f inform ed players se lectin g  from a m enu o f contractual offers.
"The agents and decision maker have th e  sam e ob jective , avoiding any principal-agent problem s.
' T he sim plify ing assum ption  th a t the inform ation relevant to  the decision  can be aggregated  into  
a one-dim ensional variable is com m on to  all o f  th e  papers d iscussed  here on both  bounded rationality  
and the econom ics o f d iscrim ination .
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interview. As the partitioning becomes infinitely fine the decision problem reduces to 
the unconstrained case, but consistent with information theory it is assumed that finer 
partitions are more costly to communicate. This definition encompasses models in the 
literatures of bounded rationality and the economics of discrimination. Often signals 
are modelled as binary random variables which are dependent on quality (or some 
other measure representing true information), meaning errors may arise in communi­
cation as there is a chance a high quality project could send a low signal.4 In contrast, 
the information structure in this thesis follows that of Dow (1991) in which there is 
no error in signals. This structure is seen as a simplifying assumption rather than a 
fundamental one. as it clarifies the underlying intuition and makes the model more 
tractable. When motivated using information acquisition constraints, coarse signals 
seem most reasonable early in the search process, when the small chance of choos­
ing any specific project means that the expected gain from a detailed inspection or 
accurate communication is lower.
The assumption that firms engage in simultaneous screening of applicants is com­
mon in papers on the economics of discrimination.0 The model developed here most 
closely resembles Cornell and Welch (1996) in which one winner is selected from a 
fixed number of applicants. The benefit of using a sequential search is that even 
if information is coarse, partitions can be optimally conditioned on previous signals 
(see Dow, 1991). However, this may require complex processing or considerably more 
communication, for example if the decision maker issues instructions back to agents 
during the search.0 When the model is motivated using information acquisition con­
straints, a screening process seems reasonable early in the search process. Later on, 
once there are fewer objects, greater returns to accuracy could mean it is optimal to 
change the procedure and treat signals sequentially. This approach is consistent with 
some psychological models of consumer search. In addition, Arrow, Pesotchinsky and 
Sobel (1981) demonstrate that using a simultaneous binary screening procedure is a 
surprisingly powerful method of finding the maximum of a sample, so it is reason­
able that a screening procedure is optimal early in a search for some specifications of 
communication costs.
The assumptions that information is coarse and search occurs through a simultane­
ous screen are consistent with several important models on the economics of discrimi­
nation. The third element better relates to models of bounded rationality: the decision
'For exam ple Calvert (1985), Cornell and W elch (1996) and L undberg and Startz (1983).
’E xam ples include P help s (1972), L undberg and Startz  (1983) and Aigner and Cain (1977).
' in vestiga tin g  the costs o f inform ation processing, R adner (1993) argues that pairwise com parisons 
should m ean th a t th e  current op tim al project is reprocessed in each com parison.
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maker learns to make optimal decisions and to have the agents communicate the most 
useful information, given the limitations imposed by the model. As with many models 
containing elements of bounded rationality, the optimal solution may be complex to 
calculate. However, optimisation is motivated by learning as the screening problem is 
repeated over time. Therefore the decision maker might behave as if the optimal pro­
cedure were calculated without actually deriving it. The assumption of screening can 
also be motivated in this way: the decision maker learns to form thresholds optimally 
over time, but actually conditioning optimally on current information requires a more 
complete understanding of the situation. As the model is motivated in the contexts of 
bounded rationality and the economics of discrimination, the results are discussed in 
relation to the relevant literature on each area at the end of Chapters Three and Five.
Chapter Three will show that to minimise the expected cost of an error, asymmetry 
(or bias) in the screening process is optimal when signals are coarse. Therefore the 
agents optimally use different thresholds to partition possible realisations of project 
utility, despite the problem being symmetric a priori. One intuition for the bias is 
that agents use different language to communicate to the decision maker. One reports 
whether project X  is terrible or not terrible while the other reports whether Y  is 
great or not great. An alternative motivation is that the decision maker chooses an 
optimistic agent and a pessimistic agent. The optimist reports that X  is good even 
when the realisation is only around average, while the pessimist has stricter standards 
and only reports that project Y  is good if it is a very high realisation.7 Proposition 3.3 
will demonstrate that introducing a small bias into a symmetric screen leads to a first 
order gain and only a second order loss, therefore the optimality of bias is expected 
to hold generally for a range of different information structures. This insight will be 
related to similar models containing elements of bounded rationality including Dow 
(1991), Meyer (1991) and Calvert (1985).
The model that will be presented in this thesis can be generalised in a number of 
ways. The decision structure could be expanded to allow more options, or to allow the 
decision maker to choose more than one project. The information (or communication) 
structure could be generalised to increase the number of partitions (either in total of 
for each project) or the number of different partitions which may be used. To illustrate 
this last point, two extreme cases are the symmetric case, where all project values are 
partitioned in the same way, and the fully asymmetric case, where every threshold is 
different. This requires complex calculation and for the decision maker to remember 
a different threshold for every project.
‘ T he first m otivation  is sim ilar to  D ow  (1991) w hile th e  second is closer to  C alvert (1985).
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Chapter Five will investigate the partially asymmetric case between these extremes, 
where the decision maker may use some different partitions but partitioning every sig­
nal differently is too complex. Instead, the decision maker can identify which group a 
project is in using an economically irrelevant characteristic, and uses the same thresh­
old for all projects within a group. In the optimal partially asymmetric screen, projects 
in the majority group face a higher threshold but are chosen in preference to projects 
in the minority group in the decision stage. Overall, projects in the minority group 
have a smaller chance of being chosen a priori. These insights will be related to some 
models from the economic theory of discrimination, where the use of biased screening 
tests is typical. Not only does this analysis suggest that a biased screening process 
might be optimal, but it also implies that this could lead to discrimination against a 
minority. For example, the intuitions developed in this thesis extend to the model of 
Cornell and Welch (1996), meaning that discrimination would be optimal even without 
their assumption that the decision maker gets less accurate signals from the minority 
group.
The thesis will briefly consider some recent interesting empirical results on resume 
screening. This is particularly relevant as both coarse signals and a screening process 
are best motivated early in the search procedure. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) 
study racial discrimination in the US labour market by submitting fictitious resumes 
which are randomly assigned "African American" or "White" sounding names. They 
find that White sounding names receive 50% more callbacks for interview and that 
callbacks are more responsive to resume quality for Whites. The analysis presented in 
this thesis could explain both these observations without any exogenous difference be­
tween individuals other than that they are identified with either a minority or majority 
group.
C hapter 3
Asym m etric Communication  
W ith Two Options
This chapter aims to show that asymmetric communication is optimal when informa­
tion is coarse. It demonstrates that bias arises in a very simple and symmetric case 
to provide intuitions that can be extended to more complex environments. A deci­
sion maker must choose between one of two projects, labelled Project X  and Project 
Y. The VN-M utility of each is a random variable X  or Y  with realisations x  and 
y respectively. X  and Y  are identically independently distributed and it is assumed 
for simplicity that they are uniformly distributed over [0,1]. The decision maker is 
aware of the distribution of X  and Y  but not their realisations. The realisations are 
observed by different agents, who only communicate a simple, coarse signal to the 
decision maker. Specifically, the agent observing X  divides the possible utility space 
into two intervals "high" and "low" , denoted by X i  and X u , and communicates which 
interval the realisation x  is in. Likewise the agent who observes Y  reports whether the 
realisation y falls in interval Y/, or Y//. Y i denotes both an interval and the signal sent 
to the decision maker, so the decision maker receives a signal profile S  =  {X . , Y}. In 
Figure 3.1 the signal profile received is the realisation s = {X u  , Y^} . The decision 
maker chooses the project which maximises expected utility conditional on the signal 
received.
As well as choosing the optimal project given a specific signal, the decision maker is 
able to control how the agents report information.1 In this simple example this means 
choosing the bounds of the intervals before signals are realised. Signals are cheap talk 
and it is assumed that agents report the coarse intervals truthfully, either because their
1 C hoosing how agents report is equivalent to  choosing  betw een a continuum  of agents w ho report 
differently, as in C alvert (1985).
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incentives are aligned with those of the decision maker or because the decision maker 
is able to use ex post monitoring.2 Although described as a single decision problem, 
it is assumed that this situation is faced regularly, so the decision maker and agents 
learn to form intervals optimally over time.
Table 3.1 explains the process:
Decision maker partitions valuation space 
Stage 1 For X  {X L , X H} =  {[O.a) , [a, 1]}
F o r Y { Y L , Yh ) =  {[0,6) . [6,1]}
One agent observes realisation x
Stage 2
and the other observes realisation y
The agents communicate the partitions 
Stage 3 containing x  or y to the decision maker, 
e.g. s =  { X h , Yl } in Figure 3.1
The decision maker chooses the 
Stage 4 project that maximises expected utility 
conditional on the signals received.
T able  3.1: T im in g  o f  th e  e o m m u i i ie a t io n  process
This is illustrated in Figure 3.1:
 ^ ---------
1
Vl IFya
I I
Xh Yl
X  ^Decision Stage
F igure  3.1: 'r im in g  o f  the  e o m m iin ic a t io n  process
In the decision stage, the decision maker maximises E [ V  | s], the expected utility 
conditional on s , the realised signal profile. This equals E  [X | s] if Project X  is chosen
'T herefore th is abstracts from the literature follow ing Crawford and Sobel (1982) in vestigatin g  
com m unication as a principal-agent problem  when the in terests of the agent and decision  maker do  
not align.
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and E  [Y | s] if Project Y  is chosen. The optimal decisions conditional on s can be 
substituted back into the communication problem to determine the optimal partitions 
of X  and Y . It is assumed throughout that the decision maker forms expectations 
using Bayes’ law.
Two cases are now considered. In the first the agents communicate in the same 
way, so possible project realisations are partitioned identically for X  and Y . In the 
second the signals may be partitioned into intervals differently, which is optimal even 
though the situation is symmetric a priori. In this thesis asymmetric communication 
and biased screening are used interchangeably to describe different motivations for the 
same model. In this sense the bias refers to the fact that identically distributed signals 
are communicated (or evaluated) differently and not that project space is partitioned 
evenly, nor that the decision stage is biased. For example, setting a =  b = |  and 
choosing Y  if both realisations are high or both low is considered symmetric com­
munication or unbiased partitioning. The reason for this definition of bias is twofold: 
firstly, a test would not be considered biased just because the pass mark differs from 
50%.3 Secondly, if Y  is always chosen when the decision maker is indifferent between 
X  and Y  this might constitute decision bias but not screening bias.
3.1 S ym m etric  C om m unication
In this case the same partitions are used to communicate information about both 
project utility values, so both random variables, X  and Y , are partitioned into in­
tervals {[0,a) , [a, 1]}. As the signals for a single project are mutually exclusive, the
expected utility E  [V] =  E  [V | s] Pr [s] can be composed from the probabilities
sand conditional expectations shown in Table 3.2.
s E [ X  | s ] E \ Y  | o]| Choice E [ V  | « 1 P r M
{ X L  , Yl ] a2
a
2 Y
a
2 a2
Yh ) a2
1 + a  
2 Y
1 + a  
2 a(l — a)
{ X u  , Y l }
l + a
2
a
2 X
l + a
2 a(l — a)
{ X H  , Y u } l + a2
l + a
2 Y
1 + a  
2 ( l - a ) 2
3.2: Proit>at>iliti(‘s and condit ional  ex  poo tial u t i l i ty  uik lor syiiiino■trio 0011111111100
If a specific signal leaves the decision maker indifferent between the projects, this means 
E  [X | s] =  E  [Y | s]. In this case expected utility is the same whether a decision rule 
chooses X , Y  or randomises between them. It is assumed for comparison with the 
asymmetric case (in Proposition 3.3) that an indifferent decision maker chooses Y ,
3Therefore th is defin ition  is very different to  the defin ition  o f bias in C alvert (1985).
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but as the labelling of the projects is arbitrary at this stage, this is without loss of 
generality.
Proposition  3.1 When the decision maker chooses between two options, optimal sym­
metric communication means dividing possible realisations of project utility into inter­
vals1 { X l  , X h }  — { Y l  , Yh} = {[0,a) , [a, 1]} where a =  to give E[V] — | .
Proof. As the signals for a single project are mutually exclusive, every combination
of such signals is mutually exclusive, so expected utility E[V] = ^ £ [ V | S]Pr [ S].
s
Substituting the probabilities and conditional expectations shown in Table 3.2 gives 
E  [V] =  |  +  ^ [l — a2] , which has a maximum at a =  ^ because \  — a and
d = — 1 • Substituting this into expected utility gives a maximum E  [V] =  | .  ■
This solution is illustrated in Figure 3.2 where possible realisations of X  and Y  
are illustrated on the axes. The signals received conditional on the realisations are 
labelled in bold. Project Y  is chosen in the shaded region and X  in the unshaded 
region.
y
X l, Y h
a
X h, Y,
a x
F igure  3.2: O p t im a l  s y m m e tr ic  c o m m u n ic a t io n
In Figure 3.2 the 45° line shows the full information optimal choice of the decision 
maker, were he to observe the true realisations of X  and Y.  Above this line y > x  and 
so project Y  is the true optimal choice, while below it x > y and choosing X  gives 
a higher utility. If the decision maker were able to observe realisations directly then 
the expected utility would be E  [V] =  Changing a affects the expected utility indi­
rectly, by changing the usefulness of the information provided to the decision maker.0
'D ow  (1991) show s that when w hen the exp ected  payoff depend s only on probabilities and con­
d itional ex p ecta tio n s , intervals are optim al. He gives an in tu itive  exam ple that when x  is d iv ided  
into an extreme  partition , X e  =  [0 , | )  U [ |  , 1], and a m oderate  partition  X \  1 =  [£ , | ) .  T his  
is to ta lly  un inform ative as E  [X  | X e \  =  E [ X  \ X m \  =  T h e use of intervals is more inform ative  
as it increases the difference betw een cond itiona l exp ecta tion s. A p pend ix  A1 sketches a proof th at 
intervals are op tim al in the m odel presented in th is chapter.
Tn the case where a  =   ^ one o f th e  signals is redundant and provides no extra  value. To see th is  
observe th at in F igure 3.2 th e  decision  m aker is indifferent in realisation X l ,Yl , so the realised value
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Proposition 3.2 shows that maximising E\V] is equivalent to minimising the expected 
cost of errors.
Proposition  3.2 Direct maximisation of expected utility is equivalent to minimising 
the expected error cost in the decision stage.
Proof. Conditional on a specific signal s, the full information expected utility, 
E  [V*], always chooses X  if X  > Y  and Y  if X  < Y . Therefore
E[V* \s\ = E [ X \ X  > Y  , S ] P r [ X > y | S ]  +  £ [ y | X < y ,  S] Pr [X < F  | 5]
expected error conditional on s is E  [e | s] =  E  [Y — X  \ Y  > X,  s] Pr [Y > X  | 5] so
£ [ V | 5 ]  =  £ [ X  I X > y  , S]Pr (X > y  I s) +  £ [ y  j X  < y  , S]Pr(X < y  I s)
+ E [ X  -  Y  \ X  < Y  , S] Pr  ( X  < Y  | 5)
=  E  [Vm | 5] -  E  [5 | 5]
The same decomposition can be carried out for the case if Y  (or any other project) is 
chosen conditional on a signal s. As signals are mutually exclusive
E  [V] =  J 2  E  [V | s] P r [s] =  E  [V" | *] Pr [« ]-£  [e | s] P r [s] =  E  [ V ' ] - E  [er] (3.1)
Therefore MaxE[V] <=$■ MinE[e]  because the full information expected utility, 
E[V*] = =  | ,  is a constant (the expected maximum of two uniform distribu­
tions). ■
Figure 3.3 illustrates the errors under symmetric communication when project Y  
is chosen when the decision maker is indifferent.
Assume in realisation s, the decision maker chooses X  so E  [V \ s] — E  [X \ s\. The
s s
y
a
a x
Figure; 3.3: Errors un der  s y m m e tr ic  c o m m u n ic a t io n
is the sam e if X  is chosen. T herefore the value is equal to  when the decision  maker chooses Y  if Y h is 
observed and X  if V/, is observed. O bserving a signal o f X  confers no extra  value in th is case as the  
decision is th e  sam e either way.
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The errors are illustrated as the shaded areas in which project Y is chosen but x > y 
(below the 45° line). Appendix A.2 illustrates Proposition 3.2, deriving the optimal 
interval partitions by minimising expected error. In the symmetric case6 illustrated in 
Figure 3.3 the expected error conditional on the realisation of a signal profile { X l , Yl } 
is | .  The expected error conditional on {X/y , Y/y} is while there is no error under 
{ X l , Yh } or { X h , Yl }. Therefore expected error is given by Equation 3.2.
E  [e] = ^ 2  E  I S1 Pr M =  +  ~ q~  -  a)2 =  ^ [l -  3a +  3a2] (3.2)
s
This is minimised when  ^ +  a, so optimally a = the optimal value of a
derived using direct maximisation of E  [Y] in Proposition 3.1. Substituting a =   ^ back 
into Equation 3.1 gives a minimum expected error of and as the full information 
expected value E  [V*] =  Equation 3.2 gives E  [V-] =  E  [V*] — E[e] = | ,  confirming 
the solution in Proposition 3.1. This shows that the problem could be presented as a 
statistical decision problem, with a loss function equal to expected error (although in 
this case there is no error in eocperiments which are observed for independent projects).
3.2  A sym m etric  C om m unication
This section analyses the case of asymmetric communication when agents may parti­
tion possible realisations of project value differently. It begins by demonstrating that 
the advantage of such bias holds very generally, then proceeds to solve specifically for 
the example when the underlying distribution of project values is uniform on [0,1].
Proposition  3.3 Introducing bias to the case of symmetric communication increases 
expected value.
Proof. From the symmetric case, assume that the threshold partitioning possible 
realisations of Y  is increased by a small amount A. The second agent now reports 
whether y lies in the new intervals {Y l , Y/y} = {[0 , a + A) , [a A , 1]} while the 
first agent continues to partition X  using {A' l  , A'//} = {[0,a) , [a, 1]}. To conserve 
space, this gain is calculated by substituting b =  a + A into the general solution for 
E  [Y] in Proposition 3.4. This gives:
E  [V (a , a + A)] -  E  (V (a , a)] =  l-  [2aA -  A2 + a2A + aA 2]
=  f  ( l - a ) 2 - ^ ( l - a )
f)T his can be derived by p u ttin g  a =  b in Table A 2.1 in A ppend ix  A2.
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Therefore increasing the threshold on Y  leads to first order gains and only second 
order losses. For any initial value of a, a small increase A increases E  [V]. ■
Proposition 3.3 is illustrated in Figure 3.4. As in Figure 3.3, errors are represented 
by X  being chosen below the 45° line or Y  being chosen above the 45° line. Compared 
to the case of symmetric communication, the chance of an error when the realisation 
of X  is low remains the same. The chance of both signals being high has reduced, 
although there is a new cost that sometimes in signal profile [Xu , Yl], project X  is 
chosen when in fact Y  is optimal. These changes are summarised in the Figure 3.4.
X l, Y h
X h, Y iY l
a x
Figurr  3.4: T h e  gain  from breaking s y m m e t r y
The first order gain ^  (1 — a )2 *s represented by the shaded area in Figure 3.4, where 
X  is now chosen while in the symmetric case Y  was chosen in error. The second 
order loss ^  (1 — a) is represented by the solid black area, where now X  is chosen 
while Y  > X  was correctly chosen in the symmetric case. When project values are 
uniformly distributed, increasing a threshold to introduce bias increases E[V]  even 
when a is already suboptimally high. For example, if a = 0.98 then there is a gain 
from increasing one threshold even further to 0.99. As Proposition 3.4 is motivated 
using first, order gains and second order losses, it holds very generally for unimodal 
continuous distributions of project value. These include cases in which sets are fuzzy, 
so there is a chance that realisations close to the threshold lead to the wrong signal, and 
a broad class of models where the coarse signal is positively correlated with underlying 
utility or quality. Cornell and Welch (1996) and Calvert (1985) are specific examples 
of such information structures.
3 .2 .1  O p tim a l B ia sed  P a r tit io n in g  in  th e  U n ifo rm  C ase
This section assumes that the decision maker and agents learn to partition the project 
valuation space optimally over time. Specifically the random variable X  is partitioned
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into intervals { X l , X h ] — {[0,a) , [a, 1]} while Y  is partitioned into {Yl , Y//} =  
{[0,6) , [6,1]}. It is assumed that a < b.7
s E[X  | s] E[Y  | s] Choice Max E[V  | s] Pr[s]
{ X L , Yl ) I  I Y  I ab
{X l , Y „ } |  i±H y  i p  a ( l - b )
{X H , Y L} i p  I X  l±s ( l - o ) 6
{X h . Y h } i±s i^  Y  i p  ( l - o ) ( l - 6 )
T able  3.3: P r o b a b i l i t ie s  and c o n d i t io n a l  e x p e c t a t io n s  un der  a s y m m e tr ic  c o m m u n ic a t io n
As with symmetric communication, realisations of signals are mutually exclusive so
expected utility, E  [V] = E  [V \ s]Pr[s], can be composed from the probabilities
s
and conditional expectations given in Table 3.3.
Proposition  3.4 When the decision maker chooses between two options, optimal 
asymmetric communication consists of dividing possible realisations of project utility 
for X  into intervals {X l , X h } =  {[0, a) , [a, 1]} and for Y  into intervals {Yl , Yh } =  
{[0,6) , [6,1]} where a = \  and b = |  giving E  [Y] =  .
Proof. Substituting the probabilities and conditional expectations shown in Table
3.3 into E  [V] =  E  [V | s] Pr [s] gives E  [V(a , 6)] =   ^ [l -I- 6 — 62 — a2b +  a62] .
Therefore:
d E[ V( a , b ) \  b
da 2 [6 — 2a]
a E l V (a ,  6)] _  l ( 1 _ a)[1 +
db 2
d 2E\V\  , , 8?Eso as d = —b and =  a — 1, letting a =  ^ and 6 =  |  gives a maximum a
priori expected value of E  [V-] =  ■
This solution given in Proposition 3.4 is illustrated in Figure 3.5, where the re­
alisations of project utilities, x  and y , are shown on the axes and the signal profiles 
conditional on these realisations are labelled in bold. The realisations in which Y  is 
chosen are shaded, while X  is chosen in the unshaded region.
'T here will be a second optim um  where a >  b due to  the sym m etric nature of the problem .
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X«, Y,X l, Y h
b
X h, Y
a x
Figure  3.5: O p t im a l  a s y m m e tr ic  c o m m u n ic a t io n
In Figure 3.5 the 45° line shows the full information optimal choice. Above this line 
y > x  so project Y  is the optimal choice, while below it x > y and choosing X  gives 
greater utility. One intuition for the bias in this solution is that agents use different 
language to communicate to the decision maker. One reports whether project X  is 
terrible or not terrible while the other reports whether Y  is great or not great An 
alternative motivation is that the decision maker chooses an optimistic agent and a 
pessimistic agent. The optimist reports that X  is good even when the realisation is 
only around average, while the pessimist has stricter standards and only reports that 
project Y  is good if it is a very high realisation.
3 .2 .2  C om p arin g  th e  O p tim a l U n b ia sed  and  O p tim a l B ia sed  C a ses
Proposition 3.2 showed that maximising expected utility is equivalent to minimising 
the expected cost of errors. The minimisation of expected errors under asymmetric 
communication is derived in Appendix A.2 (as a demonstration of this) but expected 
error can be calculated using Equation 3.1 in Proposition 3.2 so E  [e] = E  [F*] — 
E [V] =  |  When communication is symmetric, the expected error cost was
calculated as so introducing asymmetry can reduce expected error by more than 
half. This is illustrated in Figures 3.6 and 3.7, where the shaded area represents an 
error conditional on realisations of X  and Y  in Propositions 3.1 and 3.4 respectively.
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Figure 3.6: Errors under Figure 3.7: Errors under
symmetric communication asymmetric communication
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 illustrate that introducing bias reduces expected error in two ways: 
firstly, the overall probability of an error (represented as the total shaded area in these 
figures) is |  in the symmetric case compared to g in the optimal asymmetric solution. 
Secondly, the cost of any error is X  — Y  below the 45° line and Y  — X  above it. This 
is represented by the vertical distance to the 45° line. As well as the probability of 
errors being smaller in Figure 3.7 than Figure 3.6, on average the errors which occur 
are closer to the 45° line and are therefore smaller in magnitude.
3.3  D iscussion
The key insight of this chapter is that when signals are coarse it is optimal to introduce 
bias to the communication stage. It was shown that introducing a small bias leads to 
first order gains and second order losses, a general result which is expected to hold for 
all unimodal continuous distributions.8
The model of partitioning is very similar to that in Dow (1991), although in this 
case it is motivated where signals arrive simultaneously rather than sequentially. This 
leads to an intuition in common with Calvert (1985) who considers how a rational 
decision maker can optimally use imperfect advice.
Dow (1991) assumes that an individual’s memory is limited, preventing him re­
membering the exact price of an item. Instead, an agent partitions the set of possible 
prices and remembers which partition the price is in. In a second round, the agent 
observes the exact price at a second shop. This is compared to what he expects the 
first price to be, conditional on it being within the memorised partition. The agent 
then purchases the item from the store with the lowest expected price.
8 T he optim al partition ing w ill, o f course, depend  on the specific d istribution .
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Meyer (1991) assumes that partitions represent limitations on communication within 
an organisation. The agent in this case observes a noisy signal of the amount produced 
by two workers in the previous period. Although able to make a pairwise comparison 
(which is not possible in the model presented in this thesis) the agent is only able to 
communicate the ordinal information, which worker produced most, to the decision 
maker.9 Signals arrive sequentially and typically asymmetric evaluation criteria are 
optimal, as the decision maker tries to learn as much as possible about the difference 
in the underlying ability of the workers. The optimal final-period bias favours the 
leader.
In common with the model presented in this thesis, Calvert (1985) assumes signals 
arrive simultaneously and does not allow pairwise comparisons (despite a single agent 
observing both signals). Unlike this thesis, however, his model involves errors in 
communication.10 Agents are represented by a single advisor who sends binary signals 
that each project is good or bad. There is an underlying distribution of project value 
over Ui ~  U [0,1] and the probability of reporting a project as good is tq*‘ while 
the probability of reporting it is bad is 1 — . An unbiased source in his model is
interpreted as a \ =  c*2 =  1, so for each single project the advisor is equally likely 
to report that it is good or bad. He shows that when c*i =  1, it is optimal to set 
« 2  =  3.45, and argues that here bias is optimal because it increases the accuracy of 
high realisations at the cost of reducing accuracy for moderate valuations. However, 
there are two types of bias acting in Calvert’s model. The first is absolute bias, as 
given the distribution he uses, reporting that a project is good or bad with equal 
probability (i.e. =  c*2 =  1) is not optimal, and it is better to increase a* for both
projects. The second is relative bias, that it is optimal to set c*i ^  c*2 . Calvert’s 
analysis bundles these effects as he breaks asymmetry from suboptimal case of =  
c*2 =  1 and maintains cq =  1. In contrast, this thesis defines bias as a ^  b and 
therefore only considers relative bias. By assuming communication takes place without 
errors, the simpler analysis allows the optimal level of bias (i.e. optimal asymmetric 
communication) to be determined11 and it is possible to show that the bias relates to 
the underlying information structure and so holds generally for a range of different 
distributions. Calvert also shows that when the decision maker favours one of the 
projects a priori, then optimally he chooses an advisor who is biased in favour of it.
Another related approach is the economics of communication through codes. Wern-
11 In contrast to  th is m odel, as pairw ise com parisons are possib le, bias w'ould not be op tim al in the  
one period case.
10 In the sense that even if a project has a very bad realisation, there is a sm all probability  th at a 
good  signal w ill be sent.
11 In contrast, C alvert (1985) only solves for the op tim al value o f a 2 when e*i =  1.
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erfelt (2004) argues that there are compatability advantages of agents communicating 
using the same code, it can make a large difference whether a language arises as the 
result of optimisation or an equilibrium of a team theory problem. In Wernerfelt’s 
model, as in Radner and Marshack’s (1972) analysis of team theory, every informed 
agent also acts, in contrast to this thesis in which only the uniformed decision maker 
chooses an action. In this regard the model presented in this chapter is more similar 
to models of decentralised processing12 rather than decentralised decision making.
This thesis can be contrasted with Radner (1993). In common with much of the 
computer science literature, he focuses on finding a process which generates the optimal 
choice as quickly and cheaply (in terms of processing power) as possible. For example 
in Radner (1993), efficiency is motivated in the sense that the optimal solution cannot 
be reached without either longer delay or more processors. The question addressed in 
this thesis is how to minimise expected error given specific limitations in processing or 
communication, rather than how to minimise the degree of (costly) processing required 
to give the optimal solution. Arrow, Pesotchinsky and Sobel (1981) consider how to use 
binary partitions optimally to find the t largest observations in a sample size n. This 
is related to setting a in the unbias case, although their aim is to minimise either the 
number of rounds of questioning or maximise the probability that the search terminates 
within a given number of rounds. They demonstrate that using binary partitions is a 
surprisingly powerful method if the partitions are chosen optimally. In this sense their 
approach is similar to Radner (1993), as the question they address is how to find the 
optimal project as efficiently as possible, not how to get as good a project as possible 
for a given number of rounds of questioning.
''S e e  Van Zandt (1999) for a survey on th is  literature.
C hapter 4
Generalising the M odel
The model presented in Chapter Three can be generalised in a number of ways. The 
decision structure could be expanded to allow more options, or to allow the decision 
maker to choose more than one project. The information (or communication) structure 
could be generalised to increase the number of partitions (either in total or for each 
project) or the number of different partitions which may be used. To illustrate this 
last point, two extreme cases are the symmetric case, where all project values are 
partitioned in the same way, and the fully asymmetric case, where every threshold is 
different. This requires complex calculation and for the decision maker to remember a 
different threshold for every project. Chapter Five will investigate the case in between, 
where the same threshold is used for all projects in a group.
To provide benchmarks for the analysis in Chapter Five, this chapter characterises 
optimal communication in the symmetric and fully asymmetric cases with N  projects. 
A conjecture is also made about the optimal spread of partitions when the decision 
maker could focus attention on a single project. When there are many projects the 
notation is altered slightly: the zth project is labelled Xi, since it would provide utility 
equal to a random variable X i , with a realisation X{. X i is partitioned into intervals 
{[0 , (ii) , [aj, 1 ]}.
4.1 S ym m etric C om m u nication  w ith  N  P ro jec ts
In this case N  random variables Xi are partitioned into the same intervals {[0, a) , [a, 1 ]}
The simplest way to calculate the optimal value of a is to define H  as the number of high
realisations and condition expected value on its realisation, h.
E[V] = '^2  E  [V | h] Pr [/i] can be composed from the probabilities and conditional 
H
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expectations shown in Table 4.1.
Number of high results h Value E  [V* \ h] Pr (h)
_±
2h ^  0  1 — aN
h = 0  § aN
T ab le 4.1: P ro b a b ilit ie s  and  c o n d it io n a l e x p o r ta tio n s  c o n d it io n a l on h
Proposition 4.1 calculates the value of a which maximises E  [V].
Proposition  4.1 When the decision maker chooses between N  options, optimal sym­
metric communication divides the realisation of project valuations into intervals {[0 , a) , [a, 1 ]} 
where a = , to give E  [V] =  \  1
Proof. The realisations h = 0 and /i ^  0 are mutually exclusive so expected
utility E  [V] = E  [V | /i]Pr[h], Substituting the probabilities and conditional 
H
expectations shown in Table 4.1 gives E  [V] =   ^ [l +  a — aN] , which has a maximum
at a* = N _ 1  because =  \  [l — N a N~l] and d ------  < 0
providing N  > 2. Therefore the maximum E  [V] = ^ 1 +  (-^)
The optimal a* =  ( 7 7 ) N _ 1  means a* increases as N  increases, such that as N  —» 0 0 , 
a* —► 1 . This is intuitive when motivated as a screening mechanism, as the more op­
tions there are available the tougher the screening process should be. This relationship 
is illustrated in Figure 4.1 for N  > 2 . 1
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F igu re  4.1: O p tim a l sy m m e tr ic  c o m m u n ica tio n  w ith  N  p ro jects
When N  = 2, optimally a* =  ( ^ )T =  5 , demonstrating that Proposition 4.1 is a 
generalisation of Proposition 3.1.
1 T echnically  N  is discrete.
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E xam ple  4.1 When N  = 6, a* = ( | ) 5 =  0.6988. This gives an expected value 
E  [V] =  0.7912 meaning the expected error equals 0.0660.
Using the motivation of a screening process rather than a communication problem, 
this symmetric threshold can be related to Simon’s (1955) notion of satisficing, using 
a single aspiration level. Satisficing is proposed as an alternative to optimising behav­
iour, where an economic agent (in this case the decision maker) sequentially compares 
projects to a predefined aspiration level of utility ,2 and accepts the first which is above 
this level. In the model presented in this thesis, signals arrive simultaneously rather 
than sequentially.
4.2 Fully A sym m etric  C om m u nication  w ith  N  P ro jec ts
In this case each project Xi is partitioned by the respective agent into different intervals 
indexed by a threshold ai so { X u  , X h j}  =  {[0,af) , [aj, 1]}. It is assumed that a\ > 
0 -2  > ...ayv-i > «jv without loss of generality (the optimal partitioning is independent 
of the labelling of projects, which is arbitrary). E  [V] can be calculated from the 
probabilities and conditional expectations shown in Appendix A.3 to give Equation 
4.1.
r~,  r T .1 1 -  ai 1 - d o  ,  .  1  ~E  [V] -  — Hb a \—   b ... +  [aia2...an_ 1] —   b [aia2...an_ ian] —  (4.1)
Proposition 4.2 calculates the values of ai which maximise E[V}.
Proposition  4.2 When the decision maker chooses between N  options, optimal asym­
metric communication divides possible realisations of project valuations into intervals 
{[0,a;) , [a*, 1]} where the thresholds, a*, satisfy Equations 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.
Proof. Appendix A.3 derives Equation 4.1 and shows that when all ai are set 
optimally they satisfy:
1 “b d2 1 r ,a\ =  —   b -  [did2 ...dn_!dnJ (4.2)
(4-3)
an = y  (4.4)
This maximises £[V ]. Substituting the optimal solution into Equation 4.1 gives the 
maximum E  [V ] =   ^ [l — a 2 -f a\ ( l -b a^)] . ■
'In  th is exam ple, the threshold a  could  represent a constan t asp iration  level.
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It is straightforward to verify that when N  =  2, 0,2 =  ^  and therefore 
a\ =   ^ (l +  a | +  [ a i a 2 ] )  —  ^ a i — t t 2 — 3 - In this case
JE7 [V] =   ^ [ l — o f +  a i ( l  +  a \ )] =  | | .  This illustrates that Proposition 4.2 is a gen­
eralisation of Proposition 3.4.
E xam ple  4.2 Following Proposition 4.2, when N  =  6  optimal asymmetric com­
munication consists of each project X i being partitioned into intervals of the form  
{[0, a,-) , [a*, 1]} where the thresholds ai satisfy Equations 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. The values 
of ai satisfying these equations are given in Table 4.2.
a\ a2  a 3  0 4  a 5 a 6
0.8286 0.7632 0.7255 0.6716 0.5858 0.4143
Table  4 .2 : O p t i m a l  a s y m m e t r i c  th r e s h o ld s  w h en  N = 6
This partition structure is illustrated in Figure 4.2,3 which shows how ai partition the 
possible realisations of utility for each project X i by marking the optimal asymmetric 
thresholds urith squares. Example 4.1 showed that in the optimal symmetric case a =  
0.6988, giving an expected error of 0.0659. This is illustrated in Figure 4.2 as a dashed 
line.
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F ig u re  4 .2 : O p t i m a l  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  w i th  N —6
The expected utility from the fully biased case is E  [V] =   ^ (l — af +  a\ (l +  )) =
0.8123, so the expected error equals 0.0448. Therefore allowing fully asymmetric com­
munication reduces the expected error by 32%.
Some intuition for the optimal values of ai given in Proposition 4.2 can be gained 
by defining X [  as the probability that all [Xi, X 2 , Xi] up to Xi are low. This is Xfc 
if all realisations of X i  are low, and the decision maker optimally chooses X \ ,  because
!W hen TV >  2 it is no longer possib le to  represent realisations in two dim ensions so an a lternative  
representation is used.
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E  [Xy | X/'] =  so X \ is optimal as a\ > 0 ,2  > ...ayv_i > ayy. 4 As E1 [V | X ^] =  ^  
and ^  =  ayv (from Equation 4.4), ayv =  E  [V | X ^]. Therefore it follows from 
Equation 4.3 that for all i > 1 :
1 / 2  \  1 "f" a i +  l  / 1  \
a i  — ~ (l T  )  — -----2-- ( I  — a t + l )  +  a i + l a i + l
=  E  [Xj+i | Xy+i > ay+i] (l — ai+i) + E  [V \ X^+l] ay+i
= E [ V \ X t ]
Therefore an implication of Proposition 4.2 is that for all ay when i > l, optimally 
ay =  E  [V | Xf'] so the threshold dividing intervals on signal Xy is set to equal the 
expected utility if all signals up to an including Xy have low realisations.
The optimal fully asymmetric case is similar to a sequential search, inspecting first 
X i, then X 2 and continuing until a signal is high, such as the house selling problem 
of Simon (1955). An individual selling a house sets an acceptance price each day 
and receives an offer, the distribution of which is known. If the offer is above the 
acceptance price, it is accepted, otherwise it is rejected and the house is retained 
until the next day. The problem is how to optimally set the acceptance price each 
day. This problem is also discussed as a variant of the secretary problem in Moser 
( l956). In both cases there is an implicit stopping problem, with an optimal solution 
characterised by setting ayv =  0, ayv-i =  \  and ay =   ^ (l +  ay+i). The difference 
between this and the solution derived in Proposition 4.2 is that in the latter, the 
decision maker can recall earlier applicants, so in the final turn chooses X i. Although 
the model is very different, the recurrence relation is identical. This is because in both 
cases the decision maker is prevented from conditioning on the observed history, either 
because signals arrive simultaneously or because past applicants cannot be recalled. 
Under coarse information, even if the projects are screened sequentially in order of 
strictest to easiest cutoffs, Conjecture 4 . 1 implies it is not be optimal to recall earlier 
applicants. 0 The only case of recall is when all projects have low realisations and Xi is 
chosen. Of course, any permutation of the optimal screening process can be reordered 
from the strictest to easiest cutoff to provide the intuition of recall. Simon (1955) 
argues that an individual without full information of the situation might act in a way 
approximating the optimal procedure without carrying out the optimisation itself.
‘ W hen m otivated  as a screening process, X \  is the optim al choice if all projects fail th e  screen  
because it has failed the hardest test.
’In the house selling or secretary problem s, it would be trivial to  choose the best applicant if recall 
were perm itted , as the decision maker observes the exact offers (or quality).
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4.3 A sym m etric  Focus O n D ifferent P ro jects
Unlike the rest of this chapter, this section considers the case when the decision maker
can focus his attention on different projects; under the motivation of coarse communi­
cation this is represented by reallocating an agent, so that a single project is inspected 
more than once using different thresholds. This means that the possible realisations 
of utility for one project are partitioned more finely while for another, they are not 
partitioned at all.
C o n jec tu re  4.1 Asymmetric optimal partitioning consists of internal intervals which 
are not contained within an interval on another project. This implies that intervals 
must be spread as evenly as possible over the projects.
P roo f. Appendix A.5 sketches a proof that optimally no internal interval should 
lie strictly within the limits of an interval on another project. Appendix A . 6  sketches 
a proof that optimally, no internal interval should lie weakly within the limits of an 
interval on another project. This is done using general arguments to provide intu­
ition that extends to the case when intervals are spread over more than two projects. 
Therefore, where possible, intervals should overlap. ■
Conjecture 4.1 implies that the optimal asymmetric partitioning when k + N  inter­
vals are spread over N  projects must have the optimal structure illustrated in Figure
As illustrated in Figure 4.3 the requirement that internal intervals overlap means that 
intervals must be constructed in such a way that they are spread as evenly as possible 
over different projects. Therefore the solution in Proposition 4.2 when there are N  
and 2N  intervals is more generally optimal, as the expected error would increase if the 
decision maker left one project unpartitioned and partitioned another twice.
4.3.
F igu re  4.3: O p tim a l in terva l s tru ctu re
Conjecture 4.1 appears to contrasts with Fryer and Jackson (2004). In their model, 
a majority group is partitioned more finely and a minority group more coarsely. This 
result can be attributed to a difference in the cost structure of introducing additional
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intervals, as in their paper, individuals think through a limited number of categories. 
Considering the case of symmetric communication of Proposition 4.1, an additional 
category can be applied to any number of projects. In contrast, the motivation under­
lying Conjecture 4.1 is based on the precision of information acquisition in a screening 
process, represented by the total number of partitions; applying a single additional 
category to N  projects requires N  additional partitions. Within the framework of this 
thesis, their result that a majority group should be partitioned more finely is natural, 
as adding a category to the larger group means there are more additional partitions 
and therefore more information is communicated.
C hapter 5
Partially A sym m etric 
Com m unication w ith N  Options
Chapters Three and Four investigated the optimal screening (or communication) process 
in two extreme cases of fully symmetric and fully asymmetric communication. The lat­
ter case is complex and requires the decision maker to identify every agent uniquely and 
remember every different partition used. This chapter considers the partially asym­
metric case, between these extremes, where the decision maker can identify which 
group an agent (or project) is in. Continuing the analogy with the housing-selling 
problem developed in Chapter Four, this is the simultaneous equivalent of a heuristic 
proposed by Lee, O’Connor and Welsh (2006) to describe behaviour in an experimen­
tal secretary problem. They point out that " These sorts of heuristics seem likely to 
have complexity that lies somewhere between that of the biased optimal and (single) 
threshold heuristics. It may well be the case that human performance is best explained 
by an account that is more sophisticated than the (single) threshold heuristic, but does 
not have the full complexity of the biased optimal approach
One motivation for such a grouping is that the decision maker identifies each project 
by an economically irrelevant characteristic, and uses different thresholds for projects 
that are associated with different groups. The division into groups of different sizes is 
exogenous, and Conjecture 5.1 provides intuition relevant to this case. In the optimal 
partially asymmetric screen, projects in the majority group face a higher threshold 
but are chosen in preference to projects in the minority group in the decision stage. 
Conjecture 5.2 considers the case when groups are created endogenously. For exam­
ple, the decision maker could assign projects to be evaluated by relatively pessimistic
'Q u o ted  from Lee, M. D ., O ’Connor, T . A ., & W elsh, M. B (2006) "Human D ecision -M aking on  
the Full Inform ation Secretary Problem " page 6.
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accountants or optimistic marketing managers. 2 Alternatively, there could be a range 
of project characteristics on which to base a grouping, but for simplicity it is assumed 
that only two such groups are formed. Even though the decision maker could make 
the two groups equal in size, such a grouping is suboptimal; it is globally optimal to 
form majority and minority groups endogenously, and projects in the minority group 
have a lower probability of being chosen. These insights will be related to some models 
from the economic theory of discrimination, where the use of biased screening tests is 
typical. Not only does this analysis suggest that a biased screen might be optimal, but 
it also implies that this could lead to discrimination against a minority. For example, 
the intuitions developed in this chapter extend to the model of Cornell and Welch 
(1996), meaning that discrimination is optimal even without their assumption that 
the decision maker gets less accurate signals from the minority group .3 The analysis 
can also explain both discrimination and the responsiveness of callbacks to quality in 
field experiments in which fictitious resumes are submitted to companies,4 without 
requiring that there be any exogenous difference between individuals other than that 
they are identified with either a minority or majority group.
5.1 O ptim al P artia lly  A sym m etric  C om m unication
As in Chapters Three and Four the possible project utility values are identically, 
independently and uniformly distributed. Figure 5.1 shows how the projects (labelled 
Xi) are divided into two groups, B  (containing n projects) and A (containing m  = 
N  — n projects). Projects in group B  face a stricter screening threshold relative to 
those in group A , so threshold b > a. In the decision stage, good projects in group 
B  have a higher expected value than good projects in group A. The problem is to
maximise the expected value by choosing a, b and n optimally, where n is the number
of projects in group B. When the groups are given exogenously, n is chosen from just 
two alternatives (i.e. to make B  or A the majority group).
“It is assum ed the decision maker finds or trains su itab ly  op tim istic  or pessim istic  agents.
' T his literature will be discussed at the end of th is chapter.
'B ertrand and M ullainathan (2004) find ev idence o f d iscrim ination  by su bm ittin g  the sam e ficti­
tious resum es w ith either African Am erican or W hite  sounding nam es. T h is will be d iscussed  in more 
detail at the end of the chapter.
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F igu re  5.1: O p tim a l p a r tia lly  asym m etric- in terva ls  w h en  N = 6
In the following example there are N  projects split into two groups B  and A.
Group B: X& =  {Xi , ... , Xn} of n  projects
Group A: X a =  {Xn+i , ... , Xjv} of m  = N  — n projects
The event that all projects in group B  have low realisations is defined as X^; if 
some project in B  has a high realisation this is defined as the event X g . The event
that all projects in group A have low realisations is defined as Xj(; if some project in A
has a high realisation this is defined as the event X%. The probabilities and expected 
utility can be calculated conditional on the signal profiles resulting from these events 
and are shown in Table 5.1.
s Choice M axE[V  | s] Pr[s]
y ha b - y Ba b
1 + 6
2 1 -  bn
vL
a b , V " X H
1 +G 
2 bn [1 -  ani
X La b ■ X a a b
6
2 bnam
Table* 5.1: D eriv a tio n  o f  ex p e c te d value
Proposition  5.1 When the decision maker chooses between (n +  m) options divided 
into 2 groups, B  and A, optimal partially asymmetric communication consists of divid­
ing possible realisations of utility for projects in group B  into intei'vals {Xf j  , Xf j  j =  
{[0,6) , [6 , 1 ]} and for projects in group A, {X^ , X ^ }  =  {[0,a) , [a, 1]}. a and 6  
satisfy Equations 5.1 and 5.2.
Proof. Substituting the probabilities and conditional expectations in Table 5.1
into E[V] = J 2 E [V\s]  Pr [s] gives E[V) = \  [1 +  6  +  {a -  6 ) 6 n +  [6 -  1 -  a] 6 nam]. 
s
5. Partially A sym m etric C om m unication w ith  N  O ptions 39
Therefore:
f l _  o’" - ( a - 6 + 1 ) m a " - 1! = 0  (5.1)da 2
dE[V) b,n — 1
db
1
bn~1 b +  (a — 6 ) n +  bam — (a — 6  +  1 ) nar =  0 (5.2)
As n —► oo and m  —♦ oo, a —> 1 and 6  —► 1. An exact analytical solution is 
not possible because solving Equation 5.2 requires finding the root of a polynomial 
of degrec^fiv^or greater, for which no general solution exists. The problem is further 
complicated by the requirement that m  and n be integers. ■
An approximation for a and b when n and m  are large can be derived from Equa­
tions 5.1 and 5.2:
a «  [ra +  2]_ ™ (5.3)
b «  [n (1 — a) +  l]- ” ~  n +  1 — n[m  +  2}~™ " (5.4)
The conjectures in the remainder of this chapter can be demonstrated using such 
approximations. However, the approach taken is to use numerical methods to calculate 
the exact optimal values of a and b and motivate the ideas using examples. This is 
to demonstrate that it is the model, rather than the approximation, which leads to 
Conjectures 5.1 and 5.2, as expected errors will often be small. T he ideas in this 
chapter will be analysed num erically using the exam ple o f N  = 6, then  
illustrated for N  = 50. Finally Figures 5.5 and 5.7 will illustrate how the  
properties o f the optim al solutions depend on N.
Equations 5.1 and 5.2 require that 0 < n < N . l ( N  = n o i n  = 0 the optimisation 
problem reduces to the symmetric case, 0 giving a solution of either b =  (jg) N~l or 
a = ( ^ )  N~l respectively. When n = m  = 1 Equation 5.1 gives the first order condition 
b = 2a and Equation 5.2 gives the condition 2b = a + 1, so Proposition 5.1 generalises 
Proposition 3.4.
Exam ple 5.1 Projects can be identified as being in one of two exogenous groups B  
and A of sizes n = 4 and m  =  2 respectively. Optimal partially asymmetric com­
munication consists of dividing possible realisations of utility for projects in groups 
B and A into intervals {X ^  — {[0,0.7545) , [0.7545,1]} and { X ^  , A ^ }  =
'W hen n =  0 the problem  needs to  be respecified slightly as the payoff if all signals are low will be  
|  rather than
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{[0,0.5013) , [0.5013,1]} respectively. This solution, which is shown in Table 5.2, gen­
erates an expected error of 0.0513.
b a n ni V  e
0.7545 0.5013 4 2 0.8058 0.0513
Table  5 .2 : O p t i m a l  p a r t ia l l y  a s y m m e t r i c  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  w h e n  n = 4 a n d  m —2
It is straightforward to verify that the values of a, b, n and m  satisfy Equations 5.1 
and 5.2 in Proposition 5.1.
Figure 5.2 illustrates the solution in Table 5.2. The partially asymmetric optimal 
values of a = 0.5013 and b = 0.7545 are illustrated as dashed lines. The fully asym­
metric optimal interval boundaries, derived in Example 4.2, are denoted by squares.
b
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F igure 5.2: C om p arison  o f  a sy m m etr ic  am i p a r tia lly  a sy m m etr ic  c o m m u n ica tio n
Although in the optimal fully asymmetric case the labelling of projects is arbitrary, in 
Figure 5.2 the optimal partitions are ordered in descending strictness of the thresholds, 
ai, for comparison with the partially asymmetric case. The fully asymmetric optimal 
partitions are more spread out in group A  than group B  (Figure 5.4 illustrates this 
point more clearly when N  is larger).
E xam ple  5.2 Suppose that in Example 5.1 the decision maker chose the smaller group 
to face a stricter threshold, so the two groups B  and A are of sizes n = 2 and rn = 4. 
Optimal partially asymmetric communication consists of dividing possible realisations 
of utility for projects in group B into intervals {X g  , X ^ J  = {[0,0.7940) , [0.7940,1]} 
and for projects in group A, {X ^  , X% } =  {[0,0.6311) , [0.6311,1]}. This solution, 
which is reported in Table 5.3, generates an expected error of 0.0534.
b a n m V e
0.7940 0.6311 2 4 0.8038 0.0534
Tabic  5 .3 : O p t i m a l  p a r t ia l l y  a s y m m e t r i c  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  w h e n  n = 2 a n d  m = 4
It is straightforward to verify that the values of a, b, n and m  satisfy Equations 5.1 
and 5.2 in Proposition 5.1.
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A comparison of Examples 5.1 and 5.2 leads to two important observations. Firstly, 
even when a and b are adjusted to their optimal values, it is better to subject the larger 
group to the stricter threshold. In Example 5.1 the expected error is 4.1% lower than 
in Example 5.2. Secondly, b and a are both significantly larger in Example 5.2.
C o n jec tu re  5.1 When partitioning is based on projects being identified in one of two 
exogenous groups, it is better to partition the larger group using the higher threshold, b, 
and the smaller group using the lower threshold, a, providing n + m  > Afi I f  a project 
in group B  has a high realisation then it is chosen in preference to projects in group 
A in the decision stage.
Although Proposition 5.1 cannot be solved explicitly it is possible to illustrate that 
Conjecture 5.1 holds in approximation. However, as the errors in these problems are 
small, this thesis uses numerical methods to solve Equations 5.1 and 5.2 exactly. This 
section will proceed by introducing Example 5.3 and Conjecture 5.2, which is closely 
related to Conjecture 5.1. Both will be illustrated diagrammatically for the case where 
N  = 50 and the common motivation for the conjectures will be discussed.
E xam ple  5.3 Suppose that in Example 5.1 the decision maker was able to choose the 
grouping of the six projects endogenously, possibly based on different characteristics.1 
Given N  =  6 , the size of groups can be denoted by n and m  (m  =  N  — n), where 
the group of n projects faces the higher threshold b. The minimised expected error 
under optimal partially asymmetric communication when n  =  4 was calculated in 
Example 5.1 as E[e\ = 0.0513. When n = 2 Example 5.2 showed that minimised 
E  [e] = 0.0533. When n  =  0 or n  =  6  the optimal symmetric partition in Example 4.1 
gives E  [e] =  0.0660. Tabic 5.4 summarises these results and completes for the cases 
when n — 1, n = 3 and n = 5.
n 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
M in E  [ej 0.0660 0.0556 0.0534 0.0516 0.0513 0.0540 0.0660
Table  5 .4 . O p t i m a l  p a r t ia l l y  a s y m m e t r i c  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  w h en  n  is e n d o g e n o u s  f o r  N —6
For each value of n the optimal values of a and b (which are set optimally given n) 
are omitted to conserve space.
Example 5.3 can be used to illustrate Conjecture 5.1, that it is optimal to partition
the larger group using stricter thresholds, as Table 5.4 shows that when a and b are
set optimally, the minimised expected error is less when n = 5 (and therefore m  — 1)
''W hen the number o f projects is very sm all, m eaning n +  m  <  4, the chance of choosing a project 
in either group is relatively high and C onjectures 5.1 and 5.2 m ay not hold.
For sim plicity  it is assum ed th a t only tw o groups are formed.
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than when n = 1 (and rn = 5), and less when n = 4 than when n =  2.8 However, 
Example 5.3 also illustrates another interesting point. Setting n =  4 and rn =  2, 
leading to optimal partially asymmetric communication developed in Example 5.1, is 
actually optimal when n is endogenous. Therefore the expected error is less when 
there is a minority and a majority group than when both groups are of the same size 
(n =  m  =  3). So if groups are partitioned based on a single characteristic, it is optimal 
to choose a characteristic creating groups of different sizes. As with Conjecture 5.1, 
this holds generally providing n + m  > 4.
C o n jec tu re  5.2 When partitioning is based on N  projects being identified in one of 
two endogenously formed groups of sizes n and m, when N  > 4 it is better to use a 
characteristic so that group B  is larger than group A (where threshold b > a). I f  a 
signal in group B  is high then it is chosen in preference to projects in group A  in the 
decision stage.
Although Proposition 5.1 cannot be solved explicitly it is possible to illustrate that 
Conjecture 5.2 holds in approximation. However, as the error values in these problems 
are typically small, this thesis uses numerical methods to solve Equations 5.1 and 5.2 
exactly. Example 5.4 is equivalent to Example 5.3 for the case when N  = 50. The 
results are clearer graphically when N  is larger.
E xam ple  5.4 Given N  = 50 the size of groups A and B  can be denoted by n and 
rn = N  — n respectively, where group B  faces the higher threshold, b. Whether n is 
defined exogenously as in Conjecture 5.1 or endogenously as in Conjecture 5.2, expected 
error can be calculated conditional on n. For each value ofn,  Equations 5.1 and 5.2 can 
be used to calculate the optimal values of a and b which in turn are used to calculate the 
minimum expected error. Note that when n =  0 or n =  50 Proposition 4.1 shows that 
under optimal symmetric communication, expected error equals 0.0278. This provides 
an upper bound for the expected error once partial asymmetry is i n t r o d u c e d T h e  
minimum expected errors are illustrated in Figure 5.3.
8 As dem onstrated  in E xam ple 5/2.
'Partia lly  asym m etric com m unication  (or screening) could always achieve th is bound by se ttin g  
n =  rn.
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F igu re  5.3: M in im u m  e x p e c te d  error c o n d it io n a l on  n  w hen  N —50
The graph in Figure 5.3 shows the lower bound on expected error that occurs when 
a and b are set optimally. Conjectures 5.1 and 5.2 are represented by the skew in the 
graph. The skew means that for any given division of N  into groups N\ and N 2 , it is 
optimal to set n = max [N\, N 2 }. For example, Figure 5.3 shows that when N\ = 10, 
setting n =  10 gives an expected error of 0.0240 while setting n = 40 gives a lower 
expected error of 0.0200. The skew implies that this is true for any n < 25, illustrating 
Conjecture 5.1. Secondly, because of the skew, the global minimum expected error 
occurs when n = 34 and m  = 16 (rather than at n — y  =  25). This solution is shown 
in Table 5.4 and illustrated in Figure 5.4, and demonstrates Conjecture 5.2.
b a n m V e
0.9456 0.8346 34 16 0.9608 0.0196
T ab le  5.5: O p tim a l p a rtia lly  a sy m m e tr ic  co m m u n ic a tio n  w hen  n = 3 4  and m = 1 6
As in Figure 5.4, the optimal fully asymmetric partitions (shown as squares) are or­
dered in descending strictness of thresholds, a;, for comparison with the partially 
asymmetric case illustrated by the dashed lines at b = 0.9456 and a =  0.8346.
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F igu re 5.4: O p tim a l p a r tia lly  a sy m m e tr ic  co m m u n ica tio n  w hen  7V =50
Figure 5.4 shows firstly that the optimal group sizes are very different: group B  
contains more than twice as many projects as group A (n = 34 and m  = 16). Secondly, 
the fully asymmetric optimal partitions are more spread out in group A , so in a non­
technical sense a larger group B  and smaller group A is closer to the fully asymmetric 
optimal solution than if a minority faced the stricter screening threshold in group B.
The motivation underlying the optimal unequal division into groups is that when 
m  and n are large the chance of some project in group B  being chosen is approximately 
1 — bn ( 1  — am) while the chance of some project in group A being chosen is bn [1 — am], 
because as well as the difference between a and b, projects with a high realisation in 
group B  are chosen in preference to projects in group A. This is rational as in the 
decision stage the project with a realisation that exceeds the higher threshold has a 
greater expected value. In the optimum given in Table 5.5 and illustrated in Figure
5.4, even if the groups were rebalanced so that n =  rn =  25, with b =  0.9456 and 
a = 0.8346, the probability of choosing some project in group B  is 0.7557 while the 
probability of choosing a project in group A is only 0.2443.1()
Starting from the case in which the decision maker has N  options divided into 
two groups B  (containing n projects) and A  (containing m  projects), a useful thought 
experiment is to consider whether to allocate an additional project, labelled X g, into 
group B  or group A. Addition of X g to group B  increases the expected value to
10 If a and b were chosen optim ally  for the case where n  =  m  =  25 the probabilities of choosing  som e  
project in group B  or A  would be 0 .7440  and 0 .2556 respectively.
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in the case that X g is high while all other signals in group B  are low. This expected 
gain can be expressed: 11
1 + b
E[G b \ = Pr [X9h ] Pr [Xg] 
= { l - b ) b n ^1 + b
2
1 +  a
~ E [ V  | Xk]  
( 1  — a b r + 2a2  V 2
On the other hand, addition of X g to group A  increases the expected value to 
rather than |  when X g is high, but only if all signals in both groups are low. The 
expected gain can be expressed:
1 -f- a
E[ Ga] = P r [Xgff] Pr [Xg] Pr [Xj,]
1  -j- CL— ( 1  — a) bnaT
When the groups are of similar sizes (and n+ ra  > 4) and a and b are set optimally , 12 
the dominant effect is that an additional project in group B  adds value when all 
other signals in group B  are low, but allocating the project to group A  only increases 
expected value if all signals in both groups A  and B  are low. To some extent this is 
offset as the expected gain from allocating a project to group A  is greater conditional 
on it being chosen, and the chance of a project in group A  having a high realisation 
is greater than if it were allocated to group B. When n and m  are set optimally, 
these exactly offset the dominant effect. However, when n «  m, because a project 
which is rarely chosen adds little value, there is a correlation between the probability 
of choosing a project (which is higher in Group B) and the amount it adds to expected 
value. This is demonstrated in Example 5.5.
E xam ple  5.5 Consider the case when N  =  50 and n =  rn = 25. Optimally b - 
0.9484 and a = 0.8759 giving E  [V] = 0.9601 and E[e] = 0.0203. At these values, 
E \G b \ =  0.00073 while E[ Ga ] = 0.00056. This imbalance represents the fact that 
n =  rn = 25 is not a local optimum when n is endogenous. Increasing n so that n = 26 
and rn =  24 increases the expected value to E[V]  =  0.9602.
Although this chapter focuses on finding the global optimum, as n  is an integer 
there are often multiple local optima. For example, when N  = 6 , n =  rn =  3 is a local
11 It is possib le to show that se ttin g  E  [G s ]  =  E  [G.a] is equivalent to  m axim ising E  [K] in P roposition  
5.1 w ith respect to  n, which differentiates to  give dEj^  1 =  ~  [(a — b) In b -f [6 — 1 — a] a m In ( £ ) ] .
1JT his is required for the result that m ore projects should be allocated to  the group facing a higher 
threshold. For exam ple, if b =  1 or b =  0 then clearly all signals should be a llocated  to  group A,  
as screening in group B  is to ta lly  uninform ative. A lternatively, if a  =  b then d ivision into groups 
becom es irrelevant and it can be verified th a t E [ G b ] =  E [ G a ] =  ^-^-bN , which is independent o f n  
and m .
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optimum because given the optimal a = 0.5780 and b = 0.7728 it is not optimal to 
change n and m  (even though n = 4 and m  = 2 gives the unique global optimum). 
When N  = 50, the changes in a and b resulting from a unit change in n and m  is 
smaller and so n = m  = 25 is not a local optimum as shown in Example 5.5.
When N  = 6 , Example 5.3 showed that optimal endogenous choice of n was n = 4 
(and therefore m  = 2 ) which minimises expected error when a and b are set optimally, 
so the optimal proportion of projects in group B  was |  =  0.3333. When N  =  50 
the optimal solution was the minimum illustrated in Figure 5.4, where n = 34 and 
m =  16, so the optimal proportion of projects in group B  was 0.68. Figure 5.5 shows 
how this ratio varies depending on N.  As N  increases it is optimal to allocate an 
increasing proportion of projects to group B  (recalling that threshold b > a).
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F igu re 5.5: O p tim a l p ro p o rtio n  o f p ro jec ts  in group B
Figure 5.5 supports the intuition underlying Conjecture 5.2. When N  and hence rn is 
small, an additional project has a reasonable chance of being chosen in either group 
when n ss m, but as N  and therefore m  increases, the probability that all projects 
in group A have low realisations becomes sufficiently small that the project is better 
allocated to group B.
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5.2 A nalysis o f  O ptim al P artia lly  A sym m etric  Screen ing
This section begins with the conjecture that whether groups are formed exogenously 
(as in Conjecture 5.1) or endogenously (as in Conjecture 5.2), projects in the majority 
group have a higher probability of being chosen a priori when a and b are set optimally. 
Using the screening motivation, this is because although projects in the majority group 
are subjected to a tougher test, passing means that they are more likely to be chosen 
in the decision stage. Projects in the minority group face an easier test, but even if 
they pass, they may be rejected in favour of a member of the majority group which 
has passed a tougher test and therefore has a higher expected realisation. This is 
demonstrated in Example 5.6 for the case when N  = 6  and Figure 5.7 will illustrate 
that this result holds for all values of N  > 4 when n is endogenous.
P ro p o sitio n  5.2 Consider when N  projects are divided into two groups B  (containing 
n projects) and A (containing m  projects) where projects in each group are partitioned 
using thresholds b and a (where b > a) respectively. The a priori probability of a specific 
project in either group being chosen is illustrated in Table 5.6. It is assumed that when 
indifferent at the decision stage, the decision maker randomises between projects, 13
C o n jec tu re  5.3 Under optimal partially asymmetric communication, where a and b 
are set optimally and n > m, projects in group B , which face the higher threshold b, 
have a greater probability of being chosen a priori than projects in group A.
Conjecture 5.3 is illustrated in Example 5.6 for the case when N  = 6 , using the 
probabilities derived in Proposition 5.2.
E xam ple  5.6 Consider the case when N  =  6  The probabilities of a project being 
chosen conditional on it being in the majority group (B) or the minority group (A) 
are listed in Table 5.7 and illustrated in Figure 5.6. They are calculated using the 
optimal partially asymmetric solution when N  =  6  given in Table 5.2. It is assumed 
that when the decision maker is indifferent between projects at the decision stage he
11 T he decision maker m ay random ise betw een two projects in group B  if both  signal high realisations, 
but is never indifferent betw een a project in group A  and one in group B .
Unbiased Case Xi E X B (Group B ) Xi G X a (Group A)
Pr (Xi chosen \ Xi high,) 
P r (Xi chosen 
Pr (Xi chc
— a )  L J m ( 1 —jh ) bn [i -  “ml
Table  5 .6 : P r o b a b i l i ty  a p r o je c t  is c h o s e n  c o n d i t i o n a l  on  g r oup  a n d  rea l i sa t ion
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randomises between them.
Unbiased Case Xi € X b  (Group B ) X{ £ X a (Group A) 
Pr (Xi chosen \ X t highj 0.4889 0.6883 0.2433
Pr (X{ chosen \ X i lowj 0.0278 0.0270 0
Pr (X t chosen) ± 0.1893 0.1213
Tabic  5 .7 : P ro b a b i l i t y  o f  a p r o jec t  being  c h o s e n  w h e n  7V =6
The probability of a player in either group A  or group B  being chosen can be 
analysed relative to the benchmark of symmetric communication. This is a comparison 
of optimal partially asymmetric communication in Table 5.2, where a = 0.5013 and 
b =  0.7545, and optimal symmetric communication in Example 4.1, where a =  0.6988.
Figure 5.6 illustrates the probability of a project in group B  (upper diagram) 
or group A  (lower diagram) being chosen conditional on its realisation, shown on 
the x  axes. The vertical dashed line illustrates the optimal symmetric partition at 
a = 0.6988, and the horizontal dashed lines show the probability of a project being 
chosen conditional on its realisation in the symmetric case. The solid black lines 
illustrate the probability a project is chosen conditional on its realisation in the optimal 
partially asymmetric case. The probabilities illustrated are given in Table 5.7.
Pr(X. Chosen) 
Group B
 — ►
b xh
Pr(X, Chosen) 
Group A
Xa
F igu re  5.6: T h e  a d v a n ta g e  o f  b e in g  in th e  m a jo rity  group
5. Partially A sym m etric Com m unication w ith  TV Options 49
As discussed at the start of this section, in the optimal partially asymmetric case a 
project in the minority group A  faces a less strict screening threshold, but is only 
chosen in the decision stage if all signals in group B  are low. Therefore compared to 
the symmetric case, projects with high realisations in group B  are more likely to be 
chosen, while projects with high realisations in group A  are less likely to be chosen. 
However, not all realisations in group B  are more likely to be chosen under asymmetry; 
in the range [a, 6 ), as the threshold b becomes higher, realisations will move from a 
high interval to a low interval. Conversely, in the range [a, a) projects in group A  are 
more likely to be chosen than under symmetric screening, as the threshold a has fallen. 
However, the a priori chance of a specific project being chosen is higher for projects 
in group B  as the increased chance of being chosen in the decision stage outweighs the 
lower probability that the realisation is high. In Example 5.6 the a priori probability of 
a project being chosen is 0.1893 if it is in group B  but only 0.1213 if it is in the smaller 
group A, compared to a common probability of 0.1667 under symmetric screening.
In addition, for projects in group B , moving from a low to a high realisation 
increases the probability of being chosen by 0.6613, while moving from a low to a high 
realisation for projects in group A  only increases the chance that a specific project is 
chosen by 0.2433. In a model with error (which smooths the probabilities) the returns 
to having a higher realisation are greater for projects in the majority group. This result 
is important and will be discussed in relation to resume studies and the economics of 
discrimination at the end of this chapter.
Figure 5.7 shows the probability of a project being chosen conditional of whether 
it is in group A  or B  in the partially asymmetric case compared to symmetric com­
munication for values of TV other than TV =  6 . It is assumed in this figure that n, a 
and 6  are set optimally given TV.
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Figure 5.7 illustrates that the a priori chance of a specific project being chosen is 
always higher for projects in group B , the group facing the stricter screening threshold, 
therefore Conjecture 5.3 holds generally when n is chosen endogenously. In addition, 
as N  becomes larger the difference in the probability of being selected (between groups 
A and B) remains relatively significant, although the probability of a specific project 
in group B  being chosen becomes closer to the symmetric case. This is because an 
increasing proportion of projects are allocated to group B , as illustrated in Figure 5.5.
5.3 D iscussion
The contribution of this chapter is to show that within a class of screening processes, 
it is optimal to introduce asymmetry in a manner that reduces the a priori probability 
that a project in a minority group is chosen. In the economics of discrimination it is 
typical for a single individual to perform the screen; this model could be interpreted 
as an optimal boundedly rational screening process which motivates the automaticity 
of discrimination when there are information acquisition constraints (a closely related 
automatic discriminatory process based on optimal category formation is developed in 
Fryer and Jackson, 2004). This is optimal despite there being no economic difference 
between the groups. Although the characteristic used to group individuals is arbitrary, 
race is perhaps focal as an identification measure and becomes available early in the 
search process when a screening procedure (rather than pairwise comparisons) and 
coarse information are best motivated. This links the analysis in this chapter to 
recent studies of resume screening, in which fictitious resumes are submitted to firms, 
while the names of candidates, which indicate their cultural background, are varied.
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Discrimination is defined as allowing a member of a minority group to be treated 
differently from a member of the majority despite them having identical characteris­
tics. There are two main competitive approaches to the economics of discrimination . 1 1 
The first is taste-based discrimination, which has limited relevance to this thesis. For­
malised by Becker (1957), this allows discrimination coefficients to enter the utility 
functions of firms, other employees or customers. This faces two main criticisms: firstly 
it assumes discrimination rather than explaining it, and once it is assumed that firms 
do not maximise profits it is necessary to question why they do not include factors such 
as growth or effort in their optimisation problems. Secondly, discrimination in these 
models is costly, so discriminating firms would not survive under perfect competition . 10
A second approach to explaining discrimination is statistical discrimination. This 
may occur when an employer has imperfect information about the productivity of a 
worker, and uses ethnic stereotypes to minimise the information costs involved in hir­
ing decisions. 10 For example, if there is a correlation between racial characteristics 
and unobserved elements of productivity, then an optimising firm would use the racial 
characteristics in the hiring process (Arrow, 1973). Unlike taste-based discrimination, 
in this case it is the firms which do not discriminate that lose out. Statistical dis­
crimination was originally motivated in racially biased hiring by Phelps (1972) in a 
model which was developed by Aigner and Cain (1977), who argue that if a minority 
group has a noisier signal of productivity (in testing), then the productivity of an in­
dividual worker would be judged more on group characteristics, lowering the return to 
investment in human capital, including unobservable work skills. Lundberg and Startz 
(1983) incorporate human capital investment explicitly in a model where employers 
are able to assess the productivity of a minority group less accurately. They show 
that a separating equilibrium can arise in which discrimination can persist even in a 
competitive situation.
Therefore as well as the cast' when productivity differs across groups, statistical 
discrimination can occur if signals of productivity art' less informative for a minority 
group, due to less accurate testing, or if members of the minority group underperform 
in testing. In contrast, the model presented in this thesis shows that discrimination 
could arise even when there are no exogenous differences between members of the
1'T hese are also collective exp lanations where cartels form. Firstly, these could be constructed  so 
that a m inority gains, and secondly, it is hard to  im agine m illions of people w ith different incentives 
and lifestyles forming a single tacit cartel.
1 ‘ If firms have market power they could d iscrim inate indefinitely but em pirically there is little  
evidence that m onopolies and oligopolies d iscrim inate more. B esides, m inorities could sim ply work in 
com petitive  industries.
"'It is assum ed that there is som e sunk cost involved in hiring, so a costly  search process is worth­
while.
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minority or majority group, other than the size of the group with which they are 
identified. At this point it is important to make a distinction between discrimination, 
which can be supported as a separating equilibrium of a search or signalling problem 
with multiple equilibria, and minority discrimination, where discrimination is against 
a minority group specifically. While a model of coordination failure is theoretically 
appealing, as it does not require exogenous assumptions on how groups differ, unlike 
the model presented in this thesis, it cannot explain why it is not the majority who is 
discriminated against.
The analysis presented in this thesis applies directly to a model developed by Cor­
nell and Welch (1996), who also focus on discrimination in hiring rather than wages. 
In their model each worker has an identically, independently distributed quality. Firms 
observe binary signals which are correlated with the quality of a worker. Specifically 
quality, Q, is uniformly distributed over [0,1] and the probability of a high signal is 
Q and a low signal 1 — Q. They assume that an interviewer gets additional signals 
if the worker is from the same cultural background. There is a higher variance in 
the conditional quality distribution of workers from the same background , 17 making it 
more likely that a worker from the same background is chosen. Although there are no 
a priori productivity differences between groups, there are differences in the informa­
tion structure. In this situation, bias screening18 would be optimal and would favour 
a majority, so discrimination would be optimal even without Cornell and Welch’s 
assumption that the information structure differs between groups.
This approach can be contrasted to Fryer and Jackson (2004) who argue that 
bias arises when individuals form categories, which minimise the sum of within group 
variation in a broader context than the economic decision at hand. This means that 
less frequent observations tend to be grouped more coarsely and so the categories 
containing them are more heterogeneous. 19 They give an example in which workers 
are divided on two dimensions: each is either Good or Bad and Black or White. When 
grouped using three categories, if the number of Black workers is relatively small, the 
categories which minimise the sum of within category variation are Good White, Bad 
White and Black. In an economic decision, categorising groups in this way leads to 
Good White workers being preferred to Black workers as pooling Good Black workers 
with Bad Black workers creates an average expected marginal productivity.
Fewer signals for the m inority group m ean that expected  quality dev iates less from the prior.
'*B ias could be introduced in the m anner of C alvert (1985), which was discussed in C hapter Three.
1!,T his contrasts w ith Cornell and W elch (1996) if society  is even ly m ixed, as m em bers of a m inority  
group would also partition  the m ajority group m ore finely. If there is a degree o f segregation, m inority  
individuals in Fryer and Jackson (2004) m ight group those from their own background m ore finely.
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The outcome and implications of the model in this thesis and Fryer and Jackson’s 
are very similar, as in both cases good minority workers face less strict thresholds than 
the majority group . 20 Therefore average workers are categorised with excellent workers 
amongst the minority, reducing the expected utility from choosing an individual with 
a good signal, so an individual from the majority group with a good signal would be 
chosen in preference.
Despite these similarities, the model presented in this thesis differs from those 
presented in Cornell and Welch (1996) and Fryer and Jackson (2004) in two important 
aspects. Firstly, minority discrimination is explained entirely within the economic 
sphere, without differences arising due to difficulties with cross-cultural communication 
or it being desirable to categorise non-economic characteristics differently. Secondly in 
these papers, screening of minority groups is assumed to be coarser (or less accurate). 
In contrast, Conjecture 4.1 argued that for a given number of partitions, it is optimal 
to spread them as evenly as possible across projects. This can be interpreted as giving 
the same attention to each applicant (of both minority and majority groups). The 
type of bias that is optimal in the screening process described in this thesis is to bias 
the cutoff productivity levels directly rather than biasing the accuracy of the tests 
between groups. In resume screening however, it is hard to imagine why resumes 
would be grouped less coarsely or be less accurate for a minority group.
Although this is not intended as an applied thesis, it is closely related to some 
recent interesting empirical results on resume screening, which are particularly relevant 
as both coarse signals and screening are best motivated early in the search process. 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) study racial discrimination in US labour markets by 
submitting fictitious resumes to companies. Resumes are randomly assigned an African 
American or White sounding name, and they find that White sounding names receive 
50% more callbacks for interview, a result that persists across occupation, industry 
and employer size. In addition, they found that callbacks are also more responsive to 
resume quality for White names than African American names, and the gap is largest 
for those with high skill or education levels. Both of these facts are consistent with the 
model presented in this chapter: the probability of being hired increases more for high 
quality members in the majority group than in the minority group, and the difference 
between the probability of being selected is greater between high quality workers in 
the minority and majority groups than it is for low quality workers.
20T he reasoning behind th is outcom e is different however: in the latter case, th is is because th ey  do 
not face a threshold at all.
C hapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis investigated how a decision maker might optimally screen projects to max­
imise expected utility. In Chapter Three the screening heuristic was introduced as 
a coarse communication mechanism, where separate agents had private information 
which they summarised truthfully into simple recommendations for the decision maker. 
More generally, screening was motivated early in a search process, where information 
acquisition constraints lead to coarse information and it is not yet optimal to use a 
more accurate but costly procedure involving sequential search or pairwise compar­
isons.
Chapter Three showed that when choosing between two options, using different 
thresholds to partition possible realisations of utility minimises the cost of errors in 
the decision stage. Proposition 3.2 demonstrated that introducing a small bias into a 
symmetric case leads to a first order gain and only a second order loss. The optimality 
of introducing bias is expected to hold generally for unimodal continuous distributions 
of project value. These include those in which interval sets are fuzzy, so there is a 
chance that realisations close to the threshold lead to the wrong signal, and a broad 
class of models where the coarse signal is positively correlated with underlying utility 
or quality, but may involve errors.
Proposition 4.2 showed that optimal fully asymmetric screening (or communica­
tion) in the case of N  projects is similar to a sequential search without recall, such 
as the house selling problem described by Simon (1955). However, as well as requir­
ing complex calculation to implement, the decision maker must identify every project 
uniquely and remember the threshold used for every different screen. Therefore Chap­
ter Five investigated partially asymmetric screening, where the decision maker uses 
an exogenous characteristic to identify projects, and applies the same threshold to 
screen all projects within a group. It showed that it is optimal to make the screening
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threshold lower for the minority group, but a project in the majority group, which 
passes a higher threshold, is chosen in preference to those in the minority group in the 
decision stage. When the decision maker has a range of characteristics with which to 
group projects, it is optimal to create a majority and minority rather than two groups 
of equal sizes. Under optimal partially asymmetric screening, projects in the majority 
group have a higher chance of being chosen a priori.
These intuitions were discussed in relation to the biased screening models in the 
literature on the economics of discrimination. This part of the thesis provided a mo­
tivation for discrimination without exogenous economic differences between groups. 
In addition, it can explain minority discrimination, where discrimination is against 
a minority group specifically, as opposed a separating equilibrium in a search or sig­
nalling problem with multiple equilibria, in which the majority could just as easily 
face discrimination. As an example, the intuitions developed in Chapter Five extend 
to the model of Cornell and Welch (1996), meaning that discrimination would be op­
timal even without their assumption that the decision maker gets less accurate signals 
from a minority group. A numerical analysis confirms that under this information 
structure, biasing the testing process is optimal and a minority group faces a lower 
chance of being chosen a priori.
A promising extension of this analysis would be for the decision maker to choose 
more than one project, so the screening process occurs early in a search and is fol­
lowed by a more accurate (but costly) sequential search or pairwise comparison. The 
utility function at the end of the screening process could be the expected sum of the 
valuations of the chosen projects, the expected maximum, or an endogenous function 
depending on the optimal search procedure after the initial screen. Such a heuris­
tic could approximate some suggested models of consumer search. A simple numerical 
analysis suggests biased screening can be optimal in some of these situations, although 
a formal analysis would depend on the relative processing costs of screening and search 
which is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Given that screening models, and specifically bias screening models, are often as­
sumed in the literature of the economics of discrimination, it is surprising that little 
work has been done to investigate whether this bias could result from optimisation 
without assuming exogenous differences between the groups. As well as demonstrat­
ing the optimality of asymmetry in a class of screening or communication problems, 
this thesis has shown that discrimination against a minority can arise endogenously as 
part of an optimal screening process.
Part II
Endogenous Analogy Classes
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C hapter 7 
Introduction
An analogy-based expectations equilibrium (Jehiel, 2005) involves players bundling 
nodes at which their opponents move into analogy classes, and forming expectations 
that the opponents behave in the same way within each class. At every node players 
choose a best response to their beliefs, and expectations are consistent with the average 
behaviour within an analogy class. This thesis aims to refine this approach, restricting 
the range of behaviour a player will group in a robust analogy class. The underlying 
motivation for refinement is that players form their analogy classes endogenously after 
observing past histories of the game. The thesis will argue that players are more likely 
to form analogies over nodes in which the opponent’s behaviour is similar, and when 
suboptimal actions would not be very costly.
While these ideas could be applied to an analogy-based expectations equilibrium of 
any game, this thesis focuses on a class of games with finite horizon problems. These 
are timing games with complete and perfect information, such as Rosenthal’s (1981) 
Centipede game, in which players take turns to move and receive payoffs which increase 
over time, until one player takes, ending the game.1 There is a trade off between a 
player taking first and receiving a larger share of the current total, and passing, which 
could lead to a larger payout in the future if the opponent also passes. McKelvey and 
Palfrey (1992) show that in an experiment, players do indeed pass for some period of 
time, even though this class of games has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, which 
is solvable by backwards induction, in which players take at every node. This would 
mean that the game ends at the first node and both players receive a low payoff. In 
the class of games considered, the analogy approach is particularly relevant because 
the decision faced by the opponent at each node is very similar. More generally, 
the problem facing a player would be very simple in these games if he was aware
'C hap ter E ight gives a detailed  description o f the class o f gam es considered. F igures 2.2  and 2.3  
provide exam ples.
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of his opponent’s strategy. The complexity arises because the opponent’s strategy is 
unknown, and therefore focusing on a method which simplifies beliefs directly, rather 
than simplifying strategies, seems particularly appropriate.
Chapter Nine will discuss the analogy based expectations equilibrium and apply it 
to the class of games described in Chapter Eight. It will relate the existence of analogy 
based-expectations equilibria involving passing to parameters which specify the length 
and payoff structure of the game. Even when the unique pure strategy equilibrium is 
that in which players always take, some games still have a mixed strategy equilibrium 
in which passing occurs. The mixed strategy analogy-based expectations equilibria 
which are developed in Chapter Nine are not unique. In fact there is a continuum of 
such equilibria, even when players form analogies over just two nodes. Introducing the 
idea of robustness serves a joint purpose, reducing the set of mixed strategy equilibria 
and formally capturing the idea that players form their analogy classes endogenously.
Chapter Ten will introduce parameters to measure the robustness of analogy classes. 
It will argue that players are less likely to form analogy classes over nodes in which the 
opponent’s behaviour is very different, and form analogies more carefully when sub- 
optimal actions could prove very costly. These motivations lead to two approaches. 
Firstly, refinement could be based on restricting the variation of behaviour permitted 
within an analogy class. This is based on the consistency between a player’s analogy- 
based expectations and the beliefs he would hold if the analogy class was as fine as 
possible.2 An alternative approach is to measure the suboptimality of a player’s ac­
tions resulting from an analogy class. Although these approaches are quite separate 
(and have different domains) it will be shown that they are closely related and lead 
to very similar restrictions on behavioural strategies. Applying the refinements to the 
analogy classes developed in Chapter Nine leads to insights of how the robustness of 
an analogy class depends on the payoff structure and length of the game. In addition, 
mixed strategy analogy equilibria are dramatically more robust than pure strategy 
equilibria involving passing. For example, a pure strategy equilibrium in the Cen­
tipede game may need an analogy to be formed over 333 turns to be as robust as a 
mixed strategy equilibrium formed over just 4 turns. This is because in any analogy- 
based expectations equilibrium involving only pure strategies, one of the players must 
observe his opponent taking at a node in which he expected the opponent to pass 
with high probability.3 As well as being inconsistent with his analogies, in a game 
such as the Doubling Dollar game, illustrated in Figure 8.3, this leads to a payoff of
"These equal the o p p on en t’s actual behavioural strategies.
"’E xcept in the unique subgam e perfect N ash equilibrium .
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zero. Although mixed strategy equilibria also involve one of the players taking with 
certainty at some point, this node is observed with a much lower frequency.
Chapter Eleven will discuss extending the approach developed in Chapter Ten to 
the case when players have multiple analogy classes. For a given level of sophistica­
tion, a repeated game with many nodes has multiple combinations of robust analogy 
classes, which could be thought as representing different degrees of coordination be­
tween the players. For example, the most collusive game involves players passing for 
a long period, followed by a short period of mixing at the end of the game. The least 
collusive game is the subgame-perfect equilibrium. The approach proposed in this the­
sis provides an intuitive solution to the finite horizon problem: an equilibrium consists 
of players passing for a given number of nodes and then mixing towards the end of 
the game. As well as placing a bound on the most collusive analogy class for a given 
level of sophistication, the model provides some restrictions on the structure and size 
of the analogy classes which can be formed, and the type of behaviour which might be 
expected within a mixed strategy analogy class in equilibrium. Chapter Eleven will 
also propose a generalisation of the analogy-based expectation equilibrium concept by 
incorporating robustness in the requirement for consistency.
In Chapter Twelve a number of other models of bounded rationality have been 
used to explain why the subgame-perfect equilibrium in finite horizon problems might 
not arise. Rubinstein (1998) provides a general discussion of the machine game ap­
proach to solving finite horizon problems, based on the intuition is that the complexity 
of a strategy can be represented by the number of states needed to implement it, so 
boundedly rational players may use simple strategies such as always pass. Kreps et 
al. (1982) show that long periods of passing can be sustained in the finitely repeated 
prisoner’s dilemma under incomplete information. This approach can be used to gen­
erate passing in the Centipede game when there is a small probability that player 2 
is a cooperative type. Naturally the approach taken in this thesis closely follows Jehiel 
(2005), which introduces the analogy-based expectations equilibrium and applies it to 
a broader range of games. The contribution of this thesis is to endogenise the forma­
tion of analogy classes within a specific class of games, and use this to motivate the 
importance of mixing analogies in finite horizon problems. Other approaches which 
will be discussed in Chapter Twelve include McKelvey and Palfrey’s (1998) quantal 
response equilibrium, Radner’s (1980) notion of perfect e equilibrium and models of 
reciprocity (Rabin, 1993) and machine learning (Ponti, 2000).
C hapter 8
A Generalised C entipede Game
The aim of this chapter is to present the class of game that is analysed formally in 
this thesis. These are finite games of complete and perfect information in which two 
players 2 = 1 , 2  move at alternate nodes, which are indexed by X n the node where 
player i gets to move for the n th  time. Player 1 moves in the first node, X \^  and in 
the subsequent N  nodes indexed by X n^- Player 2 moves in the N  nodes indexed by 
X n£, so there is a finite number of nodes in the supergame equal to 2N . At each node 
there are two actions available to each player denoted by a =  {pass, take}. If a player 
i passes at node X n ,i the game continues to the next node in which it is player jf’s turn 
to move. If player 1 takes at node Xn>i the game ends. Player 1 receives a vNM utility 
payoff of A n,\ and player 2 receives a payoff of B n ,2-  If player 2 takes at node X n ,2 
the game ends, with players 1 and 2 receiving utilities of A ny2 and B n ,2 respectively. 
If player 2 passes in the final turn X ^ ^  the game ends and players 1 and 2 receive 
payoffs of AjV+1i and Bj^ + 1 1  respectively. Such a game is illustrated in Figure 8.1.
2 A n+i
B n+i
A..,
B1.1
A  1,2 
B  1,2
A2.,
B 2 .
A2.2
B 2 2
An., 
Bn. I
A n .2
B n ,2
An, 
Bn, 1
A n.:
Bn,;
F igu re  8.1: A G en era lised  C en tip ed e  G am e
It is assumed that payoffs satisfy Equations 8.1 and 8.2 where appropriate:
A i+ 1,1 >  AUj 1 >  2 >  An-i^ V n
B n + 1,2 B n 2  ^  B n>\  V 71
(8 .1)
(8 .2 )
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This creates conflicting incentives. As An+i i > A ny\, player 1 has an incentive to pass 
at node X Uyi if he expects player 2 to pass at node X n If player 1 expects player 2  to 
take at node X n^, then the optimal response is to take first in node An i, preempting 
player 2, because A n \ > A n 2 - The same incentives apply for player 2 at nodes in 
which he moves. Behavioural strategies for the game are defined as follows: at node 
X Hyi, the node where player 1 moves for the nth time, he takes with probability pn and 
passes with probability ( 1  — pn). At node X ny2 , the node where player 2 moves for the 
nth time, he takes with probability qn and passes with probability (1 — qn). Therefore 
a full behavioural strategy profile for player 1 is defined p = {pi, p2 , ...pn, - P n } ,  and 
for player 2, q = {<71, <72,■■■qn, - Qn } -  The history h (An i) conditional on reaching node 
Xny\ is simply that players have passed in all previous nodes.
Despite the conflict in incentives, this class of games has a unique subgame- 
perfect equilibrium in which players take at all nodes, meaning p = { l , l , . . . l , . . . l }  
and q = {1,1, ...1, ...1}. In this case players receive payoffs of A \y 1 and B \y\ even if 
the gain from taking is small and the benefit from passing large, as in the Centipede 
game illustrated in Figure 8.2. As the game has complete and perfect information, it 
is solvable by backwards induction. In the final node X n ,2 , player 2’s strategy is to 
take as B ^ y2  > ^/v,i- Knowledge of player 2’s rationality allows player 1 to predict 
that 2 takes at node Ayv,2> and therefore player 1 chooses a best response, to take at 
node Ayv,i- Player 2 knows that player 1 is rational and in addition, that player 1 
knows that player 2 himself is rational, so the best response at node A ;v -i ,2 is also to 
take. Increasing orders of knowledge of rationality allow players to predict that their 
opponent takes in all future nodes, meaning this procedure can be iterated backwards, 
generating the unique solution in which players take at every node. Such a process 
corresponds to the iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies. As well as be­
ing the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, the outcome in which player 1 takes in 
node X \y\ and players 1 and 2 receive payoffs of A \y\ and B \ \  is also the unique Nash 
equilibrium outcome.
This thesis applies the analogy class approach to a subset of such timing games, 
where the problem faced by players is similar at every node. The assumption is that 
payoffs at node X n + \  ^ are a constant linear transformation of the payoffs at node X Uyi ,  
so that where appropriate Equations 8.3 and 8.4 hold.1
Afi-\-\yi — fa “I- AAfiyi V 71 , i 
B n+i,i — ^  ■(■ ABu i V n, i
(8.3)
(8.4)
E quations 8.1 and 8.2 m ust still hold. If the gam e is norm alised (see D efinition 8.1) th is m eans // 
and A are positive  constan ts w ith /z +  A >  1.
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Firstly, note that the parameters p  and A encompass a large range of timing games. 
For example, setting p = 1 and A =  1 gives Rosenthal’s (1981) specification of the 
Centipede game which is illustrated in Figure 8.2, and setting p =  0 and A =  2 gives 
the Doubling Dollar game illustrated in Figure 8.3. Alternative specifications give the 
games used empirically by McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) and in theoretical learning 
models by Ponti (2000). Secondly, the analogy class approach is particularly well 
motivated when the problem faced at different nodes is similar, as it is more reasonable 
for a player to expect his opponent to behave in the same way. Such payoffs could 
be motivated if the supergame represents the reduced form of an underlying, finitely 
repeated game in which payments axe accrued continually during the game. Thirdly, 
by introducing these parameters, it is possible to consider comparative statics for a 
class of games. A acts as a scaling effect, determining whether the gain from being the 
player to take increases (if A > 1) or decreases (if A < 1) as the game progresses, p  has 
an additive effect, increasing payoffs by the same amount regardless of which player 
takes. 2  This assumption simplifies the concepts underlying the analogy class approach 
in Centipede-like games. However, the ideas for refinement extend much more broadly, 
and these will be discussed in Chapter Eleven.
The approach taken in this thesis is to motivate ideas using the Centipede and 
Doubling Dollar games illustrated in Figures 8.2 and 8.3 respectively. Intuitions about 
the existence and robustness of equilibria are then extended to games with parameters 
p and A. It is useful to normalise these other games, so that they can be specified fully 
in terms of p and A. Such a normalisation is proposed in Definition 8.1.
D efin ition  8.1 N orm a lisa tio n : The game illustrated in Figure 8.1 in which payoffs 
satisfy Equations 8.3 and 8.4 can be normalised by applying the same linear transfor­
mation of utility to player i ’s payoffs at all nodes so A\^\ =  1 and =  B\ \ =  0.3
The first game considered is the Centipede game (Rosenthal, 1981) in which p = 1 
and A =  1. This is illustrated in Figure 8.2 for the case when N  =  4 (each player 
moves 4 times so there is a total of 8 nodes).4
"For exam ple, increasing fx for player 1 will increase the payoffs A n,\ and A n ,2 by the sam e am ount.
' N ote th at norm alisation does not  m ean that B  1,2  — 1- T his will not affect the analogy equilibrium  
nor the proposed refinem ents, and for sim plicity, creating a degree of sym m etry betw een the players 
m eans that B \ , 2  =  ^ 2,1 =  p  +
'N o te  th at the C entipede and D oubling Dollar gam es illustrated  in F igures 2.2 and 2 .3  respectively  
are not norm alised. To norm alise the C entipede gam e is is necessary to subtract 1 from all of player 2 ’s 
payoffs B n,i■ To norm alise the D oubling D ollar gam e all o f player 2 ’s payoffs, B n,i, m ust be doubled. 
N orm alisation is not necessary for these  gam es, as it is carried out im plic itly  in the refinem ent concept.
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1 0 2 1 3 2 4 3
1 3 2 4 3 5 4 6
F ig u re  8.2: T h e  C en tip ed e  G am e w h en  N —A
The second game considered is the Doubling Dollar game (similar to the Dollar Game 
proposed in Reny, 1993) where p  =  0 and A =  2. This is illustrated in Figure 8.3 for 
the case when N  =  4 (each player moves 4 times).
16
0
1 0 2 0 4 0 8 0
0 1 0 2 0 4 0 8
F igu re  8.3: T h e  D o u b lin g  D ollar  G am e w hen  N —A
For any payoffs satisfying Equations 8.1 and 8.2, behavioural strategies exist which 
leave the opponent indifferent between mixing and passing at any node, because 
An+1,1 > AUi\ > A U t 2  implies that A np can be expressed as a convex combination 
of An+i i and A n In the games considered in the main part of this thesis, which 
also satisfy Equations 8.3 and 8.4, the utility payoff at node i is a constant linear 
transformation of the payoff at node X n^. This implies that A nj  can be expressed as 
the same convex combination of A n+1,1 and A Ut2 , and therefore the same behavioural 
strategy at all nodes for player i leaves player j  indifferent at every node. This is 
demonstrated in Proposition 8.1.
P ro p o sitio n  8.1 The assumption that payoffs at node X n+\^ are a constant lin­
ear transformation of the payoffs at node X n, i f  whenever applicable, is sufficient 
but not necessary for the existence of behavioural strategies p =  [p, p , ..., p } and 
Q = {Qi T  ■■> q} which leave the opponent indifferent between passing and taking at 
every node (except for player 2 in the final node, X ^ ,2 )-
5In other words, th a t E quations 2.3 and 2.4  hold.
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P roof. Indifference for player 1 at node X N;1 implies that
Apft\ =  qAu, 2 +  (1 — <7Mjv+i,i (8.5)
An+i,i — An, i 
A/v+i,i -  A N , 2
( f i  +  AAa^i) — ( p  +  AAjy-1,1) __ A n , i  — A n - i , i  
( / x  +  A A w . i )  — ( p  +  A  A y v —i  , i )  — A j v - 1 , 1
A n -1,1 = qA n -1,2 +  (1 —  q) A n ,i (8 -6)
Therefore player 1 is also indifferent at the previous node X n -i ,i-  Repeating this 
process implies that A n,\ = qA n , 2  +  (1 — q)An + for all 1 < n < N  and by symmetry 
that B n , 2  =  pBn,i +  (1 —p)Bn+i, 2  for all 1 < n < N  — 1. In the final node X n , 2 , player 
2 is never indifferent (as he is not responding to player l ’s strategy). Therefore this 
assumption is sufficient for the existence of q and p. That it is not necessary follows 
from the observation that Equations 8.3 and 8.4 can be satisfied by specifying payoffs 
to player 1 without the restriction of constant linear transformations. ■
Therefore if player 1 holds the belief that player 2 takes with probability q at all 
nodes, then player l ’s indifference at any node implies indifference at all others in which 
player 1 moves. In the class of timing games satisfying Equations 8.3 and 8.4, q can be 
expressed in terms of the starting utilities q = » which becomes q = if
the game is normalised. This is a very useful simplification as the constant q contains 
all the information about player l ’s payoffs which is relevant to an equilibrium. The 
assumption that q is constant (or constant over some range) is necessary for the simple 
interpretation of analogy classes used formally in this thesis, although Chapter Eleven 
will demonstrate that the same approach could be generalised to consider other games. 
Proposition 8.1 leads to Definitions 8.2 and 8.3.
D efin ition  8.2 The constant q is defined so that if player 1 believes that player 2 
takes with probability q at all nodes, then player 1 is indifferent between passing and 
taking at all nodes.
D efin ition  8.3 The constant p is defined so that if player 2 believes that player 1 
takes with probability p at all nodes, then player 2  is indifferent between passing and 
taking at all nodes.
The fact that q contains all the information about player l ’s payoffs which is 
relevant to an equilibrium raises the question of why the game is defined in terms of two 
parameters p. and A. The answer is that these have implications once the robustness 
of an analogy-based expectations equilibrium is considered. For example, both the
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Centipede and Doubling Dollar games illustrated in Figure 8.2 and 2.3 respectively 
have the same p = q =  meaning that if each player believes the opponent takes at 
all nodes with probability both players are indifferent at all nodes in which they 
move. However, the incentive to take first is greater in the Doubling Dollar game, and 
therefore the requirement for an analogy class to be robust is more severe.
It should be noted that the Centipede and Doubling Dollar games satisfy the 
additional assumption that p = q,6 and it was implicitly assumed that p and A are 
the same in Equations 8.3 and 8.4. These are simplifying assumptions which generate 
some symmetry between the players.7 Extending the analysis to games in which p, A 
or p and q are not the same across players is straightforward.
'T h is is equivalent to  „ „ — . .
n  1 A 2 , l - A i ' 2
1 T he term  s y m m e t r y  here is used casually, as the gam e is clearly not sym m etric.
C hapter 9
Analogy-Based Expectations 
Equilibrium
This section describes the concept of an analogy-based expectations equilibrium in the 
context of the perfect information finite horizon games described in Chapter Eight. 
Some examples of analogy beliefs are used to motivate the idea of analogy classes, 
followed by more detailed examples to illustrate how analogy-based expectations equi­
libria in pure and mixed strategies might overcome the finite horizon paradox. For a 
more general exposition, the reader is referred to Jehiel (2005), which provides a more 
general and complete description of the concept and its application to other games. 
The contribution of this chapter is to extend the analysis to mixed strategy analogy- 
based expectations equilibria within the class of games described in Chapter Eight, 
exploring the conditions necessary for such an equilibrium to exist and demonstrating 
that an equilibrium in mixed strategies may exist even when there is not one in pure 
strategies.
Each player i forms analogy classes over the nodes X \ j ,  X 2 j ,  X nj ,  ..., X n j
in which his opponent moves. Specifically, player 1 forms L analogy classes indexed by 
ftl while player 2 forms M  analogy classes indexed by ^ m. This chapter follows Jehiel 
(2005) in assuming that the analogy classes are specified exogenously as a feature 
of the strategic environment. Chapter Twelve will investigate which analogy classes 
(and hence equilibria) are robust when players form their analogy classes endogenously. 
Players base their expectations of how an opponent acts on the average behaviour in 
each analogy class and assume that the opponent plays according to this expectation 
at every node within it. Although player l ’s true behavioural strategy profile is p = 
{pi, ..., Pn }, where pn is the probability that player 1 takes at node Xn>i(the nth 
time he moves), player 2 forms an expectation that player 1 takes with probability pm
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at every node in the analogy class \I/m. Likewise player 1 forms an expectation that 
player 2 takes with probability <7/ at every node in the analogy class 17/. This is best 
explained using examples.
Exam ple 9.1 Assume that player 1 in the Centipede game illustrated in Figure 9.1 has 
two analogy classes ft = {17i , 172} where 171 =  { X i ^  , -^2 ,2 } and 172 — { ^ 3 ,2  , ^ 4 ,2 }- 
This means that player 1 expects player 2 to take with probability q\ in his first and 
second moves and to take with probability <72 in his third and fourth moves. Player 
1 ’s analogy-based expectations q\ and <72 combine to form a perceived strategy profile 
9 =  {91 > 9i, 92 , 921-
Exam ple 9.2 Assume that player 2 in the Centipede game illustrated in Figure 9.1 
has a single analogy class =  { ^ 1,1 , A ^i, ^ 3 ,1 , X ^i}. This means that player 2 
expects player 1 to take with probability p\ at every node. Player 2 's perceived strategy 
profile of player 1 ’s behavioural strategy is p =  {pi, pi, p\, p \}.
Recall that behavioural strategies were defined for player 1 as p = {pi, ..., p/v} 
and for player 2 as q =  {q\ ; ..., <7/v}- The notation is summarised in Table 9.1. Having 
motivated analogy classes, it is necessary to define two conditions necessary for an 
analogy-based expectations equilibrium.
D efinition 9.1 O ptim ality: It is assumed that both players play sequential best 
responses to their analogy beliefs. A strategy p (q) for player 1 is a sequential best 
response to the analogy expectations profile q i f  and only if  for all strategies p ', the 
expected utility for player 1 is weakly maximised so
Ui\p(q)  , 5 ]> ^ 1  ( P \  9 )V p '
Definition 9.2 C onsistency: In equilibrium, the profile of analogy-based expecta­
tions must be consistent with the average true behaviour in each analogy class. The 
simplest way to express this consistency requirement is using expectations as shown in 
Equation 9.1:
E  [number of times 1 observes 2 take in 17/ | p , <7]
^  E [number of times 1 observes 2 move in 17/ | p , q]
Defining PrP)9 (X n as the probability that node X n i^ is reached, given strategy 
profiles p and q, Equation 9.1 can be rewritten as Equation 9.2. An equivalent deriva­
tion for pm gives Equation 9.3. To be consistent, 9.2 and 9.3 must hold for all analogy 
classes 17/ and \km.
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P m
5 - ' * n,2 e f 2i P rP,<7 ( X n , 2 ) Qn 
etti ^ rP-9 ( ^ . 2 ) 
^ n . i e ^ m  ^ rP-9 ( X n , l ) P n
(9.2)
(9.3)
An important feature of the equilibrium is that behaviour within an analogy class is 
weighted by the frequency with which it is observed. An interpretation of consistency 
is that a player uses a very long history to forecast behaviour in the analogy class f1/, 
forming an analogy expectation by averaging behaviour at all nodes X n ,^ G fh, within 
it. If this is the result of a process in which players eventually learn to have analogy 
expectations, then it is not necessary to know an opponent’s analogy classes or even 
payoffs. The notion of strong consistency (Jehiel, 2005) is used here meaning that 
beliefs off the equilibrium path must also be consistent with the strategy profile.
D efinition 9.3 An assessment (p , q, p, q) is an A nalogy-B ased  E xpecta tions E qu i­
librium  if and only if
1) p and q are sequential best responses to q and p respectively
2) p and q are strongly consistent with (p , q)
Jehiel (2005) shows that if every player has the finest possible analogy partitions 
then the analogy-based expectations equilibrium is also a subgame-perfect equilib­
rium. He also demonstrates that every finite environment (including a specification 
of player’s analogy classes) has at least one analogy-based expectations equilibrium. 
Combining the analogy-based expectations equilibrium approach with Proposition 8.1 
gives Proposition 9.1.
Proposition 9.1 I f  p =  p and q = q where p and q are consistent as defined in 
Definition 8.3, then the assessment (p , q, p, q) = (p, q, p, q) is an analogy-based 
expectations equilibrium for a n y  game satisfying the requirements in Proposition 8.1 
with the same N , p and q.
Proof. The proof follows from Definition 9.3 of an analogy-based expectations 
equilibrium and from Proposition 8.1. If the analogy-based expectations p and q are 
consistent, they are sufficient to make players 1 and 2 indifferent at all nodes (by 
Definitions 8.2 and 8.3) therefore any behavioural strategies are optimal. ■
Proposition 9.1 follows directly from the way p and q were defined, but it will be 
useful to refer to it in later analysis. It formalises the discussion following Proposition 
8.1, that q and p, the beliefs required to make players 1 and 2 indifferent, capture all
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of the information required about the payoff structure of the game necessary to derive 
an analogy-based expectations equilibrium in which both players mix. Therefore if 
(p' i q' j Pi q) is an analogy-based expectations equilibrium in the Centipede game in 
Figure 8.2, then it is also an analogy-based expectations equilibrium of the Doubling 
Dollar game in Figure 8.3, as in both cases p = q =
9.1 Sum m ary o f  N o ta tio n
X n>i Node at which player i moves for the n th  time
A Uii Utility player 1 receives if the game ends with take at node A,
B n,i Utility player 2 receives if the game ends with take at node A,
Behavioural strategy profile for player 1: 
take with probability pn at node i 
An analogy class of player 1 grouping 
nodes at which player 2 moves 
Player l ’s analogy-based expectation of player 2’s 
behavioural strategies at nodes in analogy class D/
Behavioural strategy profile for player 2: 
take with probability qn at node X n;2 
An analogy class of player 2 grouping 
nodes at which player 1 moves 
Player 2’s analogy-based expectation of player l ’s 
behavioural strategies at nodes in analogy class
p  Probability that node X n,i is observed
P q ’ given behavioural strategies p and q
Table 9.1: Summary of Notation
P =  { P h  •••, P n }
= {A ,2, A.,2}
qi
q =  {91 , •••, ?at} 
* m =  { x m1, ..., x fl}
P m
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9.2 P ure S trategy  A nalogy  E quilibria
This section considers the case when players use pure strategies and have the coarsest 
possible analogy partitions. A simple example is used to motivate the approach which 
will then be generalised to a game with N  moves for each player.
E xam ple 9.3 Consider the four period Centipede game illustrated in Figure 9.1 and 
assume that players have the coarsest possible analogy partitions, grouping all nodes 
at which their opponent moves into a single analogy class}
F ig u re  9 .1 : T h e  C en t ip ed e  G a m e  w i th  7V=4
There are two possible pure strategy analogy-based eocpectations equilibria. The first is 
equivalent to the subgame-perfect equilibrium in which both players take at all nodes, 
so that p = q = { 1, 1, 1, 1} and q =  p = 1.
However, there is a second equilibrium in which player 1 always passes and player 
2 takes only in the final node so that p = {0, 0, 0, 0} and q = {0, 0, 0, 1}. Actions 
at every node are observed equally often with probability 1 , so for player 1 to have 
consistent analogy expectations it is necessary that q =  0+0^ 0+1 =  \ , while for player 
2, p =  0 as player 1 passes at every node. It remains to verify that each player uses 
a sequential best response to their analogy beliefs. I f  player 1 believes that q = |  at 
all nodes, he will always pass as q < q = ^. For player 2, q = {0, 0, 0, 1} is a best 
response to the analogy expectation that player 1 always passes.
Therefore the assessment [p = {0, 0, 0, 0} , q = {0, 0, 0, 1} , q = \  , p = 0] con­
stitutes an analogy-based eocpectations equilibrium in pure strategies when players have 
the coarsest analogy groupings.
The unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in which players take at every node is 
also an analogy-based expectations equilibrium supported by analogy beliefs of q = 
(1, ..., 1) and p = (1, ..., 1) for any set of analogy classes. Example 9.4 shows that a 
pure strategy analogy-based expectations equilibrium involving passing may also exist,
^ h i s  was illustrated  in F igure 8.2 but is reproduced here to  m otivate  E xam ple 9.3.
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providing the game is long enough. This bound is generated by the case when each 
player passes as much as possible and has the coarsest analogy partition, averaging 
their opponent’s behaviour in all nodes. A bound exists because player 2 is rational 
and so always takes in the final decision node, thus q^ = 1 puts a lower bound on 
player l ’s consistent analogy expectation that 2 takes with probability q.
P ro p o sitio n  9.2 Assuming p = q and N  > 2, the existence of a passing pure strat­
egy analogy-based expectations equilibrium is bound by q =  and therefore N  >
so ^  — /x+l-i *n normalised game.
P roof. Assume each of the players has the coarsest analogy class and plays equi­
librium pure strategies p = {0, ..., 0} and q = {0, ..., 0, 1} respectively. Every node 
in equilibrium is visited once meaning player 2 passes (N  — 1) times and takes once, so 
consistent analogy beliefs for player 1 are that player 2 takes with probability q  =  X  
As player 1 always passes, consistent analogy beliefs for player 2 are that p = 0. To see 
that is a lower bound on q (or p) observe first that if either player takes in an earlier 
node X n,i, beliefs will be q = ^ > j j  or p = ^ > j q ,  so the lower bound occurs when 
take is at the end of the game. Secondly, given take occurs at the end, any finer analogy 
partition for player 1 would mean the analogy class containing q^ = 1 contains only 
n nodes, so to be consistent q = A is not a lower bound as A > j j . Having established 
that q = jj  creates a lower bound to consistent analogy expectations q, it remains to 
show that this is an equilibrium. From Proposition 9.1 it is optimal for player 1 to pass
requires that q = ^  < q and for player 2 to pass providing that p = 0 < p. This is an
equilibrium providing q < q =>  ^  N  -  p+XAul-My  If the Pay°ffs in
the game are normalised as described in Definition 8.1, then N  > M a x  > 2^.
■
For example, in the Doubling Dollar game illustrated in Figure 8.3, player 1 is 
indifferent at all nodes if player 2 always takes with probability q = ^ . For always pass 
to be a best response, player 1 must form an analogy-based expectation q < q. If player 
l ’s analogy beliefs are consistent, it is necessary that q = so combining these gives 
the condition ^   ^ => N  > 2. Rearranging the final expression in Proposition 9.2
means that a pure strategy analogy-based expectations equilibrium exists providing 
+  A > .
While the strategy profiles p = { 0 ,  0, 0, 0} and q = {0, 0, 0, 1} might seem rea­
sonable as an equilibrium in the Centipede game, it is less reasonable in the Doubling 
Dollar game as player 1 always receives a payoff of 0. Although it satisfies the technical 
requirements for an equilibrium, it seems unsatisfactory when motivated as the result
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of a learning process. In any pure strategy analogy-based expectations equilibrium in­
volving passing, in every history of the game one of the players observes his opponent 
take with probability 1 at a node in which he expected the opponent to pass with high 
probability. In Chapter Ten it will be argued that mixed strategy analogy classes are 
dramatically more robust, as taking is closer to mixing (than passing) and pure take 
may be observed with a very low frequency. In addition, mixing behaviour might be 
more complex to determine, motivating the formation of analogy classes.
9.3 M ixed  S trategy  A nalogy  Equilibria
For simplicity this section begins by focusing on the case when players have the coarsest 
possible analogy partitions and form analogy expectations q or p at all nodes at which 
their opponent moves. The extension of this approach to the case when there are 
multiple analogy classes will be discussed in Chapter Eleven. This section outlines the 
conditions required for a mixed strategy analogy-based expectations equilibrium and 
illustrates the idea in games in which N  = 2, demonstrating that even in this case, 
there are multiple mixed strategy analogy equilibria.
This section examines mixed strategy equilibria in which both players mix.2 If p 
and q are equilibrium mixed strategy profiles for players 1 and 2 respectively, following 
Proposition 8.1 mixing is optimal if players are indifferent, so it is necessary that q = q 
for player 1 and p = p for player 2. Recalling that Prp 9 (X n is the probability that 
node i is observed, for analogy expectations to be consistent is it necessary that
2 P rP,<?(*n,2)-9n j P rp ,? (^ n ,l) -P n
q = ! —p , v—t— and p =  —D —r- which can be rewritten as Equations
P lW * n , 2 )  y  E .V n l P rM ( ^ , l )  M
9.4 and 9.5.3
0 (9.4)
0 (9.5)
2 T here are other equilibria in which only one player m ixes w ith  sufficiently low probability  and the  
opponent plays a pure strategy, p  =  (0 , 1 ) or q =  (0 , 1 ).
3 T hese were derived in E quations 9.2  and 9.3.
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E xam ple 9.4 The optimality and consistency requirements for a mixed strategy analogy- 
based expectations equilibrium are demonstrated for the Centipede game when N  = 2 
(illustrated in Figure 9.2).
1 1
U - P , ) ( i-qi) ( l -P z) O-qz)
P i P2 <72
0
3
2
2
1
4
Fig u re  9 .2 ; T h e  T w o  P e r io d  C en t ip ed e  G a m e
For player 1 to be indifferent at all nodes, he must expect player 2 to take with proba­
bility q =  \  and likewise for player 2 to be indifferent at all nodes,
he must expect player 1 to take with probability p = ^ . For mixing to be optimal, the 
requirements are that analogy expectations q = q = i ,  p = p = i  and that qN = 1 .
For analogy expectations to be consistent it follows from Equations 9.4 and 9.5 that
y P r ( I n ,2 ) ( g n - g )  =  0  => (1 - p ^  (qi -  q) +  (1 - p i )  (1 -  ?i) (1 - &) (q2 -  q) =  0  
“  P.9An,2
y 'P r ( A n,i) (pn - p )  = 0 => (pi - p )  +  (1 - p i )  (1 -  qi) (p2  - p )  =  0
« ^  n n
x,i P,Q
This gives five expressions which can be solved simultaneously:
Optimality for player 1 q = q =  ^
Optimality for player 2 p = p = ^
Optimality for player 2 <72 =  1
Consistency of 1 ’s beliefs (q\ — q) 4- (1 — qi) (1 — P2 ) (<72 — 9 ) =  0 
Consistency of 2 ’s beliefs (pn — p) +  (1 — pi) (1 — </i) (p2  — p) =  0
These can be expressed in terms of p\ as Table 9.2 shows.
P i  <7i P 2  <72 P  q
1
3 (1 —p i ) ^  ^ P l  1 2 2
Table  9 .2 ; E q u i l i b r iu m  B e h a v io u r a l  S t r a te g ies
Pi 1 -
Thus even when each player forms coarse analogy classes over just two nodes, 
there are multiple mixed strategy analogy-based expectations equilibria. This follows 
intuitively from Example 9.4 as the equilibrium imposes five constraints over six pa­
rameters p\, P2 , <7 1 , <72 , P and q. In longer games, where players form analogy classes 
over N  nodes, there are still only five constraints, leaving 2N — 3 free parameters. 
However, generally these restrictions still place bounds on possible mixing behaviour.
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P ro p o sitio n  9.3 Assuming p =  q and N  > 2 the existence of a mixed strategy 
analogy-based expectations equilibrium is bound by q =  ^  and therefore N  >
so N  > in the normalised game.
i _  (  •Al, i ~ A 1,2 V
^ M + ^ ^1,1 -^ 1 ,2  J
( / i + A )  — 1
P roof. The proof that the bound occurs when players pass until the end of the 
game and have the coarsest analogy classes is equivalent to that in Proposition 9.2. 
A mixed strategy equilibrium could exist in which player 1 mixes in the penultimate 
node, so that p = {0, ..., 0, pjvj and q = {0, ..., 0, 1}. For mixing to be a consistent 
best response for player 1 it is necessary that q = q, and for player 1 to have consistent 
beliefs the requirement is that q = • For player 2 to pass until the final node
X n  2  it is necessary that p > p and consistent expectations require that p = Pff. As 
p = q by assumption, for these conditions to be satisfied ^~J^N = q = q =  p > p  = 
in equilibrium. Therefore a mixed strategy analogy-based expectations equilibrium 
can exist in which p ^  = providing so substituting and solving the
quadratic means q > I — \ f  therefore N  > — ,} ^  ;-----------  7-5-. If the
v  “  M 1-*) . ( y
y i -  Aj 2 J
game is normalised as described in Definition 8.1 then N  > M ax  ( ^ ^ 2  1 ’ ■
Proposition 9.3 implies that if
1 1
> N  >
1 - Ai'i —v4i,2 /i+A.4x,x— Ai,2
then a mixed strategy analogy-based expectations equilibrium exists which involves 
passing, even though the unique pure strategy analogy based expectations equilibrium 
outcome involves players taking at every node. If the game is normalised this domain 
can be expressed > N  > 1 • In terms of p  and A this occurs when
N  -  1 -  r -  V i V - 1
For example, if A = p = 0 and N  = 2, Proposition 9.3 implies that a mixed strategy 
analogy based expectations equilibrium exists in which q =  p =  and q = 
means p/v = Therefore p = {0 , and q =  {0 , 1} is a mixed strategy
analogy-based expectations equilibrium, although none exists in pure strategies.
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9.4 D iscussion
In the Centipede game in Figure 9.2, there is a mixed strategy analogy-based expecta­
tions equilibrium in which p = {0.4167 , 0.75} and q = {0.4286 , l} .4 This addresses 
some of the problems with the passing pure strategy equilibrium which were discussed 
in Section 9.2. Pure take is now only observed with probability rather than 1. 
Player 2’s behaviour at q% is now to take with probability |  rather than 0, which is 
closer to player l ’s analogy-based expectation that he mixes with probability In 
the Doubling Dollar game, player 1 would receive a payoff of 0.9167 which is closer to 
1, the amount he would expect under his analogy beliefs. In games in which N  > 2 
these arguments become more powerful.
The next chapter investigates the case when players form analogy classes endoge­
nously. The motivation for this approach is that players would not form analogies over 
nodes in which the opponent’s behaviour is very different, or that they form analo­
gies more carefully when suboptimal actions could prove very costly. It will propose 
formal measures of the inconsistency of analogy beliefs (with true behaviour) and the 
suboptimality of a player’s behaviour resulting from a poor analogy. These measures 
allow an investigation of how the payoff parameters, p and A, and the length of the 
game, N , affect the robustness of the different pure and mixed strategy equilibria that 
have been developed in this chapter.
  ^
4 T h is follows by su b stitu tin g  p i =  7 5  =  0 .1467 into Table 9.2.
C hapter 10
Endogenous Analogy Classes
Chapter Nine showed that as well as pure strategy analogy-based expectations equilib­
ria, there is a continuum of mixed strategy equilibria, even when players form analogy 
classes grouping just two nodes. Rather than defining analogy classes exogenously as 
part of the strategic environment, this chapter will argue that players form analogies 
endogenously. Earlier it was suggested that players learn to form consistent expec­
tations after observing a history of past games. This chapter will extend the idea to 
suggest that players also form their analogy classes from this history.
It is convenient to refer to this process as refinement, whereby players form analogy 
classes and reject undesirable ones, based either on inconsistency between analogy- 
based expectations and true behaviour, or the suboptimality of actions responding to 
a single analogy class. However, the underlying motivation is that players are less 
likely to form analogy classes over nodes in which the opponent’s behaviour is very 
different, or that they form analogies more carefully when suboptimal actions could 
prove very costly. Any refinement takes place in players’ minds as part of the process 
by which they form their analogy expectations.
The discussion is formalised by defining measures to analyse the extent of sub­
optimality and inconsistency, providing a framework for assessing the robustness of 
an analogy-based expectations equilibrium. To motivate the need for refinement even 
of mixed strategies, consider the strategy profiles p = { |  , 0} and q = {0 , 1} in 
Table 10.1. These form a mixed strategy analogy-based expectations equilibrium of 
the Centipede game in Example 9.4 when players have the coarsest possible analogy
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partitions, so p = q = p = q =  i . 1
Pi Q\ P2  92
Probability of take |  0 0 1
Deviance from p or q 6
Probability behaviour is observed 1 5 5 3
T ab le  10.1: E x a m p le  o f  a M ixed  S tra teg y  E qu ilib r iu m
This analogy-based expectations equilibrium seems unsatisfactory even for unso­
phisticated players in such a short game. Firstly, it seems unreasonable for the players 
to fail to recognise that their analogy beliefs differ from the opponent’s true behav­
iour, when this difference is so significant and regularly observed. Secondly, player l ’s 
strategy profile is very suboptimal given player 2’s true behaviour.2 The first criti­
cism questions how inconsistent analogy-based expectations are with the opponent’s 
actual behaviour, while the second investigates how much the player stands to gain by 
switching to the true optimal strategy. In both cases, the comparison to a benchmark 
case where the player breaks an analogy class into the finest possible partitions seems 
the most natural.3 These motivations for refining analogy-based expectations equi­
libria are closely related, as optimal beliefs lead to optimal behaviour. It is assumed 
that to be robust an analogy class must survive both optimality and consistency based 
refinements.
To illustrate these refinements, they are first applied to simple games in which each 
player moves twice and holds the coarsest possible analogy partition. This will then be 
extended to when the game has more nodes but players continue to form coarse analogy 
classes. In addition, it will argue that some mixed strategy equilibria are unlikely 
to arise, and permit a formal comparison of mixed and pure strategy analogy-based 
expectations equilibria. Mixed strategy analogy-based expectations equilibria may be 
dramatically more robust than the pure strategy equilibria which involve passing. For 
example, a pure strategy equilibrium in the Centipede game may need the analogy to 
be formed over 333 turns to be as robust as a mixed strategy equilibrium formed over 
just 4 turns. Chapter Eleven will discuss the case when players may form multiple 
analogy classes.
'T h is  follows from setting  pi =  |  in Table 9.1.
"In either the C entipede or D oubling Dollar gam e player 1 could double his payoff by se ttin g  p\  =  0, 
P2 = 1.
"Firstly, if th is were not the case refinem ent would becom e dependent on which analogy classes an 
equilibrium  was d ivided to. Secondly, two analogy classes are a lm ost alw ays sufficient to  support the  
true optim al strategy anyway.
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Refinem ent Based on Consistency
This approach considers how much a player’s analogy-based expectations differ from 
his opponent’s true behaviour. A player is less likely to form an analogy that the 
opponent behaves in a similar way at different nodes, if the opponent’s true behaviour 
at those nodes is very different. The mean absolute deviation of behaviour within 
an analogy class is used to measure this difference rather than the variance. Mean 
absolute deviation puts equal weight on outliers, which are typical in such equilibria 
(as at some point one of the players must take with probability 1) while the variance4 
weights outlying observations more heavily. Despite it being intuitive - the average 
deviation from the mean - mean absolute deviation is rarely used in statistics because 
of the difficulty of using absolute values. In this case however, it is straightforward 
to calculate and is similar to the requirement for analogy beliefs to be consistent, 
because of the statistical result that the average deviation about the mean is zero 
(when deviations are not absolute).
D efinition 10.1 A  co n sis ten cy  based re fin em en t m easure Oi k f or player i in 
analogy class k is defined 0\ i{q , p) =  M A D ( q )  for player 1 and 
02,m(p , q) =  M A D (p) for player 2.°
The mean behaviour in this case is the observed mean, so it is correctly calculated 
based on the probability with which behaviour at each node is observed within an 
analogy class. This corresponds to the analogy expectations for each analogy class 
p and q respectively. The absolute deviations from this behaviour should also be 
weighted by frequency, which means that more extreme absolute deviations from p 
are possible in a robust analogy class the less frequently they are observed. The mean 
absolute deviations can be expressed:
01M  , P) =  
h,m{p > q) =
^ -'X ni2e fh  ( X n , 2 ) |Ql ~  Qn\
PrP'<7 ( ^ n.2)
^>rP-<7 ( ^ w , l )  I P m  ~  P n  | 
2e f li P r p ,<7 ( ^ 1 , 2 )
The approach of using a measure of dispersion to form optimal categories is used 
by Fryer and Jackson (2004) who show that it may be optimal to partition larger 
groups more finely than smaller groups. However, the game theoretic situation used 
here is significantly different from their model of a single decision problem.
1 Instead o f using the variance itself, a related dim ension less m easure such as the coefficient of 
variation would be an appropriate a lternative  to  the m ean absolu te deviation .
5 As discussed in the tex t, M A D ( q )  is the m ean absolute dev iation  o f q.
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Refinem ent Based on O ptim ality
A second approach is motivated by the idea that players form analogies more carefully 
when suboptimal actions could prove very costly. The greater the relative gain in utility 
from refining analogy-based expectations and responding optimally to the opponent’s 
true behaviour, the more likely a player is to refine his analogy beliefs and hence the 
less robust an analogy class. The optimal and expected equilibrium payoffs player 
1 receives are calculated based on the opponent’s true behaviour (given the analogy 
beliefs the equilibrium strategy is already optimal). It is not implied that players 
actually calculate these, as they would need to find the optimal strategy to do so.
The motivation behind this approach is related to that of ^-equilibrium (Radner, 
1980), where players have a cost of finding or switching to an optimal strategy, and so 
only adjust their behaviour if an alternative strategy increases utility by more than e. 
However, Radner (1980) uses the approach to increase the set of equilibria from the 
unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, while here it is used to reduce the set of equilibria 
in an approach that already contains elements of bounded rationality.
The true expected utility for player i is defined as U\ [p , q] when players play 
according to strategy profiles p and q. The optimal response to an opponent’s true 
strategy is defined p*(q) and q*(p) for players 1 and 2 respectively. Proposition 10.1 
shows that it is sufficient to examine only pure strategies to find the optimal response 
to an opponent’s strategy profile.
Proposition 10.1 When players have the finest possible analogy groupings, weakly 
optimal profiles of pure strategies exist for players 1 and 2 , and are defined as p* (q) 
and q* (p) respectively.
Proof. Utility payoffs are a linear function of strategies, so the payoff from a 
mixed strategy is a convex combination of pure strategy payoffs. See Appendix B.3 
for an example of this in an analogy-based expectations equilibrium. ■
An intuitive measure of the suboptimality of a player’s actions might be the per­
centage gain from switching from the equilibrium strategy to the optimal strategy, 
lh\p_ (<t)^]-JA[p , <7] for p}ayer 1  an(j p ^ for player 2. This has the advan­
tage of being invariant to the scale of utility, allowing comparisons of different payoff 
structures and games of different lengths. However, some normalisation is necessary 
to make these measures invariant to the level of utility.6 is subtracted from all
6 So that adding 100 to  all payoffs does not make an analogy equilibrium  more robust to  payoff 
based refinem ent.
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of player l ’s utilities and B\ \ from all of player 2’s. This is equivalent to normalising 
the payoffs in the manner described in Definition 8.1.
Definition 10.2 A n  o p tim a lity  bcised re fin em en t m easure is defined as t^k (p , q)
for player i in analogy class k and represents the expected (normalised) percentage gain 
a player would make by switching to the optimal strategy. 7
U i  [p*(?) , 0\ ~  Ui \p , q)
h i p , q) =  
h i p , q) =
Ui [p , q] -  A i>2 
U2 \p , g*(p)] -  U2 \p , q] 
U2 \p , q] ~  £ 1,1
For example, if the game is normalised then an optimality based refinement mea­
sure of t\ =0.1  means that switching from the equilibrium strategy to the real optimal 
strategy increases expected utility by 10%.
As well as allowing the measures to be compared between games of different lengths 
and payoff structures, normalisation provides a comparison of the robustness of an 
equilibrium between players. This judgement is necessary to determine the most robust 
analogy-based expectations equilibrium, as a bound exists at which it is not possible 
to improve the robustness of an analogy class for one player without simultaneously 
making the opponent’s analogy class less robust.
Comparing the Approaches to  Refinem ent
In Example 9.4, each player was indifferent if their opponent passed with a probability 
of p =  q = . An equilibrium of the Doubling Dollar and Centipede games has the same 
consistency based refinement measure as only q and p , and not A and p  individually, 
enter the equilibrium8 and robustness measures. Therefore if the Doubling Dollar 
game is more sensitive to analogy beliefs than the Centipede game, this must be 
implemented exogenously. However, the consistency based measure is natural in an 
environment where it is uncertainty about the players’ actions that generates the 
complexity motivating an analogy-based expectations equilibrium.
An optimality based refinement measure has the advantage that it makes sensitivity 
to the payoff structure endogenous. An implication of this is that if a player plays an 
optimal strategy, the analogy class is totally robust even if the opponent’s behaviour 
within it is very varied. For example, the mixed strategy analogy-based expectations 
equilibrium in Table 10.1 is:
'A ll expectations here are based on players having the finest possib le analogy partitions. Under  
analogy-based expecta tions the current strategy  would already be optim al.
8 As in P roposition  9.1.
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Probability of take p\ q\ P2  <72
0.6667 0 0 1
In this case £2 =  0 because backwards induction shows that player 2’s response 
to player l ’s actions is optimal already, so U\ \p*{q) , q] = U\\p , q]. Despite this, it 
seems unreasonable that no degree of sophistication allows player 2 to understand that 
player l ’s behaviour at p\ and P2  is different.
As well as comparing the robustness of different analogy classes, the optimality and 
consistency refinement measures could be used to give bounds, reversing the question 
to ask what equilibria survive refinement for a given level of player sensitivity. For 
example, an analogy class is considered robust providing 6 \ < 0\ and t\ < t\. In 
the limit, as the equilibrium strategies tend towards the subgame-perfect equilibrium, 
Oi = 6 2  = t\ = t 2  = 0.9 These two approaches are related because when the consis­
tency based refinement is small, a player’s analogy-based expectations are close to the 
opponent’s true actions, so the optimal response to the analogy class is close to the 
fully optimal response. It will be demonstrated in the next section that when players 
have the coarsest analogy classes and expect the opponent to mix, the most robust 
equilibria given optimality and consistency based refinement are extremely similar. 
Even if they do not give similar restrictions, the measures are complementary, as a 
robust analogy class should survive both types of refinement.
10.1 R efinem ent o f  P ure S trategy  A nalogy E quilibria
This section analyses optimality and consistency based robustness measures of pure 
strategy analogy-based expectations equilibria in which players pass, for a comparison 
with the robustness of mixed strategy analogy-based expectations equilibria in Sections
10.2 and 10.3. The case when each player has a single analogy class is relatively simple 
to analyse, as all nodes are observed with probability 1. Player 1 always passes while 
player 2 passes until the node which he takes. The analogy class held by
player 2, that player 1 always passes, is correct and is therefore totally robust. That 
held by player 1 is suboptimal however, as the variation in player 2’s behaviour means 
that player 1 is better off taking rather than passing in his own final move.
P ro p o sitio n  10.2 I f  each player has a single analogy class, a pure strategy analogy- 
based expectations equilibrium involving passing in the Centipede game is robust for 
any tolerance level if the game is sufficiently long, as 0\ —► 0 and t\ —*■ 0 as N  —> 00 . 10
9 A s the subgam e perfect equilibrium  is reached, £2 and 6 2  are undefined.
10 A s player 1 always passes 6 2  =  <2 =  0.
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Proof. In this equilibrium player 1 always passes and player 2 passes until the 
last node at which he takes with probability 1. As actions at all nodes are observed 
with equal probability 1, player 1 forms consistent analogy beliefs q = jj . Therefore 
the mean absolute deviation within the analogy class player 1 holds about player 
2’s actions is = ——N —n1 — 2 ^ ^ - . The payoff received by player 1 in
equilibrium is N  — 1 but if he switched to the optimal strategy of taking just before
his opponent, in his own final node, he would receive a payoff of N. Therefore t\ =
= Ov-O-o =  Tv^I- As N  -> 00 > 01 0 and h  0 as required. ■
The measures of robustness 6 \ and t\ given N  for a pure strategy analogy-based
expectations equilibrium involving passing are illustrated in Figures 10.1 and 10.2 
respectively.11
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Figure 10.1: Consistency based robustness of a passing pure strategy 
equilibrium of the Centipede game when each player moves N  times
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Figure 10.2: Optimality based robustness of a passing pure strategy 
equilibrium of the Centipede game when each player moves N  times
11 T hese graphs show continuous approxim ations as N  is an integer.
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The first relationship occurs because the absolute deviation12 is being averaged over 
an increasingly large number of nodes as N  —» oo, and the second because payoffs to 
both players are increasing, so as a percentage, the gain from switching to the optimal 
strategy decreases. Therefore the optimality based and consistency based robustness 
measures follow a very similar trend. However, although both 6 \ or t\ tend to 0 
as N  increases, even small values may not be robust when player 2’s strategy is so 
straightforward for player 1 to understand and respond optimally to.
P ro p o sitio n  10.3 I f  each player has a single analogy class, a pure strategy analogy- 
based expectations equilibrium involving passing in the Doubling Dollar game is not 
robust for any tolerance level.
P roof. In the Doubling Dollar game, consistency based refinement puts the same 
bound on the number of turns as the Centipede game, 6 \ =  2 ^ ^ - derived in Proposi­
tion 10.2. However, the optimality based refinement for player 1 is never robust. The 
payoff received in equilibrium is 0 as player 2 always takes, but player 1 could receive a 
payoff 2 ^ _1 by switching to the optimal strategy, and take in his final move. Therefore 
t\ =  ' ql _ UA\ ^  =  2V o~0 =  2No 1 ’ and the pure strategy equilibrium involving
passing is not expected to be robust in Doubling Dollar games of any length. ■
The optimality based refinement measure for the Doubling Dollar game is very 
different from the Centipede game (see Proposition 10.2) and the consistency based 
refinement measure. This reflects that payoffs in the Doubling Dollar game are more 
sensitive to the opponent’s actions. If the passing analogy-based expectations equilib­
rium in which each player has a single analogy class is not robust, then no analogy- 
based expectations equilibrium in pure strategies is robust other than the equivalent 
of the subgame-perfect equilibrium.13
Having observed that there are differences between the Centipede and Doubling 
Dollar games, an interesting question is how the robustness of a pure strategy equi­
librium depends on the payoff structure of the game. The mean absolute deviation 
of beliefs is independent of the payoffs, and so providing a pure analogy-based expec­
tations equilibrium exists, the consistency based robustness measure is the same (as 
explained above for the Centipede and Doubling Dollar games). The same is not true 
for the optimality based refinement.
I2W hen players use pure strategies, the absolu te deviation equals 2 N~ 1 so is increasing in N ,  but 
the effect o f  averaging it across all nodes dom inates this.
13 Even if the analogy classes were finer, m eaning that the final take  would occur in an analogy class  
w ith  n nodes, t \  =  2 0  would still not be robust.
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Proposition 10.4 For a normalised game in which each player has the coarsest anal­
ogy partition, the robustness of the pure strategy passing equilibrium is decreasing in A 
and increasing in p..
Proof. Assuming for simplicity that the game is normalised so that A \p  =  1 and
A1 2  =  0 , the payoff to player 1 at node X ^ p  can be calculated as ^ * 7 ^ a—- +  \ N~l
and at node X n , 2  is M^ 7 -a—"• Therefore:
+  y v - i  _  M i z A p  y v - i ( 1 _ A)  
tl ^(1 _  A " -1)
1—A '
dti A ^ l - A )
d p  p 2 ( 1  -  A^_1)
d t \  _  * N ~ 2 [N -  1 -  NX  +  XN] ^
~d\ ~  p (  1 -  A ^ " 1) 2 >  °
as iV — 1 — N A +  A^ > 0 follows from Bernoulli’s inequality. Recall that t 2  = 0 as 
player 2 ’s payoff is already optimal. ■
Proposition 10.4 shows that the robustness of the passing equilibrium to optimality 
based refinement decreases in A and increases in p . 14 This is because a larger A 
increases the scaling of the difference between taking now and the opponent taking next 
node all through the game, raising U\ \p*(q)  , q] — U\ [p , q] and therefore increasing 
t\ (reducing robustness). Increasing p  scales up the expected payoff U\ \p , q] but not 
the difference JJ\ \p*(q) , q] — U\ \p , q], so the percentage gain of optimal over expected 
utility is reduced and the analogy class becomes more robust.
10.2 R efinem ent o f  M ixed  S trategy  A nalogy  E quilibria  
in Tw o P eriod  G am es
This section calculates consistency and optimality based robustness measures for mixed 
strategy analogy-based expectations equilibria. There are three main reasons to expect 
analogy classes (and therefore equilibria) involving mixing to be more robust than 
those in which players use only pure strategies. Firstly, the change from mixing to 
taking is less extreme than the change from passing to taking. Secondly, although any 
equilibrium involves one player taking with probability 1 when they were expected to 
mix, this node is observed less often than in a pure strategy equilibrium. For example, 
if players have the coarsest analogy partitions in the Centipede game in Figure 8.2
14 For a robust equilibrium  the consistency  based and payoff based refinem ent m easures should  be 
as sm all as possible.
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when N  =  4, a mixed strategy equilibrium exists in which pure take is observed with 
less than 1% probability. Thirdly, mixing behaviour may be more complex to analyse 
than pure strategies.
This section focuses on the Centipede and Doubling Dollar games illustrated in 
Figures 10.3 and 10.4 respectively, where each player forms analogy classes over the 
two nodes at which his opponent moves. The later sections will examine the most 
robust mixed strategy equilibrium when the game has N  nodes.
2 2 3 2 2
>T-P0 ...TO.. 0 -P2) TO 3 ( I -P l) (Hi) 0 -P2) (HJ
Pi 4/ P2 <12 P i <// P: <12
F igu re 10.3: T w o  P eriod  C en tip ed e  G am e F igu re 10.4: T w o  P er iod  D o u b lin g  D o llar  G a m e
It is assumed for the rest of this section that the strategy profiles p = (pi , P2 ) and 
0  =  ( 0 1  1 0.2 ) 1  which generate analogy beliefs p and q respectively, form an analogy- 
based expectations equilibrium. Following Example 9.2, these equilibria have one free 
parameter and so behaviour at all nodes can be specified in terms of p\:l°
P i
P i  1
0 i P2 02 P  0
3 (1 —p i ) ^  3p i  1 2 2
Note that 0 < P2  < 1 implies 3  < Pi < §, so the requirements for analogy-based 
expectations equilibria restrict the range of p \  even without considering robustness.
10.2 .1  C o n sisten cy  B a sed  R efin em en t
Expanding the consistency based refinement measures 6 \ , 6 2  when N  = 2 gives:
E ^ x „ ,2e n , P r P><7 ( ^ > 2 ) \0i ~  On | \qY -  q\ +  (1  -  q x) (1  -  p 2 ) \q2 -  q]
° i  A o  1 P )  =
^2 , m { P  1 0 )  =
E x n,2en, P r P,q ( x n,2 ) 1 +  ( 1  -  0 1 ) ( 1  -  P 2 )
P r P-<7 ( X n , l )  \ p - P n \  \P l  -  p \  + (1 -  Pl) (1 -  qrj) \p2 ~ p\
£ * „ , 2Gn, PrP’9 ( -2) 1 +  (1 -  pi )  (1 -  9 1 )
This can be further simplified by recalling that consistency requires:
J ^ P r (Xn,2)(qn- 0) = (1 - P i )  (01 ~  0) +  (1 - P i )  (1 -  9i) (1 - P 2 ) (02 ~ 0) =  0
— '  P i9^n,2
^ P r ( X n>1) (pn - p )  = (pi - p )  +  (1 - p i )  (1 -  qi) (P 2  - p )  =  0
P,QX,1
’T his was derived in E xam ple 9.4 (see Table 9.2).
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Therefore the consistency refinement measures can be written as:
2 \q i -q \
Oi{q, p) = 
h  (p , q) =
i +  (i - 9 i ) ( i  - P 2 )
2 \p i - p \
i +  (i - p i ) ( i - 9i )
Using Table 3.2 these can be expressed as a function of p\:
«M ?,p ) =
0 2 ( p , q) =  ^  |2pi - 1|
A judgement is needed to compare analogy classes between players, assuming they 
have similar sensitivities to the inconsistency between their opponent’s real actions 
and the analogy expectations they hold. Therefore the robustness of an analogy- 
based expectations equilibrium depends on the legist robust analogy class within that 
equilibrium. In other words the inconsistency of the equilibrium can be defined as
Q* =  M ax [6 U , 02 ,m] V I , m
This is illustrated in Figure 10.5 which shows the mean absolute deviation of q, 
(q  ^ P)i and p, 0 2  (p , q), resulting from the mixed strategy analogy-based expecta­
tions equilibrium given by p\ when N  = 2.
0.6
01,02,0* -61
0.5 -----02
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
\ /
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.70.6 0.8
P1
Figure 10.5: Consistency based refinement 
of mixed strategy equilibria when N  = 2
As well as specifying how robust a given analogy-based expectations equilibrium is
the question can be reversed to ask which analogy-based expectations equilibria survive
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Therefore the consistency refinement measures can be written as:
2|9i -  </]#1(q , P) =  
0 2 (p , 9) =
1 +  (1 -  9 i ) (1 - P 2 ) 
2  \pi ~ p\
1 +  ( 1  - p i )  ( 1  -
Using Table 3.2 these can be expressed as a function of p \ :
« . ( 9 , P )  =  ^
0 i ( p . 9 ) =  j  |2pi - 1|
A judgement is needed to compare analogy classes between players, assuming they 
have similar sensitivities to the inconsistency between their opponent’s real actions 
and the analogy expectations they hold. Therefore the robustness of an analogy- 
based expectations equilibrium depends on the least robust analogy class within that 
equilibrium. In other words the inconsistency of the equilibrium can be defined as
0* = M ax  [0i , 02,m] V I , m
This is illustrated in Figure 10.5 which shows the mean absolute deviation of q, 
01  (Q > P)i and p, 0 2  {p ? q), resulting from the mixed strategy analogy-based expecta­
tions equilibrium given by p\ when N  =  2.
0.6
61,62,6*
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
\ /
\ /
. . .  -01
 02
0.2 0 .3  0 .4  0 .5  0 .6  0 .7  0.8
P1
Figure 10.5: Consistency based refinement 
of mixed strategy equilibria when N  =  2
As well as specifying how robust a given analogy-based expectations equilibrium is
the question can be reversed to ask which analogy-based expectations equilibria survive
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refinement for a given robustness measure. A logical step following this is to investigate 
which analogy-based expectations equilibrium is the most robust given this method of 
refinement. This is illustrated in Figure 10.5 as the intersection between 6 \ and 6 2 , i.e. 
the lowest point on 6 *. At this point 6 \ =  6 2  and so 3^pi2~^ =  |  |2pi — 1| . This has a 
unique solution p\ = ^  giving 6 \ = 6 2  = Therefore the most robust equilibrium, 
where both players’ analogy classes have the lowest possible mean absolute deviation, 
is that in which:
Pi q\ P2  Q2  6 *
0.4167 0.4286 0.75 1 0.125
Although each analogy class contains just two nodes, this refinement gives an 
equilibrium in which the observed deviation of beliefs is relatively small, especially 
compared to the pure strategy equilibria in Section 10.1. Secondly, pure take by 
player 2 is observed only with probability ^  in this equilibrium.
10 .2 .2  O p tim a lity  B a sed  R efin em en t
The robustness of mixed strategy equilibria in the Centipede and Doubling Dollar 
games illustrated in Figures 10.3 and 10.4 respectively will now be examined using 
optimality based refinement measures. Appendices B.l and B.2 derive these mea­
sures fully for the Centipede and Doubling Dollar games respectively. A convenient 
feature of the Centipede game is that in all the mixed strategy analogy based expec­
tations equilibria given in Table 3.2, the true expected utility received by each player 
is U\ \p , q] =  1 and U2  [p , q] = 2.
The maximum utility a player can receive by responding optimally to an opponent’s 
strategy may be complex to determine generally, as the optimal strategy depends 
on the opponent’s equilibrium strategy. Following Example 9.2, a mixed strategy 
equilibrium can be characterised by:
Pi <71 P2  Q2  P q
P1 * -  3(1—p i) 2 — 3 p i 1 \ 7}
As q2  = 1, the belief that q — \  requires q\ < ^ so the optimal pure strategy for 
player 1 in response to player 2’s true behaviour is p*(q) =  (0 , 1). For player 2 the 
optimal strategy depends on the equilibrium. If P2  < \  (meaning that p\ > \ )  the best 
response is q*(p) = (0 , 1) while if P2  > \  (meaning that p\ < \ )  the best response 
is q*(p) = (1 , 1). The expected payoffs from these strategies are derived in Appendix 
B.l:
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h ( p , q )  =  1 — 2 i^
. , v _  /  1 -  2pi if Pi <  5
W  , q)  | 2 _  3pi +  2p2(pi _  i)  if pi  >  i
Substituting for the consistency and optimality conditions allows these to be ex­
pressed in terms of p \:
=  3 0 ^ ) - 1
if Pi <  5
1
2
This is illustrated in Figure 10.6 which shows the (normalised) relative utility gains,
. /  l - 2 Pl ! i
’ “  \7 p i — 6 pJ — 2 if pi > i
li alise 
ft(P > 9 )5  which player i makes if he switched to the true optimal strategy.
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7
pi
Figure 10.6: Optimality based refinement of analogy 
equilibria in the two period Centipede game
As under consistency based refinement, the most robust equilibrium under optimality 
based refinement is illustrated in Figure 10.6 as the intersection between t\ and £2 ? i-e- 
the lowest point on t*. At this point £1 =  £2 and so 1 — 2q\ = 1 — 2p\, so p\ = q\. The 
behavioural strategies in this equilibrium are summarised as follows:
Pi qi P2  92 t*
0.4226 0.4226 0.7321 1 0.1547
Note that £* =  0.1547, so if either player were to switch to the true optimal strategy 
he would only increase his (normalised) payoff by 15.47%, despite each analogy class
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containing just two nodes. These equilibrium strategies for the Centipede game are 
close to those that are most robust to consistency based refinement Section 10.2.1. 
Pure take by player 2 is observed only with probability 0.0893 in this equilibrium.
Appendix B.2 analyses the optimality based refinement of the Doubling Dollar 
game, giving the following tolerance measures:
t l ( p ’ 9) =  ( 4 - 3 p 1) ( l  —Pl) _ 1
I \ -/  ^  ~  1 - 5
2 ( P , < ? )  “  \ 2 ( 1 - P1)(3P1- 1 )  t  i f  p i  >  1 
P l L
This is illustrated in Figure 10.7, showing the (normalised) relative utility gains, 
Uip } q)i which player i could make by switching to the true optimal strategy.
0.5
0.3 0.35 0.4 0.46 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7
P1
Figure 10.7: Optimality based refinement of analogy 
equilibria in the two period Doubling Dollar game
As in the Centipede game illustrated in Figure 10.6, the most robust equilibrium under 
optimality based refinement is illustrated in Figure 10.7 as the intersection between t\ 
and <2> i.e. the lowest point on t*. At this point t\ =  t<i and p\ can be calculated by 
solving the equation — 1 =  2^ 1~pi^ 3pi~1^ — 1. The behavioural strategies in this 
equilibrium are summarised as follows:
Pi Qi P2 q2 t*
0.4334 0.4117 0.6998 1 0.3074
As t* = 0.3074, if either player were to switch to the true optimal strategy he 
increases his (normalised) payoff by 30.74%. While this is lower than the equiva­
lent measure for the pure strategy equilibrium, partly because pure take is observed
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only with probability 0.1, it is still much higher than the Centipede optimality based 
refinement measure due to the greater impact of taking on the payoffs.
10.3 R efinem ent o f  M ixed  S trategy  A nalogy  E quilibria  
in N  P eriod  G am es
The solutions in Section 10.2 assume N  = 2. Given that the analogy classes contain 
only two nodes, some mixed strategy equilibria are surprisingly robust. For exam­
ple, in the most robust mixed strategy analogy-based expectations equilibrium of the 
Centipede game, switching to the real optimal strategy increases (normalised) utility 
by just 15.47% for either player. One of the reasons mixed strategy analogy classes 
are expected to be more robust is that pure take, which must occur at the end of 
the game, is observed with low probability. Following this logic, the more nodes over 
which mixing occurs, the less frequently pure take is observed and the more robust 
analogy classes could be.
This section will consider a game where players have the coarsest analogy partition 
(one analogy class) and move N  times each. The aim is to characterise and compare 
the most robust analogy classes based on the optimality and consistency based robust­
ness measures. As discussed earlier, the consistency and optimality requirements for 
equilibrium use three degrees of freedom, leaving 2N  — 3 behavioural strategies as free 
parameters.
10 .3 .1  C o n sisten cy  B a sed  R efin em en t
This section is motivated by considering the most robust analogy class possible, when 
analogy beliefs and real actions correspond exactly so that p = (p, p, ..., p) and 
Q = <7> •••■> q)- Unfortunately this is not an analogy-based expectations equilibrium,
as player 2’s optimal response in the final decision node, q^, is to take. Increasing qyv 
to 1 satisfies optimality, but the probability of taking in some other nodes must be 
reduced below q to maintain q = q which is necessary for player 1 to mix in equilibrium. 
The linearity of the problem suggests a bang-bang solution, regaining consistency by 
reducing the probability of taking, qg, in a single node specified as
P ro p o sitio n  10.5 The consistent strategy for player 2 which minimises absolute de­
viation is to mix with probability q for all nodes except and X ^ ^ -
16 T his section assum es that N  is sufficiently large that the proposed analogy equilibrium  ex ists. In 
the C entipede and D oubling D ollar gam es in F igures 2.2 and 2.3 it is only necessary th at N  >  2.
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Proof. Assume that pn < 1 V n and player 2 adopts a strategy q = (q, q, ..., 1). 
Player l ’s analogy beliefs must be consistent so P rPi<7 (X n$) (qn — q) = 0. If
player 2’s behaviour at a single node X g£ is adjusted to give consistency, then qn = 
q =  q\f n ^  g , N.  Therefore the consistency requirement becomes
Pr (ATjv.2 ) (1 -  5) =  Pr (X9,2) ( q -  qg) 
p a  p a
N
and therefore q — qg = (1 -  qg) (1 -  q)N~9  (1 -  pn), so
n = g + 1
l - u n ( ! - ? " )
n=</+l
meaning that qg is decreasing in g. The expression for absolute deviation is
N
V  Pr (An,2) Iq -  qn \ = 2  Pr (X N,2) ( 1  -  9 ) =  2  TT ( 1  -  qn ) ( 1  -  pn)PA ,Xn>2 n= 1
which is decreasing in qg, and as qg is decreasing in g it follows that to minimise 
absolute deviation g should be set equal to 1. It is never optimal to set some qn > q 
as that means qg will have to be reduced more to offset it, increasing the absolute 
deviation. The linearity of the absolute deviation in qg means that this is a bang-bang 
solution, so qn = <7 V n ^  g , A  is in fact optimal. ■
The intuition behind Proposition 10.5 is that to offset the final take, in some node 
X g£ player 2 must take with probability qg < q. The earlier this occurs (i.e. the smaller 
g is), the more often it is observed and the more heavily it is weighted in expectations, 
so a smaller deviation from q is sufficient to offset the final take. Therefore qg is 
decreasing in g , so setting g = 1 maximises qg. The direct effect of changing g on 
the absolute deviation is 0, because the although the deviation \q — qg\ increases as g 
increases, this is exactly offset by the fact that it is observed less frequently. There is 
a powerful indirect effect, however. The higher qg is, the less frequently the final pure 
take is observed.
P ro p o sitio n  10.6 I f  pn = p V n the strategy for player 2 which is consistent with 
q =  q and maximises the expected number of nodes X n i 2  observed is to mix with 
probability q for all nodes except A 1 2  and Xyv,2 -
P roof. Assume that pn =  p V n and player 2 adopts a strategy q = (q, q, ..., 1). 
Player l ’s analogy beliefs must be consistent so (^n/2 ) (q-n ~ q) = 0- If■  ^Xn o ’ ’
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player 2’s behaviour at a single node X gj2 is adjusted to guarantee consistency, then 
from Proposition 10.5 qg = 1 ---------------1~^~n---------• Substituting this into the ex-
1 -(l-q ) N ~ 9 n  (1 -p )
9+1
17pected number of times player 2 moves gives Equation 10.1.
£  Pr (Xni2) =  i - p  +  p [ ( i _ z ? ) _ ( i - ? ) P
“  M  q + p ~ qpA„, 2
Equation 10.1 shows that Y lx n 2 Prp,g (Xn,2 ) is decreasing in g, so minimising g 
maximises the number of times player 2 is expected to move in equilibrium. ■
When pn =  p V n and qg = 1 -------------- 1-(? N the expected number of nodes
( 1 - p )
n=<j + l
observed in Equation 10.1 is independent of N.  For example, if player 1 always passes,
t h e n  E x „ , 2 P r P,<7 ( x n,2) =  \ -
P ro p o sitio n  10.7 There is an analogy-based expectations equilibrium in which 
pn = p V n, qi = 1 -  Qn = 9  V (1 < n < N ), qN =  1. This
is the most robust analogy-based expectations equilibrium to consistency based refine­
ment given player 2 ’s analogy class remains totally robust.
P roof. If pn = pV n then p =  p, and q = q from the definition of q\ in Proposition
10.5, therefore as both players have consistent beliefs and are indifferent at all nodes 
the proposed strategy is an analogy-based expectations equilibrium. The consistency 
requirement i{q , p) = — — ns— n r - 1 ? is minimised by setting g — 1 as 
following Proposition 10.1, minimising g minimises the absolute deviation (the numer­
ator) and following Proposition 10.2, minimising g maximises the expected number of 
nodes player 2 moves at (the denominator). Therefore minimising g also minimises 
#1,i (Q > P)- For player 2, 02,m(<7 , p) = 0. ■
In fact, Proposition 10.7 follows from the linearity of the mean absolute deviation 
and holds very generally. It can be interpreted intuitively as a statement that the most 
robust consistent strategy for player 2 is to take with probability q\ < q in the first 
turn, mix with probability q at all other turns and take in the last turn. As discussed 
in Chapter Nine, 6 \ i(q , p) could be reduced further by allowing 0 2 ,m(Q , p) > 0. To 
avoid repetition, an equivalent expression to Proposition 10.7 is not derived for player 
1, but the intuition is the same. 9\j(q , p) can be reduced by increasing the probability 
that player 1 takes in any node before it. The most robust way to achieve this is for
1' T his is calculated in A ppend ix  B4.
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player 1 to take with probability pyv > P, just before qjy is reached, and offset this by 
setting pi < p while leaving pn =  (1 < n < N). Conjecture 10.1 follows directly
from these intuitions and will be illustrated with examples. Assuming a degree of 
symmetry between players, the minimum robustness will set 0 i fiq , p) = #2 ,m(<7 , p)-
C o n jec tu re  10.1 In the analogy-based expectations equilibrium most robust to con­
sistency based refinement, players use the strategies illustrated in Table 10.2.
q\ q\ ••• qn ••• qN
P l  P l  . . .  p n  . . .  p N
_____________ l~p   n  n  ~  1±
l - ( l - 9 l ) ( l - $ ) " - 2 ( l - p ) " - 2 (P jv- p )  P  P 2
Table  10.2. M o s t  ro b u s t  ana logy  c lass  to c o n s i s t e n c y  based  r e f i n e m e n t
Generally p ^  is set so that Oij(q , p) =  #2 ,to(</ , P)• When q = p, Pn  ~
Therefore in the Centipede and Doubling Dollar games illustrated in Figures 10.3 
and 10.4, where q — p = I  and N  = 2, the most robust analogy-based expectations 
equilibrium is that in which <72 =  1, P2 ~  =  | , qi = | , pi = ^ . These exactly equal
the behavioural strategies derived above and illustrated in Figure 10.5. Example 10.1 
illustrates Proposition 10.7, the equilibrium most robust to consistency refinement 
when p = (p , p , p , p). Example 10.2 shows that the corresponding solution when 
g = 3 is inferior. Example 10.3 demonstrates that increasing #2 ,m (by changing p) can 
further reduce Oifiq , p).
E xam ple  10.1 Consider the Centipede and Doubling Dollar games with N  =  4 illus­
trated in Figures 8.2 and 8.3. Following Proposition 10.7, an analogy-based expecta­
tions equilibrium is p = (p , p, p, p) =  (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5) and
q =  ( [ 1  -  , _( 1] .  q, q, 1)  = (0 .4 9 2 , 0 .5 , 0 .5 , 1 ). e u (? , p) =  0 .0 1 1 9
and 6 2 ,m{q , p) =  0. This equilibrium is the most robust to consistency based refine­
ment without adjusting player 1 ’s strategy.
E xam ple 10.2 Consider the Centipede and Doubling Dollar games with N  = 4 illus­
trated in Figures 8.2 and 8.3. An analogy-based expectations equilibrium is 
P = P, P, >P) = (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5) andq = (< q, q, q, 1) =  (0.5, 0.5, 0.3333, 1).
®i,i(q 1 P) — 0.0156 and ^2,m(^ > p) =  0. Therefore setting g = 3 significantly increases 
6 1  fiq , p), reducing robustness, compared to the case when g =  1 in Example 10.1.
E xam ple 10.3 Consider the Centipede and Doubling Dollar games with N  = 4 illus­
trated in Figures 8.2 and 8.3. Following Conjecture 10.1, an analogy-based expectations
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equilibrium isp = (< p, p, p, > p) = (0.4960, 0.5, 0.5, 0.75) andq = (< g, g, g, 1) = 
(0.4961, 0.5, 0.5, 1). #i,j(g , p) =  #2 ,m(<7 , p) =  0.0060. This equilibrium is the most 
robust to consistency based refinement.
Example 10.3 shows that even when N  =  4, a mixed strategy analogy-based ex­
pectations equilibrium can be extremely robust to consistency based refinement, with 
a mean absolute deviation as low as 0.0060. The final take is observed with a proba­
bility less than so it is very unlikely players will realise behaviour at node X tv,2 
is significantly different from q. Of course, players need not coordinate on the most 
robust mixed strategy analogy-based expectations equilibria, though any equilibrium 
in this region is extremely robust to consistency based refinement. The thesis will now 
derive a very similar result under optimality based refinement.
10 .3 .2  O p tim a lity  B a sed  R efin em en t
As with consistency based refinement, this solution is motivated by considering the 
most robust analogy class possible, when analogy beliefs and real actions correspond 
so p = (p, p, ..., p) and q =  (g, g, ..., g). In this case players are truly indifferent at 
all nodes, so mixed strategies axe optimal. This is not an analogy-based expectations 
equilibrium, as optimally, g/v =  1. In this case, however, the probability of player 2 
taking in some other nodes must be reduced below q to maintain player l ’s analogy 
belief q = q. The linearity of the problem leads to a bang-bang solution, regaining 
consistency by reducing the probability of taking qg in just one node X g^ - ls
P ro p o sitio n  10.8 The consistent strategy for player 2 which minimises optimal util­
ity is to mix with probability q for all nodes except X \£  a,nd ATyv,2-
P roof. Assume that pn < 1 V n and player 2 adopts a strategy q = (g, g, ..., 1). 
Player l ’s analogy beliefs must be consistent so P rp,q ( Xn,2 ) (Qn ~ o) = 0. If
— * X  n,2
player 2’s behaviour at a single node X g£ is adjusted to guarantee consistency, then 
qn = q = q V n ^ g ,  N.  Therefore the consistency requirement becomes:
P r(X „ ,2 ) ( l  —«  =  P r(X 9,2 ) (9 -9 9)
p ,q  p , q
N
and can be rewritten q — qg = (1 — qg) (1 — q) N ~ 9  (1 — pn) therefore qg = 1 —
n=g+1
------------l q-N---------- so qg is decreasing in g. For player 1, as player 2 mixes with
Y [  (1  ~ P n )  
n = s + 1
18 T his section  assum es that the gam e is sufficiently long that the analogy equilibrium  proposed in 
the following sections exist. In th e  C entipede and D oubling D ollar gam es in F igures 8.2  and 8.3 it is 
only necessary that N  >  2.
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probability q at all nodes after qg, a weakly optimal strategy is to always pass and take 
in X/v,i- 19 As the payoff in node X n ,i is  ^ -I- XN , the expected payoff from this
strategy is (1 ~ 0) N ~ 2  (1 — Qg)i which is decreasing in qg. Therefore
as qg is decreasing in g it follows that to minimise optimal utility g should be set 
equal to 1. It is never optimal to set some qn > q as that means qg would have to 
be reduced more to offset it, increasing the absolute deviation. The linearity of the 
absolute deviation in qg means that this is a bang-bang solution, so qn = q V n  ^  g, N  
is in fact optimal. ■ __
Unfortunately, the true expected true utility is increasing in g. However, even 
when mixing is over just 2  nodes the deviations of q\ and p\ are sufficiently small 
that the true expected utility is almost constant for different values of g. In fact, 
when qg and pg are set to provide consistency in the Centipede game illustrated in 
Figure 8.2, for all g, U\ \p , q\ = 1 and U2  [p , q] =  2 and so expected true utility 
is constant. In the Doubling Dollar game illustrated in Figure 8.3, then for all <7, 
Ui [p , q] ~  0.97 and U2  [p , q\ ~  0.48. On the other hand, the effect of changing g on 
optimal utility, U\ \p*(q) , q], is significant, so it is the effect derived in Proposition 
10.8 that determines t\(p , q) and ^ (P  > o)- This is illustrated by Examples 10.4 and
10.5.
E xam ple  10.4 Consider the Doubling Dollar game with N  = 4 illustrated in Fig­
ure 8.3. An analogy-based expectations equilibrium of this game is given by p — 
(P, P, P, P) =  (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5) and q =  (<q,  q, q, 1) =  (0.492, 0.5, 0.5, 1). 
t i(p , q) = 0.076 and ^ (p  , g) = 0. This is the most robust analogy class to op­
timality based refinement without increasing ? q) by changing p.
E xam ple  10.5 Consider the Doubling Dollar game with N  = 4 illustrated in Fig­
ure. 8.3. An analogy-based expectations equilibrium of this game is given by p = 
=  (°-5> °-5’ °-5’ °-5) and Q = (£Sj& 9, T  1) =  (0-5, 0.5, 0.333, 1). 
U(p 5 9 ) =  0.391 and ^ (p  , <f) =  0. This is significantly less robust than the analogy 
equilibrium in Example 10.4 in which g =  1.
In Example 10.4, consistency is achieved by player 2 offsetting the take at X yv,2 
by passing slightly more often in the first turn (i.e. g =  1). This analogy-based 
expectations equilibrium is the most robust possible in the Doubling Dollar game 
when N  = 4, given player l ’s strategy. Player 1 could increase his payoffs by 7.6% 
by reacting optimally to their opponent’s true behaviour, and taking in node ATjv,i-
19Any strategy in which player 1 passes  un til X g<2 and takes  w ith probability 1 before X n ,2 is 
weakly optim al.
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In example 10.5 however, consistency is achieved by player 2 offsetting the take at 
X n ,2 by passing more often in node X 3 2 (i.e. g =  3). In this case the analogy- 
based expectations equilibrium is significantly less robust, as player 1 could increase 
his utility by 3 9 .1 % if he adjusted his strategy to be an optimal response to q.
E xam ple 10.6 Consider the Centipede game with N  = 4 illustrated in Figure 8.2. An 
analogy-based expectations equilibrium of this game is given by p = (<  p, p , p, >P) = 
(0.4960, 0.5, 0.5, 0.7490) and q = (<q,  q, q, 1) -  (0.4960, 0.5, 0.5, 1). *i(p , q) =
^ 2 (p , q) =  0.0079. This is the most robust analogy class to optimality based refinement.
E xam ple  10.7 Consider the Doubling Dollar game with N  — 4 illustrated in Fig­
ure 8.3. An analogy-based expectations equilibrium of this game is given by p —
{<P, P, P, >P) = (0.4972, 0.5, 0.5, 0.6793) andq = (< q, q, q, 1) -  (0.4949, 0.5, 0.5, 1). 
t i(p 5 q) — ^ 2 {p 5 q) — 0.0474. This is the most robust analogy class to optimality based 
refinement.
Example 10.6 shows that most robust analogy-based expectations equilibrium of 
the Centipede game is significantly more robust than that of the Doubling Dollar 
game in Example 10.7. Consistency is achieved by player 2 offsetting the take at 
X n , 2  by passing slightly more often in the first turn, X \$  (i.e. g =  1) The condition 
for requirement is balanced across the two players as player 1 takes slightly more in 
node Xjvj and maintains consistency by passing slightly more in the first turn. In 
the equilibrium of the Doubling Dollar game in Example 10.7, players could increase 
their (normalised) utilities by 4.74% by responding optimally to their opponent’s true 
behaviour. In the Centipede game, switching to the true optimal response leads to 
gains of only 0.79%.
C o n jec tu re  10.2 The analogy-based expectations equilibrium most robust to 
optimality based refinement sets:
qi qi ••• qn ••• qN
1 “  l - ( l - ^ ) ^ - 1( l - S ) Ar- 2( l - p n ) V Q 1
Pi Pi ... Pn ••• Pn
1 "  P p  Z p
Table  10.3. M o s t  r o b u s t  ana logy  c lass  to o p t im a l i t y  based r e f i n e m e n t
and pn  is set so that t\{jp , q) = ^ (p  , q)
Conjecture 10.2 follows from the discussion and examples in this section. Overall, 
the equilibrium which is most robust to optimality based refinement is very similar to 
that which is most robust to optimality based refinements, supporting the intuition 
developed in the case when N  = 2.
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10.4 D iscussion
This section will summarise some of the main results from endogenising analogy classes, 
before extending the analysis to the case of multiple analogy classes in Chapter Eleven.
Different Payoff Structures
When refinement is based on the variation of behaviour within an analogy class, the 
payoff structure of the game is irrelevant for a given p and q. Therefore any consistency 
based refinement of the Centipede game in Figure 8.2 applies equally to the Doubling 
Dollar game illustrated in Figure 8.3. This is not true of optimality based refinement. 
Proposition 10.4 showed that the robustness of the pure strategy equilibrium involving 
passing is increasing in p and decreasing in A. The pure strategy passing equilibrium in 
the Doubling Dollar game, in which player 2 takes in the final node, is never robust to 
optimality based refinement, no m atter how long the game. However, there are mixed 
strategy analogy-based expectations equilibria which may be very robust if the game 
is sufficiently long. For a given game length and equilibrium,20 the Centipede game 
is more robust than the Doubling Dollar game. More generally, for a given p and q,21 
the lower the value of A the more robust a mixed strategy analogy-based expectations 
equilibrium is to optimality based refinement. When A and p are increased individually 
however, without keeping A +  p constant, then over a large domain of parameter 
values an indirect effect dominates these direct effects: increasing A or p  individually 
raises p and q. In robust analogy-based expectations equilibrium this can reduce the 
probability with which the pure take node is observed and also brings this pure take 
closer to q (or p) the expected behaviour necessary for indifference.
Passing and M ixing Equilibria
Mixed strategy analogy-based expectations equilibria may survive refinement in games 
which do not have a robust pure strategy equilibrium involving passing. For example, 
the only pure strategy equilibrium that is robust to optimality based refinement in 
the Doubling Dollar game has the subgame-perfect outcome. However, robust mixed 
strategy equilibria may exist even for relatively small values of N , as shown in Example 
10.7 where t\(p , q) = ^ (p  , q) = 0.0474. In the Centipede game the pure strategy 
passing equilibrium is robust for any level of player sensitivity, providing the game is 
long enough; Proposition 8.3 showed that when N  =  4, 6 \ =  2 ^ ^  =  0.375 and the
20 Recall from Proposition  9.1 th at a m ixed strategy analogy-based ex p ecta tio n s equilibrium  of the  
centipede gam e is also a m ixed strategy  equilibrium  of the doubling dollar gam e.
21 If q — ^ *7 1 ^  tf*6  gam e is norm alised, so m aintaining q m eans raising A and sim ultaneously  
lowering fi.
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optimality based refinement measure t\ = — 0.333. However, for a given length
of the game, N,  the mixed strategy equilibria are dramatically more robust than 
the equilibrium in pure strategies. The consistency and optimality based refinement 
measures for the most robust mixed strategy equilibrium, derived in Examples 10.2 
and 10.7, were 0\ = 0.0060 and t\ =  0.0079. To achieve the same degree of payoff 
robustness, the passing equilibrium requires a Centipede game with at least 126 moves 
for each player; the same degree of consistency based robustness needs N  =  333.
Games of Different Lengths
It was demonstrated in Proposition 9.4 that the pure strategy analogy-based expec­
tations equilibrium of the Centipede game involving passing is robust to refinement 
providing the game is long enough, although increasing N  could not make the pure 
strategy passing equilibrium of the Doubling Dollar game robust to optimality based 
refinement. In mixed strategy equilibria, increasing N  also reduces the probability of 
observing player 2 taking with probability 1 in node X n ,2 - Therefore increasing N  
tends to increase robustness using either consistency or optimality based refinements 
when players mix. Using the intuition that the most robust analogy class involves 
passing slightly more often in turn X\^. to give robustness, approximations for consis­
tency measures can be calculated for the Centipede and Doubling Dollar games for a 
given value of N . This is illustrated in Figure 10.8.
g 0 3 *
e
-O ptimally for C en tp ed e  Game
—  —  C onsistency
. . . .  Optimality for Doubling Dollar Game
E
I  0.2
m■oc
0 1
0
2 3 4 5 76 8 9 10
F igure 10.8: Low er h o u n d s on P layer 's  R efinem ent P aram eters  g iven  N
From Figure 10.8 it is clear that a mixed strategy analogy-based expectations equilib­
rium when N  > 8 can be extremely robust, even in the Doubling Dollar game.
C hapter 11
Extensions and Discussion
The purpose of this analysis has been to investigate which analogy-based expectations 
equilibria are robust when players form their analogy classes endogenously. An analogy 
class is less likely to be refined when it is a reasonable approximation of the opponent’s 
true behaviour and when the utility gain from such refinement is small. Although 
the most robust equilibrium is characterised for illustrative purposes, refinement to 
a unique equilibria is not in the spirit of the analogy class approach. Rather, the 
aim is to provide bounds to rule out unrealistic behaviour for a given sophistication 
level of players. This section will discuss some straightforward extensions of the ideas 
presented before relating them to the literature on bounded rationality in finite horizon 
games in Chapter Twelve.
11.1 M ultip le A nalogy C lasses
The ideas presented in Chapter Ten for refining single analogy classes extend to when 
players form multiple analogy classes. The robustness of an analogy-based expectations 
equilibrium depends on the least robust analogy class within the equilibrium, so it is 
important to refine one analogy class at a time. Firstly, this means assessing each 
analogy class conditional on it being reached. Secondly, the payoffs in the final node 
of an analogy class should be assessed using the analogy-based expectations of future 
behaviour.
If players have multiple analogy classes and play pure strategies, off-the-equilibrium- 
path beliefs are an issue if take occurs before the final node. However, this only arises 
when a player’s best response to an analogy class is strictly to take, so in the mixed 
strategy equilibria developed in Chapter Nine, take can occur before the end of the 
game without this problem arising. For example, consider the following analogy-
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based expectations equilibrium of the four period Centipede game depicted in Fig­
ure 8.2. Players 1 and 2 use behavioural strategy profiles p  =  ( ^ ,  Pa) and
q = ( | ,  1 , l ) 1 respectively and group nodes in which their opponent moves in a
single analogy class so that q = p  = <74 =  1 is required for optimality, and p \  is
irrelevant - both for the analogy-based expectations equilibrium and for the refinement 
measures proposed in this thesis. Taking at node ^ 2 ,3  is optimal for player 2 as beliefs 
off the equilibrium path are specified as p  = ^ by the analogy class. If there is a cost 
of additional analogy classes this could remove classes to which the best response is 
take, if they follow a class in which mixing is expected, as the same strategy could be 
motivated by a single analogy class in which the opponent is expected to mix. More 
generally however, the analogy-based expectations equilibrium approach is consistent 
with players learning to use backwards induction and forming analogy classes finely in 
the last few nodes of the game.
Focusing on analogy classes in which players believe the opponent either passes 
or plays mixed strategies, the approach proposed in this thesis provides an intuitive 
solution to the finite horizon problem: an equilibrium consists of players passing for a 
given number of nodes and then mixing near the end of the game. 2 A top down view 
of the Centipede game when N  = 8  is illustrated in Figure 11.1, in which at each node 
take is equivalent to playing down. In this example, each player forms two analogy 
classes. In player 1 expects player 2 to pass, while in Q2  player 1 expects player 
2  to take with probability q (which leaves player 1 indifferent between passing and 
taking). Player 2 expects player 1 to pass in and mix with probability p  in ^ 2 -
n 2
X7.2
Figure 11.1: T op dow n view  o f th e  C en tip ed e  g am e w hen  N —8
This approach might be even better motivated in longer finitely repeated games. For 
example, if =  100 then the passing stage might last for 90 turns, followed by a 10 
period mixing stage. As discussed, pure take could occur before the end of the game. 
The consistency and optimality based refinement measures, proposed in Chapter Ten, 
'F ind in g  a consistent value for q\  follows by pu ttin g  k = 1 and TV = 3 in P rop osition  4.7:
_ _  i 1 - ?  _  3
91 l - ( l - 5 ) a ( l - p ) a 7
Player 2 m ust take  w ith probability  1 in the final node.
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mean that the sensitivity level of players puts a lower bound on the number of nodes 
in f^ 2 and 4*2 > the analogy classes in which mixing is expected, for the equilibrium to 
be robust. However, as discussed in Section 10.4 and illustrated in Figure 10.8, an 
analogy class in which players expect the opponent to mix need only contain a few 
nodes to achieve this. The refinement measures do not put an upper bound on the 
number of turns of mixing required for an equilibrium to be robust, so for a given level 
of player sensitivity, there are multiple robust analogy equilibria that players might 
learn to coordinate on. The most cooperative of these is that in which pure take occurs 
only in node X m,2 , players use the most robust equilibrium behavioural strategies in 
the mixing stage of the game, and the mixing stage is as short as possible subject to 
achieving a given level of robustness.
When multiple analogy classes are formed, other issues include the structure of 
analogy classes, whether a passing stage could arise after a mixing stage and if mixing 
could occur when a player is expected to pass. Firstly, for a player to be indifferent 
between passing and taking it is necessary that he believes the opponent is mixing, so 
the analogy-based expectations equilibrium restricts the structure of analogy classes 
and behaviour even before refinement is applied. For example in Figure 11.1, if 
and 0 , 2  were combined into a single analogy class fi, then player 1 would expect player 
2 to pass with high probability at all nodes. Player 1 would pass as a best response,3 
making player 2’s expectation that player 1 mixes in inconsistent, breaking the 
equilibrium. This argument means that the boundaries between player l ’s analogy 
classes 'Iq and ^ 2  and the boundary between player 2’s analogy classes 0 \ and O2  
must be close together, as shown in Figure 11.1.
Secondly, at node X ^ 2  in Figure 11.1 player 2 is indifferent between passing and 
taking, yet player 1 expects him to pass. For player 2, passing in X 5 2 is among the 
best responses to his analogy beliefs, and in the most robust analogy class player 1 
mixes with ps < p at node Xq^\, s o  in this case it is generally optimal to pass in X 5 ,2 - 
However, if player 2 mixed at node ^ 5 ,2 , this is consistent with the approach, providing 
player 2 takes with relatively low probability, so player l ’s analogy class, Hi, remains 
robust.
Finally, although the analogy-based expectations equilibrium does not rule out a 
phase in which players are expected to pass following a mixing phase, an equilibrium 
in which this is the case typically has very high consistency and optimality based 
refinement measures, and so would not be robust. For example, consider Figure 11.1
’i f  responding to  0 .2 , player 1 is indifferent betw een passing  and taking, then com bining th is w ith  
f ii  w ill leave player 1 w ith a best response of pass.
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and suppose that players expect their opponents to mix in analogy classes and 
but pass with high probability in analogy classes Q2  and ^ 2 - The expected passing 
in Q2 and ^ 2  means players are no longer indifferent at all nodes in fli and \Pi. To 
mix, they must be indifferent only at nodes X \ a n d  X\ £ ,  in which they take with 
high probability so the opponent’s expectation that they mix is consistent. For player 
2 this strategy is very suboptimal as it involves taking with a high probability even 
though player 1 would actually pass for the next seven nodes! Although not considered 
explicitly, a similar argument can be applied to analogy classes that are not formed 
over an interval.4
In summary, it has been argued that an analogy class in which players expect their 
opponents to mix is generally necessary for robustness and that such a mixing phase 
is likely to be preceded by a period in which both players pass. The most cooperative 
robust analogy based expectations equilibrium is that in which pure take occurs only 
in node Ajv,2> players use the most robust equilibrium behavioural strategies in the 
mixing stage of the game, and the mixing stage is as short as possible (subject to 
satisfying a given level of robustness).
11.2 M onoton icity
The probability of each player taking in an analogy-based expectations equilibrium 
need not be monotonically increasing. However, the previous section argued that 
when players have multiple analogy classes, an equilibrium in which passing behaviour 
is expected to follow mixing behaviour will not be robust. In the most robust mixed 
strategy equilibria, described in Conjectures 10.1 and 10.2, the probably of a player 
passing is weakly monotonic. This is because players offset taking with high probabil­
ity at the end of the game by taking with p < p in the first node of a mixed strategy 
analogy class. More generally, if an analogy class in which a player is expected to 
mix is reasonably long, behaviour towards the end of it is rarely observed, so non­
monotonic strategies are possible. In experiments, monotonicity may be exaggerated 
due to heterogeneity between players. Taking the approach developed in this thesis, 
some players could coordinate on an analogy classes in which they expect one another 
to mix over the last 10 turns while others expect mixing in the last 9 turns. An exper­
imental study would average these behaviours and observe a monotonically increasing 
probability of taking when in fact most mixing occurs with similar probabilities in 
these heterogeneous equilibria.
4 In the sense that it would m ean passing is expected  after a period o f m ixing.
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11.3 D ifferent G am es
This thesis has focused on games in which the problem faced by players is similar at 
every node, so behavioural strategies exist as described in Proposition 8.1, in which 
players are indifferent between passing and taking at every node. The analysis extends 
directly to the case when a game possesses this property only over some range (in which 
mixing occurs). By changing the way in which players form analogy expectations, 
however, the approach could be applied to a broader range of games. For example, 
rather than forming an analogy that "the opponent mixes with probability p" players 
could instead form the analogy "the opponent mixes in such a way that I am indifferent 
at every node within " • This could still generate a specific value of p that is required 
for consistency, or it could be defined more broadly. This is related to Fudenberg and 
Levine’s (1993) notion of a self-confirming equilibrium, in which players form consistent 
beliefs on the equilibrium path, and respond optimally to these beliefs, but adjustment 
does not take place on information sets that are not visited in equilibrium. However, 
if the period of learning were long enough this concept would still lead to a unique 
self-confirming equilibrium which is equivalent to the subgame-perfect equilibrium. 
More generally, analogies such as "the opponent mixes between taking and a trigger 
strategy at the end of the game" might permit robust cooperation in almost perfect 
information games such as the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma.
11.4 G eneralising th e  Solution  C oncept
In this thesis the focus has been on extending the analogy-based expectations equi­
librium to the case when analogy classes are formed endogenously in finite horizon 
paradox games. One of the refinements was based on consistency, restricting the 
range of behaviour that players would group in an analogy. Although it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, this approach could be endogenised as part of the requirement for 
an analogy equilibrium. It was argued that mixing is particularly robust to refinement 
in finite horizon problems. It is possible that being indifferent is considered focal, so 
players form the belief that the opponent is mixing with probability p even though true 
behaviour may deviate from this slightly. Rather than requiring that an analogy-based 
expectation must equal a specific value for consistency, the requirement could be that 
the mean absolute deviation or variance of behaviour from p must be less than some 
constant 77. This approach could be considered similar to an e equilibrium , 0 although 
in this case it is average beliefs which can deviate slightly from a focal analogy "the 
opponent mixes in a way which leaves me indifferent". If players form their beliefs
5 £- equilibrium  (Radner, 1980) is d iscussed in more detail in C hapter Tw elve.
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from a finite history, consistency based on the variance of true behaviour around the 
focal belief could be similar to a statistical hypothesis test (weighted appropriately 
by frequency of observation). This approach introduces consistency based refinement 
into the notion of analogy-based expectations equilibrium directly, while maintaining 
full optimality of player’s best responses. This addresses the idea that it is strategic 
uncertainty which leads to complexity in forming beliefs, in contrast to a difficulty in 
optimising when players form beliefs correctly. When t) = 0 this approach leads to the 
unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, but mixed strategy analogy-based expectations 
equilibria may satisfy this measure of consistency even if 77 is very small.
Chapter 12
Relation to the literature
Chapter Eleven argued that the approach proposed in this thesis provides an intuitive 
solution to the finite horizon problem: an equilibrium consists of players passing for a 
given number of nodes and then mixing towards the end of the game. Such a solution 
was illustrated in Figure 11.1, which shows a top down view of the Centipede game, 
where at every node take is equivalent to playing down. In this example, each player 
forms two analogy classes. In and 'I'i players expect their opponent to pass, while 
in and ^ 2  they expect their opponent to mix in a way that leaves them indiffer­
ent between mixing and passing. Chapter Ten showed that when players form their 
analogy classes endogenously, a mixed strategy equilibrium can be extremely robust 
to consistency and optimality based refinement. This chapter will relate the concepts 
underlying this approach to other attempts to resolve finite horizon paradoxes. Three 
particularly relevant approaches are those of machine games, incomplete information 
and models which argue for simplicity of beliefs. The discussion will finish by consid­
ering other important approaches.
Incom plete Information
Kreps et al. (1982) show that long periods of passing can be sustained in the finitely 
repeated prisoner’s dilemma with incomplete information. Specifically, there is a small 
chance that one of the players is irrational and plays a tit-for-tat strategy. Even when 
the chance of being irrational is very small, it is optimal for rational players to maintain 
a reputation for being tit-for-tat players to convince the opponent to cooperate until 
late in the game. A similar approach can be used to generate passing in the Centipede 
game when there is a small probability that player 2 is a cooperative type who plays 
the strategy always pass. Players update their beliefs about whether the opponent is 
cooperative using Bayes’ law (this is necessary even in the Centipede game as players 
mix at some point). A perfect Bayesian equilibrium can be sustained in which players
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pass for some periods, followed by mixing, then finally taking. Although this ap­
proach generates a similar equilibrium to that proposed in this thesis, the motivation 
is very different. In the mixed strategy analogy-based expectations equilibria, players 
are boundedly rational and form simple beliefs, for example that the opponent passes 
in the first 70 nodes of a centipede game and mixes in the last 30. In the incom­
plete information model of the Centipede game, players update their beliefs about the 
probability that their opponent is crazy by applying Bayes’ law throughout the game, 
effectively making belief formation more complex.
Refinem ent of Beliefs
In the Centipede game, Spiegler (2002) demonstrates that always pass may be an 
equilibrium in justifiable strategies. This is a procedurally rational concept based on 
the idea that players need to justify their strategies ex post by offering a hypothesis 
about their opponent’s strategy. The hypothetical strategies are simple, in the sense 
that they are modelled as single state finite automata.1 As well as the subgame-perfect 
equilibrium, an equilibrium in justifiable strategies exists for the Centipede game in 
which player 1 always passes and player 2 takes only in the final period. Although 
these are the two pure strategy equilibria of the analogy-based expectations approach 
when players have the coarsest analogy groupings,2 this can be contrasted with the 
importance placed on mixed strategies in this analysis.
Naturally the approach taken in this thesis closely follows Jehiel (2005), which 
introduces the analogy-based expectations equilibrium and applies it to a broader range 
of games. The contribution of this thesis is to endogenise the formation of analogy 
classes within a specific class of games, and use this to motivate the importance of 
mixed strategies when forming analogies in finite horizon problems. Another approach 
is taken by McKelvey and Palfrey (1998) who use the quantal response equilibrium 
to analyse the Centipede game. In the quantal response equilibrium, players use a 
probabilistic choice function which leads to them making small errors, and account for 
the fact that other players may make errors when forming their beliefs. In equilibrium 
the probabilities determining the expected utilities of different strategies equal the 
probabilities with which players choose a specific strategy.3 In contrast, given their 
beliefs, players do not make errors in an analogy-based expectations equilibrium.
' in  contrast, in an analogy-based expecta tions equilibrium  players m ust have consisten t beliefs.
2 T he pure strategy analogy-based expectations equilibria are derived in Jehiel (2005).
-,T he solution concept is that of sequential equilbrium  as these  errors are not realised until a player  
actually  moves.
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Machine Games
The idea of using machine strategies to model players in finite horizon problems was 
introduced in the context of the prisoner’s dilemma by Neyman(1985).4 Rubinstein 
(1998) provides a general discussion of this approach. The underlying motivation of 
these models is that the complexity of a strategy can be represented by the number of 
states in the machine necessary to implement it. Players have effectively one decision, 
to choose a machine at the start. Strategies such as always pass and always take can 
be implemented without counting, and so need only one state. However, a strategy 
such as take in the nth turn requires a machine with at least n states to identify the 
nth period and implement it. If players have limited ability to count, or counting is 
costly (represented by a bounded number of states or a cost of additional states) then 
the strategy take in the final node may be costly for the second player to implement. If 
these costs or limits are significant, always pass may be superior and the cooperative 
outcome occurs. If the costs or limits are not significant then both players choose 
machines which always take, leading to the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome. 
Therefore simple machine games cannot generate the strategy in which player 2 takes 
in the final node, nor the periods of mixing proposed for robust mixed strategy analogy- 
based expectations equilibrium in the Centipede game. In games such as the Doubling 
Dollar game the only equilibrium in simple strategies corresponds to the subgame- 
perfect equilibrium.
Other Approaches
Other related concepts of bounded rationality include Radner’s (1980) notion of perfect 
e equilibrium. This is applied to a finitely repeated Cournot game, in which firms use 
trigger strategies providing deviating does not confer a benefit greater than e given 
the opponent’s strategy. This reflects the idea that it is somehow costly to discover 
and implement the true best response. Although similar to the idea of optimality 
based refinement proposed in this thesis, the spirit behind it is quite different. Radner 
permits deviations to increase the set of equilibria and allow a cooperative outcome, 
while this thesis uses a related approach to reduce the set of mixed strategy analogy- 
based expectations equilibria. If e > 2 then always pass is a pure strategy equilibrium 
for both players in the Centipede game (as player 2 does not have a sufficient incentive 
to change his strategy) but not the Doubling Dollar game.0
*In the protocol proposed by N eym an (1985) players use to  send m essages at the start o f  th e  gam e  
in a repeated prisoner’s dilem m a is not appropriate in the class o f gam es considered in th is paper, as 
taking ends the game.
T n  C entipede like gam es th is interpretation, which corresponds more closely to  R adner’s a lternative  
definition o f e-equilibrium  (see Radner, 1980) seem s more natural.
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This literature review has focused on how bounded rationality has been used to 
explain cooperation in finite horizon paradoxes. There are a number of other ap­
proaches which could be used. Particularly relevant to the Centipede game is the 
literature on psychological games of which Dufwenberg (2006) provides an excellent 
review. Psychological games allow utility functions to include beliefs. This is necessary 
when modelling reciprocity, in order to deduce the motivation behind an opponent’s 
actions, so a player knows whether to respond with kindness or unkindness (Rabin, 
1993). Another approach is that of learning, or machine learning. Ponti (2000) shows 
that eventually the Centipede game converges to the backwards induction solution if 
players are represented by continuous-time monotonic selection dynamics. Although 
he finds that this solution may be unstable, this is partly linked to the specification 
he chooses for the Centipede game, which in the notation in this thesis means that 
p = q = j  and even p = q = §§. When players optimally pass even if they believe their 
opponent takes with up to 95% probability, it is not surprising that such dynamics 
may take a long time to converge to the subgame-perfect equilibrium, if the starting 
strategies are far from equilibrium and when there is a reasonably large chance of er­
rors (drift in this class of models). However, the paper provides a convincing argument 
supporting backwards induction when players observe their opponent’s strategies.
Chapter 13 
Conclusion
An analogy-based expectations equilibrium (Jehiel, 2005) involves players bundling 
nodes at which their opponents move into analogy classes, and forming expectations 
that the opponents behave in the same way within each class. At every node players 
choose a best response to their beliefs and expectations are consistent with the aver­
age behaviour within an analogy class. The contribution of this thesis has been to 
investigate which analogy-based expectations equilibria are robust when players form 
analogy classes endogenously. The underlying idea is that players form their analogy 
classes from the same long history of past games in which they learn to have consistent 
analogy-based expectations. Players are less likely to form analogy classes over nodes 
in which the opponent’s behaviour is very different, and form analogies more carefully 
when suboptimal actions could prove very costly.
Formal analysis was carried out on a class of games of complete and perfect infor­
mation, intended as a generalisation of the Centipede game, in which there is a finite 
horizon paradox. Although it seems reasonable for players to pass for some periods 
when the game is long (and such behaviour is supported experimentally) this class of 
games has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in which players take at every node. 
Several approaches attempt to resolve this, including models of bounded rationality 
which are discussed in Chapter Twelve. In this class of games the analogy approach 
is particularly relevant because the decision faced by the opponent at each node is 
very similar, and the problem facing a player would be very simple if  he knew his 
opponent’s strategy. Complexity arises because the opponent’s exact strategy is un­
known, and therefore focusing on a method which simplifies beliefs directly, rather 
than simplifying strategies, is particularly appropriate.
In any analogy-based expectations equilibrium involving only pure strategies, one 
player must observe his opponent take with probability 1 at a node in which he ex­
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pected the opponent to pass with high probability.1 It was argued that the intro­
duction of mixed strategy analogy classes has two effects which are likely to make an 
analogy-based expectations equilibrium more robust. Firstly, taking with probability 
1 (which is inevitable at some point) is closer to mixing than it is to passing. Secondly, 
although the equilibrium still involves one of the players taking with certainty at some 
point, this node is only be observed with a relatively low frequency. Finally, mixing 
behaviour could be considered more complex to evaluate than pure strategies, so the 
formation of analogy classes is perhaps more natural when the opponent uses mixed 
strategies.
Introducing the idea of robustness serves the joint purpose of reducing the set 
of mixed strategy equilibria and formally capturing the idea that players form their 
analogy classes endogenously. Two methods of refinement were proposed, based on 
restricting the variation of behaviour permitted within an analogy class, and putting 
an upper bound on the suboptimality of a player’s actions resulting from an analogy 
class. This type of optimality based refinement allows the robustness of the analogy- 
based expectations equilibrium to be linked to the underlying parameters which specify 
the game. In games in which a large part of the increase in payoffs is additive (with a 
high parameter p), such as the Centipede game, cooperative equilibria were found to 
be more robust to optimality based refinement than games where the scaling of payoffs 
(represented by parameter A) creates a much stronger incentive to be the first player 
to take (such as the Doubling Dollar game).
Although the two approaches to refinement are separate (and have different do­
mains) it was shown that they are closely related and lead to very similar restrictions 
on behavioural strategies. In addition, mixed strategies may be dramatically more 
robust than pure strategies involving passing. For example, the consistency and op­
timality based refinement measures for the most robust mixed strategy equilibrium, 
derived in Examples 10.2 and 10.7, were 9\ = 0.0060 and t\ — 0.0079 when N  = 4. 
To achieve the same degree of payoff robustness, the passing equilibrium would need a 
Centipede game with 126 moves for each player; the same degree of consistency based 
robustness would require N  = 333. This intuition was extended to the case when play­
ers form multiple analogy classes. For a given level of sophistication, a repeated game 
with many nodes has multiple combinations of robust analogy classes, which could 
be thought as representing different degrees of coordination between the players. The 
approach proposed in this thesis provides an intuitive solution to the finite horizon 
problem: an equilibrium consists of players passing for a given number of nodes and
E x c e p t  the unique subgam e perfect N ash equilibrium .
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then mixing towards the end of the game. Such a solution is illustrated in Figure 11.1, 
which shows a top down view of the Centipede game, where at every node taking is 
equivalent to playing down. In this example, each player forms two analogy classes. 
In Oi and players expect their opponent to pass, while in O2  and ^  players expect 
their opponent to mix with probabilities which leave them indifferent. A promising 
extension of this approach was discussed in Section 11.4, which proposed a generali­
sation of the solution concept, relaxing the consistency requirement so that the mean 
absolute deviation (or variance) of behaviour from p must be less than some constant 
77. This analysis addresses the idea that it is strategic uncertainty which leads to com­
plexity in forming beliefs, in contrast to a difficulty in optimising when players form 
beliefs correctly.
Part III
Common Value M ulti-U nit 
Auctions
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Disclaimer: This part of the thesis is a revised, restructured and extended adap­
tation of my MPhil thesis, titled "IPO Auctions" and intended as a more applied 
paper. As well as this change in focus, Chapters 16 and 17 formalise proofs that were 
only sketched in the original. Previously, many equilibria were omitted and the pro­
posed equilibria of the Vickrey and Uniform auctions in Chapters 18 (and some in 
Chapter 17) were incorrect (the former constitutes a major result of this thesis). As 
well as these corrections, Chapter 18 also extends the analysis of the discriminatory 
auction to compare it more completely to the analysis of the auction for the bundle. 
Chapter 19 and almost all of Chapter 20 is entirely new.
Chapter 14
Introduction
Although the understanding of auctions where bidders have multi-unit demand is grow­
ing, most of the literature focuses on the cases in which bidders have either indepen­
dent private valuations or constant marginal valuations for all additional units. This 
thesis explores the implications for efficiency and expected revenue of using different 
multi-unit auction mechanisms when bidders have multi-unit demand and a common 
valuation V m for the mth object they win. The information and payoff structure is 
that bidders have independently distributed signals and value the first object they win 
at the average of bidders’ signals. 1 It is assumed for simplicity that there are two 
bidders and two objects for auction, so for bidder i, V^ 1 =  f (s* +  sj). The extent to 
which the results generalise will be discussed at the end of the thesis.
This analysis shows that unlike the case when bidders have independent private 
values, common value auctions may decompose into multiple single-unit auctions in 
equilibrium because of the way bidders adjust their strategies to allow for the winner’s 
curse. When bidders have increasing or decreasing marginal valuations for additional 
units, these auctions are asymmetric, so insights from the analysis of asymmetric auc­
tions can be used to analyse the discriminatory and Vickrey auctions. It is shown 
that revenue equivalence holds when bidders have constant or increasing marginal 
valuations, although the uniform price auction has an additional demand reduction 
equilibrium which is inefficient and generates low revenue; in addition, all of the auc­
tions considered have equilibria which involve bidders submitting flat demand curves 
(bj = b?), which are not supported empirically. This motivates the introduction of 
decreasing marginal valuations in Chapter Eighteen, in which case second-price auc­
tions are efficient but yield low revenues. The discriminatory auction raises the most 
revenue of all the auctions considered, including auctioning the bundle, although it is
^ h i s  is a m odified version o f the wallet gam e proposed by K lem perer (1998).
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not generally efficient.
Chapter Twenty-One will consider some empirical results from experimental eco­
nomics and treasury auctions. While some of the empirical results are explained by 
introducing more units and bidders, others, such as overbidding on a first unit, can 
only be explained by introducing bounded rationality, which seems reasonable as the 
complexity and uncertainty of the situation make it harder to condition on winning 
and to calculate optimal bidding strategies. Even if most bidders are able to fully 
comprehend the multi-unit auction, the presence of a few smaller bidders who are 
boundedly rational may introduce supply uncertainty. Generalisation of the model 
will show that expected revenue in the uniform price auction is non-monotonic as the 
number of bidders and units changes; this is reinforced by bounded rationality as in 
some cases implicitly collusive equilibria can be supported by simple bidding strategies.
14.1 Independent P rivate Value A uctions
Traditionally the theory of single-unit auctions has focused on first- and second-price, 
sealed-bid auctions, ascending auctions and descending auctions. Assuming that bid­
ders are risk neutral and have independent private valuations, Vickrey (1961) showed 
that these four different mechanisms generate the same expected revenue, equal to the 
expected valuation of the second highest bidder. The intuition behind this is briefly 
analysed, as the revenue equivalence theorem applies to the case when the objects are 
sold in a bundle, either explicitly by the auctioneer or implicitly as a feature of the 
equilibrium.
In the first-price, sealed-bid auction each bidder submits a bid without observing 
the bid of any other player; the highest bid wins the auction and the winning bidder 
pays a price equal to this bid. This is strategically equivalent to the descending auction 
in which the auctioneer continuously lowers the price until a bidder takes the item at 
its current price. Each bidder faces a trade off; raising their bid increases the chance 
of winning, but lowering it increases the surplus they receive if they do win. Each 
bidder’s strategy is a function of his own private valuation and his prior beliefs about 
the valuations of the other bidders. If there are N  bidders each with valuation S{ 
drawn independently from a uniform distribution over [0  , 1 ] then there is a unique 
symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which each player uses a bidding strategy
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bi (S{) =  Therefore the expected revenue raised is:
E max (bi (Si)) =  E
N  -  1 
max I — —— SiN
N  -  1 
N E max (Si)
N  - 1  N N  - I
N  N  + 1 N  + 1 
This is equal to the expected valuation of the second highest bidder,
N  - 1E  [second highest Si\ = N  +  1
In an ascending auction each bidder can raise the current price. The auction ends 
when no bidder will raise the price further and the last bidder to raise the price wins 
the auction and pays the current price. In this mechanism it is a dominant strategy 
for bidders to raise the current price until their own valuation is reached. Thus the 
bidder with the highest valuation wins the auction and pays the price at which the 
second highest bidder drops out, meaning that the revenue raised equals the actual 
valuation of the second highest bidder.
In the Vickrey auction (second-price, sealed-bid in the single-unit case) each bidder 
submits a bid without observing the bids of any other players. The highest bid wins the 
auction but the winning bidder pays the price of the second highest bid. It is a weakly 
dominant strategy for players to bid their true valuations. If they bid above their 
valuation, then reducing their bid only reduces the probability of winning in situations 
where they would receive a negative surplus. If they bid below their valuation then 
increasing their bid increases the probability of them winning without reducing the 
surplus they receive if they win. Therefore the bidder with the highest valuation wins 
the object and the revenue raised is equal to the second highest bidder’s valuation.
14.2 C om m on V alue A uctions
In common value auctions winning provides the same utility to all bidders, but ini­
tially they have incomplete information of this value. Rational bidders should adjust 
their strategies to avoid the winner’s curse. This is an empirical phenomenon used 
to describe the case when bidders fail to realise that winning implies bad news about 
the valuations of other players, reducing their own expected valuation conditional on 
winning the unit. In equilibrium, fully rational bidders avoid the winner’s curse by 
basing their bids on the value of the object conditional on winning it rather than on 
an unconditional expected valuation.
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If there are three or more bidders with affiliated signals, 2 so that a higher realisation 
for one bidder makes a higher realisation for another more likely, then the revenue 
equivalence theorem breaks down because of the linkage principle. This is because 
in second-price auctions, the expected price paid by a bidder is now increasing in his 
signal (as the second highest bid is positively correlated with his signal) so bidders with 
high signals pay more. This is not the case in first-price auctions and therefore the 
expected revenue from a second-price auction is greater than that for a second-price 
auction. In the wallet game bidders have common values but independent signals, so 
in the symmetric case the revenue equivalence theorem holds.
Clearly other factors affect the practical choice of an auction. For example, if 
there are few bidders then a first-price auction might be more robust to collusion, as it 
provides bidders with a strong incentive to cheat on any pre-agreed bidding strategies. 
Secondly, small asymmetries can have a very large effect on equilibrium strategies and 
revenues in second-price auctions, as the winner’s curse is greatly magnified for weaker 
bidders, so a first-price auction might be chosen to maximise expected revenue. Other 
factors such as the presence of budget constraints or when entry is endogenous might 
also affect the choice of auction format.
14.3 M ulti-U n it A uctions
All sealed-bid multi-unit auctions considered in this thesis have the same allocation 
rule. Bidder i submits k marginal bids b^. The auctioneer aggregates all the bids to 
form a demand curve, and awards a unit to the K  highest bids. This reordering of 
bids constrains bidders to submit weakly decreasing demand curves, so when there 
are two units b*+l > 6 * V (k , s , i). This does not affect the equilibrium outcomes 
developed in this thesis. 3 For example, when there are two units in the auction if 
bidder i submitted bids of (0.6, 0.3) and bidder j  submitted bids of (0.4, 0.1), each 
bidder would be allocated a single-unit. This example is illustrated in Figure 14.1.4
2M ilgrom and Weber (1982).
,!W hen bidders have constant or dim inishing m arginal valuations, it is optim al to  su bm it weakly  
decreasing dem and curves. W hen bidders have increasing m arginal valuations, in equilibria o f the  
com m on values m odel developed in th is paper, typically both  units will be awarded to  th e  sam e  
bidder, so it is b\ + bf which is im portant, not the individual bids. T his will be d iscussed  in more 
detail at the end o f Chapter 6.
4 T he auctioneer satisfies the h ighest m arginal bids first, effectively constraining each b idder’s stra t­
egy space so that b\ > because o f the way the auctioneer com piles them .
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Supply
F igu re  14.1: A ggregated  bid fu n ction s
Figure 14.1 is also useful for illustrating different payment rules in the auction. In the 
discriminatory auction, bidders pay their winning bids for each unit they are awarded, 
so in the example above, bidder i pays a total bid of b\ = 0 . 6  and bidder j  pays 
bj =  0.4. If there is only one unit being auctioned then the discriminatory auction is 
equivalent to a first-price, sealed-bid auction.
In the uniform price auction, each bidder pays the same price for every unit won. 
Consistent with the literature, this thesis follows Friedman (1960) and develops ex­
plicitly the uniform price auction where the price equals the highest losing bid. Al­
ternatively, it could equal the lowest winning bid or some price between these bids. 
Assuming bidders pay the highest losing bid then in the example above both i and j  
pay b2 = 0.3, as each wins one unit. In the single-unit sealed-bid second-price auc­
tion it is a weakly dominant strategy for each bidder to bid his valuation, but in the 
multi-unit case this truthfulness property is lost. There is a chance that any bid after 
the first will become the marginal bid that determines the price paid for all units won, 
so bidders engage in demand reduction, reducing bids on later units to reduce the 
expected price they will pay for earlier units, and therefore increasing their surplus.
In the Vickrey auction for multiple units , 0 bidders pay the auctioneer’s opportunity 
cost for each unit won. For bidder i this equals the sum of the bids which would have 
won a unit if bidder i had not bid in the auction. In the example illustrated in 
Figure 14.1 bidder i pays b2 and bidder j  pays b2. In the case of independent private 
valuations the Vickrey auction gives bidders the incentive to bid their valuations. In
°In this paper, "Vickrey auction" refers to  the m ulti-unit Vickrey auction. T he second-price sealed- 
bid auction for a single unit is referred to  as a second-price auction.
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the case of common values and diminishing marginal valuations, this thesis shows that 
the Vickrey auction may be undesirable. In addition, Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) 
show that there may be monotonicity problems with the Vickrey auction when the 
objects are not substitutes, as additional bidders may lower expected revenue. The 
assumption of common values and symmetry between bidders assumed in this thesis 
avoids this problem, as implicit bundling occurs when bidders have increasing marginal 
demands. 6
In general, intramarginal bids submitted in the discriminatory auction are gener­
ally lower, as bidders aim to pay just above the clearing price. This is less important 
in a uniform price auction as each bidder pays the same regardless of what they bid. 
Much of the literature relating to treasury auctions is aimed at determining whether 
uniform price or discriminatory auctions raise more revenue. In the discriminatory 
auction, several papers show flat demand curves occur in equilibrium (see Back and 
Zender, 1993, Lebrun and Tremblay, 2003 and Ausubel 2004). This motivates the 
introduction of decreasing marginal valuations. In uniform price auctions, the exis­
tence of low revenue equilibria is well established (see Wilson, 1979, Back and Zender, 
1993, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Khan, 1998). The contribution of this paper is to 
analyse decreasing marginal valuations and show that this can lead to the low revenue 
equilibrium being unique. Secondly it considers the introduction of additional bid­
ders and units, and argues that as bidding strategies are simple when the number of 
units is perfectly divisible by the number of bidders, bounded rationality may support 
significant non-monotonicities.
6 W hen units are com plem ents bidders would choose to  bid b\ >  b} in equilibrium  w hen they  have  
increasing m arginal valuations.
Chapter 15
The M odel
The model attempts to capture the strategic implications of an auction in which bid­
ders have multi-unit demand for objects and a common value V m for the m th unit they 
win. The information and payoff structure is such that bidders have independently 
distributed signals and value for the first object they win at the average of bidder’s 
signals. 1 It is assumed for simplicity that there are two bidders and two objects for 
auction, so for bidder t, V* =  \  (s* -I- sj). Signals are uniformly distributed over the 
range [0 , 1]. The aim of this analysis is to develop a simple model which is tractable 
for a range of different valuation scales. The extent to which the model generalises 
will be discussed at the end of the thesis. In addition, it will be shown that introduc­
ing bounded rationality may mitigate some of the extreme theoretical results while 
reinforcing others. This is a particularly relevant consideration in multi-unit auctions, 
which are often complex.
Although bidders have a common value V m for the mth unit they win, they may 
not have constant marginal valuations for every unit. Both bidders derive the same 
utility  ^ (si -|- sj) from winning a single-unit and (s{ 4 - s j) from winning two units. 
The subsequent analysis will focus on three cases. When a = 1 bidders have constant 
marginal valuations so V{1 = V? = S t . When a  < 1 bidders have diminishing 
marginal valuations and V? < V^ . Finally there may be situations when bidders have 
increasing marginal valuations, for example when winning a second unit gives a bidder 
monopoly power. In this final case a  > 1 and V? > V^1.
Bidder i submits a marginal bid of h™ for each unit m. Inverse bid functions are 
defined such that (f>™ (bis the inverse of so tif(si) gives player z’s bid for a
second unit (as a function of s )^ and the inverse (J>f(b) determines the signal necessary 
for bidder i to submit a bid of b for the second unit. The allocation rule is the same in
'T h is is a m odified version of the w allet gam e proposed by K lem perer (1998).
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all the auctions considered, with the two highest marginal bids each receiving one unit. 
This constrains bidders to submitting downward sloping demand curves, as b\ > b2. 
Allowing bidders to submit specific bids for their first and second units does not affect 
the equilibria which are developed explicitly in this thesis . 2
In the formal analysis, bidders rationally compensate for the winner’s curse by 
conditioning their expectations of the value of the objects on the possible outcomes. 3 
If 6] > b2 then the expectation of sj is lower the more units bidder i wins. As b\ ^  b2 
for both bidders, the outcome for bidder i can be broken down into three cases:
Case 1: Bidder i wins two units b2 > b) => Sj < (pj (&2)
b )  > b i = >  sj >  4>) ( 6 ? )
b i > b j  = >  S J <  4>2j  (&J)
4>) (bf) < Sj < <p] (b})
Case 3: Bidder i wins zero units b2 >  b! = > * > $  W )
T ab le  15.1: A llo ca tio n s  C o n d itio n a l on s j
This is summarised in Figure 15.1 which shows how different allocations depend 
on the realisation of S j .  As Sj  is uniformly distributed the probability of winning a 
given number of units is represented by the length of the line between thresholds, and 
the expected value of Sj  conditional on winning a given number of units is given by 
the midpoint of a section of the line. Figure 18.1 gives a specific example of how this 
is derived for the discriminatory auction when a  =  | .
i wins 2  i wins 1 i wins 0
4>j (ft?) <t>j (b!) Sj
F igu re  15.1: A llo ca tio n s  co n d it io n a l on Sj
If in equilibrium (b2) ^  4>2 (6 | )  and (p\ ^  <f)2 (bi^j always binds then implicit
bundling occurs, as both units are always allocated to the same player.
The probabilities and expectations are summarised on the following page. To avoid 
complicating the notation further, all of the optimisation carried out by bidder i is 
conditional on the signal s*. This notation is omitted, but unless otherwise s ta ted  all
2 T his is because when bj >  b? binds, it does so for all bidders and all signals, lead ing to  im plicit 
bundling. T his will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Seventeen.
3 Chapter Tw enty-O ne will discuss the im pact of bidders failing to fully com pensate for the w inner’s
curse.
Case 2: Bidder i wins one unit
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expectations and probabilities in this thesis are conditional on a bidder’s signal. In 
addition bid functions are generally written without including signals.
Probability of bidder 
i winning one unit only:
Pr (w inl) = (bj) -  </>} (6?)
Probability of bidder 
i winning two units:
Pr (win2) =  0] ( )
Expectation of s, conditional on _ r . n <f>?(b1)+4>1(b2)E  [Sj I w in lj  =  ■ w 2 ■ l J
bidder i winning one unit:
Expectation of Sj conditional on ^  r { . ol <j>\(bf)
£/ [Sj | 'UJl/Tl/Jtij — ^
bidder i winning two units:
The allocation rule is to award a unit to each of the two highest marginal bids, so 
these probabilities apply to all the different auction formats considered in this thesis. 
However, the expected payments will depend on the type of auction used. Bidder i 
aims to maximise expected surplus:
Net payoff to bidder i for winning one unit: ft+fj _
Net payoff to bidder i for winning two units: (s^ +  Sj) — pf
For example, in the discriminatory auction bidders pay their own bids, so the price 
paid when winning one unit is bj, and the price paid conditional on winning two units 
is bj +  tif. Bidder i aims to maximise expected surplus:
Ui = E  [surplus]
= E  
+E
S i  +  S -1 — pj | w inl Pr (w inl)
(Si +  sj) —p2{ | win2 Pr(win2) (15.1)
This is because the events of winning either one or two units are mutually exclusive 
and the expected surplus conditional on winning no units is zero in the auction formats 
considered here.
Chapter 16
Decom position and First Order 
Conditions
This section demonstrates that the discriminatory and Vickrey auctions decompose 
into two single-unit auctions when the requirement that b\ > bj V (s , i ) does not 
constrain the optimal bids in equilibrium. The intuition is that for either bidder to 
win a second unit, he competes against his opponent’s bid for a first unit. This section 
will also develop the first order conditions for the uniform price auction and derive the 
first-price, sealed-bid auction for the bundle of units. Later sections will show that 
these first order conditions form part of an equilibrium, allowing the efficiency and 
revenues of these different auction mechanisms to be compared.
16.1 T he D iscrim inatory A uction
In the discriminatory auction bidder i pays a bid of bj conditional on winning one unit 
and bj +  bj conditional on winning two units. The expected surplus can be calculated 
by substituting pj = bj and pj =  bj +  bj into Equation 8.1, as well as the probabilities 
and conditional expectations of sj in Table 15.1.
U i E
+ E
1
4
S i  -(- S j  j  .— — 0 ,- w inl
2
1 4- a
Pr (winl)
(.S i  +  S j )  -  (bj +  bj) | win2 Pr(iom2)
(2st +  d>) (bj) +  $  (bj) -  46J) [d>) (6}) -  $  (6?)]
+  (2(1 +  a) Si +  (1 +  a) <j>) (bj) -  4(6] +  bj)) 0] (6?)
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Differentiating Ui with respect to 6*and b2 gives the following first order conditions:
d U i
d b j
d U i
^ h  + $  (*>!)] -  *>! <t>f (f>!) -  $  (&,1)
The first order conditions for bidder j  are the same due to symmetry.
P ro p o sitio n  16.1 When bids are increasing, continuous functions of signals the dis­
criminatory auction decomposes into multiple first-price, sealed-bid single-unit auc­
tions providing that h\ > iff V (s , i) does not constrain the optimal bids in equilibrium.
Proof. The first order conditions for b\ and b2 are:
q
\  I®.+ <q(*><)] - bi (bi) = (bi)
h [S j+ m  -  q]  m ^  w ( 16.1)
Assuming that the condition b\ > b2 V (s , i) does not constrain the optimal bids, 
in equilibrium bj and b2 can be solved independently of bl- and b2, as neither these 
bids nor their inverses enter these first order conditions. This is equivalent to the 
equilibrium of an asymmetric first-price, sealed-bid auction for a single-unit. The 
same applies to bids b2 and by symmetry. ■
The intuition behind this result is that bidder Vs bid for a first unit competes 
against bidder j 's bid for a second unit. This decomposition relies on the assumption 
that it is not optimal to set b2 > b\ in the equilibria of these single-unit, first-price 
auctions, so in the multi-unit auction bj > bj does not constrain the optimal strategies 
for either player. It will be shown that the assumption of common values, leading to 
the winner’s curse, means that in equilibrium bj > b2 constrains the optimal strategies 
either at all signals or none, depending on the parameter a. If a  > 1, it always binds 
so bj = b2 V (s , i) and the discriminatory auction results in implicit bundling, as both 
units will always be allocated to the same bidder. If q < 1 then bj > b2 does not 
constrain the optimal bids in equilibrium, and the discriminatory auction decomposes 
into multiple first-price, sealed-bid single-unit auctions. It is worth noting that when 
a = 1, both of these statements hold, so the constant marginal valuations most often 
dealt with in the literature is actually a special case where the auction both decomposes 
and leads to implicit bundling.
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16.2 T he V ickrey A uction
In the Vickrey auction bidders pay the opportunity cost of their bid to the auctioneer. 
When there are two bidders this is the second highest bid for each unit they win.1 
Therefore if bidder i wins a single-unit he pays bj, bidder j ’s bid for a second unit. If 
bidder i wins both units then he pays (bj + bj^ . Bidder i is not aware of j/’s bids but 
can form the following expectations conditional on winning either one or two units.
m )
Expected bid paid conditional 
on bidder i winning one unit:
Expected total bid paid conditional 
on bidder i winning two units:
E bj | w in l
E bj +  bj | win2
; ( » ; R ( ^  /  bi (x)dx
m )
m )J  b )(x )+ tj(x )d o
These bids can be substituted into the expression for expected surplus derived in 
Equation 15.1:
U i E St ^  — bj | w inl Pr (w inl) -|- E ( H r ^ )  ^  +  ~ b) ~  h2j  i w i n 2 Pr(m n2)
[2 * +  rf?(i}) + ^  (6?)] (* ? (* } )-* } (» ? ))
-4  j  tf(x )d x  + (1 + a) [2s< +  0} (6?)] <t>) (6?) - 4  [  b'j(x) + bj(x)d:,
* m  0
Differentiating Ui with respect to b\ and bj gives the following:
dUi
db}
dUj
H [« + 4>) (6?)] -  (6?)
P ro p o sitio n  16.2 When bids are continuous, increasing functions of signals the mul­
tiple unit Vickrey auction decomposes into multiple second-price, sealed-bid single-unit 
auctions, providing that bj > bj V (s , i) does not constrain the optimal bids in equi­
librium.
Proof. The first order conditions for b] and bj can be calculated as follows:
1 J
b) ^ [sj +  4>j (6})] -  bj <j>J (hi) =  0
^h+0j(6|)]-6?l^(6?)=O (16.2)
Tn this simple case of two bidders and one-dimensional signals the Vickrey auction is straightfor­
ward to implement. The problems which arise in these other cases will be discussed at the end of this 
part of the thesis.
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Assuming that the condition bj > bj does constrain the optimal bids, the equilib­
rium bids bj and bj can be solved independently of bj and bj, as neither these bids nor 
their inverses enter these first order conditions. This is equivalent to the equilibrium of 
an asymmetric second-price, sealed-bid auction for a single-unit. An equivalent result 
can be derived for bj and bj by symmetry. ■
The intuition used to motivate the decomposition of the discriminatory auction 
also applies to the Vickrey auction. Bidder Vs bid for a first unit competes against 
bidder j ’s bid for a second unit. This decomposition depends on the assumption 
that it is not optimal to set bj < bj in the equilibria of these single-unit, second- 
price auctions, so in the multi-unit auction bj > bj does not constrain the optimal 
strategies for either player. As with the discriminatory auction, it will be shown that 
the requirement bj > bj V (s , i) constrains the optimal strategies either at all signals 
or none, depending on the parameter a , so either the Vickrey auction decomposes into 
two single-unit auctions or it results in implicit bundling, as both units will always be 
allocated to the same bidder. When implicit bundling occurs the Vickrey auction is 
equivalent to the single-unit, second-price, sealed-bid auction for the bundle of units.
16.3 T he U niform  P rice A uction
In the uniform price auction the same price is paid for every unit won. In the case 
developed here explicitly this is the highest losing bid. As bj > bj V s, if bidder i 
wins two units he pays a price of 2bj. If each bidder wins one unit then they both pay 
M ax  |'bj , bj^j. Bidder i will not know j ’s bids in advance, but can form expectations 
of the price conditional on winning either one or two units. The full derivation of this 
auction is in Appendix C.2, giving the following differentials for bidder i:
dUj
dbj
m
dbj
i  [Si + ^  ( ( , ] ) ] # ( t } )
a
L2 h  +  $  (b?)] -  6?1 <t>}' (6?) +  &} (b2i ) -  $  (6?)
P ro p o sitio n  16.3 I f there is an implicit bundling equilibrium of the Vickrey auction 
in which bj =  bj V (s , i), this is also an equilibrium of the highest losing bid uniform  
price auction.
P roof. The first order conditions for bj and bj in the highest losing bid uniform 
price auction are:
b] \  [s. +  $  (6|)] -  f>! <p]' (i>l) = 0
(16.3)
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If (>}(»)= 4? (s) V s , i is an equilibrium of the Vickrey auction then it must be true 
that inverting these conditions (jff (b) = 4>\ (b) V s , i. Therefore <pj (bj'j — 4>\ =  0
and the first order conditions for the uniform price auction are identical to those of 
the Vickrey auction. Chapter Seventeen will demonstrate that this constitutes an 
equilibrium. ■
In the highest losing bid uniform price auction the first order condition for a bid on 
the first unit is identical to that for the Vickrey auction. For the second unit, bidders 
submit bids weakly below those in the Vickrey auction. This is deduced by considering 
bidder j ’s bid for a second unit, bj, as b\ > bj V (s , i) implies that (fj (6) > 4>\ (6), so in 
general when bj = f  sj +  4>j (bj'j , =  (f>\ ^6^ — 0? (bj'j < 0. This represents the
effect of demand reduction, where bidders reduce their bid for a second unit to lower 
the expected price paid for the first unit. The extent of demand reduction depends 
on 4>\ — $  (b^j which is the probability that bidder j  wins one unit and pays
bj. If the probability of this is 0, which occurs when b\ = bj V sj there is no demand 
reduction. However, the next chapter will show that even when this is an equilibrium, 
there is another equilibrium in which full demand reduction generates a market clearing 
price of zero.
16.4 B undling T he U n its
The auctioneer could bundle the units and sell them using a single-unit auction. The 
equilibrium of the first-price auction for the bundle is derived here for comparison 
with the discriminatory auction. Bidders have a common valuation for the bundle of 
(1 +  a) anci conditional on winning bidder i pays his own bid bi. As P r (6f > bj) =  
Pr (4>j{bi) > sj) the probability of winning equals (f>j{bi) and E  [sj | win] = ^1,— when 
sj ~  U [0 , 1]. Therefore the expected surplus is:
Ui = E (1 + q )
Si “t“ S ’]
bi I win Pr (win)
(! +  ar) bi <t>Abi)
Differentiating Ui with respect to bi and solving for bj by symmetry gives the 
following first order conditions:
bt : 
bj :
1 +  a
2
1 +  a
[si +  <j>j(bi)] -  bi 
is3 +  <t>i(bj)} -  bj
(f>fj(bi) = <f>j(bi) 
<t>'i(bj) = <(>i(bj) (16.4)
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P ro p o sitio n  16.4 The first-price auction for the bundle of units has a symmetric 
equilibrium in continuous strategies in which bi = ^ p S i and bj = ^ jrS j. This is 
efficient if a > 1 and inefficient if a  < 1, and raises an expected revenue for the 
auctioneer of p p .
P roof. It is routine to verify that these strategies constitute a local optima by 
substituting them into the first order conditions above. For example, if bj = p p Sj 
then (f)j(bi) =  yppbi and the first order condition for bi becomes =  bi. Secondly
note that [sj +  <^(6;)] -  bi] (f>'j(bi) -  4>j{bi) =  «* -  ypp&i and therefore
> 0 if bi < p p  Si and < 0 if bi > pp« i- Therefore this strategy profile is glob­
ally optimal. The efficiency results follow from the argument that when a  < 1 bidders 
have diminishing marginal valuations and so bundling the units is inefficient. When 
a > 1 bundling is efficient, as bidders have constant or increasing marginal valua­
tions. The expected revenue can be calculated as E[R] = E  [M ax  (p p ^ i , p p S j)]  =  
p p E [M ax(si , S j ) ]  =  p p .  ■
When the auctioneer bundles the units and sells them in a single-unit auction, 
the implicit asymmetry which occurs when multi-unit auctions decompose does not 
arise, as both bidders have the same valuation for the bundle. As the allocation rules 
(and hence interim probabilities) and interim expected payments are the same in the 
symmetric equilibria of all the methods of auctioning the bundle, the revenue equiva­
lence theorem holds so any standard auctions generates the same expected revenue.2 
Therefore it is the question of whether or not to bundle which is important, not how 
to auction the bundle.
Chapter Seventeen will show that if the discriminatory auction leads to implicit 
bundling then it is equivalent to the first-price, sealed-bid auction for the bundle. The 
bid paid for the bundle equals the sum of the marginal bids in the discriminatory 
auction, so bi = bj +  bj. If the Vickrey auction results in implicit bundling then it is 
equivalent to the second-price, sealed-bid auction of the bundle. In this case if bidder 
i wins then he pays bj, the opponent’s bid for the bundle, which equals the sum of j ’s 
marginal bids in the Vickrey auction, bj = bj + h j. This thesis will argue that implicit 
bundling is likely when bidders have increasing or constant marginal valuations.
2 In the com m on values setting  the second price auctions will have additional asym m etric equilibria  
which will lead to  lower revenues (M ilgrom , 1981).
Chapter 17
Constant Marginal Valuations
The constant marginal valuations case is motivated on a liquid secondary market, 
meaning common values hold for all bidders and units. When a = 1 any allocation is 
efficient as all marginal valuations are the same. The payoffs equal the average of the 
bidders’ signals and are summarised as V{1 =  V f = 51 V i.
17.1 T he D iscrim inatory A uction
In a discriminatory auction Proposition 16.1 demonstrated that providing bj > i? V 
(s , i) does not constrain the optimal bids in equilibrium, first order conditions for 
bids bj and bj are independent of bj and bj. The case of constant marginal valuations 
is special as in equilibrium the constraint bj > bj binds exactly at the optimal bids. 
However, as it does not actually constrain the bids, the auction can still be solved by 
assuming it decomposes into separate single-unit, first-price auctions in an equilibrium 
which also involves implicit bundling.
\  (*>i)] -  bi (bi) = <t>2j (&,1)
i  ta  +  <t>l (6j)] -  f>jl 4>'i (bj) =  4>\ (b2)
P ro p o sitio n  17.1 When bidders have constant marginal valuations the discrimina­
tory auction has a symmetric equilibrium in which bids are a continuous, increasing 
function of signals where bj = bj = ^  and bj = bj = As bj = bj V (s , i) implicit
bundling occurs.
Proof. Assuming that it is never optimal to set bj < bj or bj < bj then Proposition 
16.1 implies that the discriminatory auction decomposes into two separate single-unit, 
first-price auctions. When bidders have constant marginal valuations these auctions
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are symmetric. It is routine to verify that these strategies form a local optimum of 
the single-unit, first-price auction by substituting them into the first order conditions 
above. For example, if ^  then <pj{bj) — 2bj and the first order condition for bj 
becomes =  bj. This is a global optimum as ^  [s* -I- (pj(bi)\ — &*] (pfj(bi) —
(pj(bi) = Si — 2b{ and therefore > 0 if bi < ^  and < 0 if bi > ^Si. By 
symmetry bj = ^  is the equilibrium strategy for bidder j ,  and solving for bj and bj 
will give bj = bj = ^  and bj =  bj = This leads to implicit bundling as winning 
one unit when bj > bj implies that bj > bj also, so a bidders always wins both units or 
neither (as bids are continuous and increasing, the probability of ties is zero). Finally 
in these equilibria it is never optimal to set bj < bj or bj < bj, consistent with the 
assumption made at the start of the proof. ■
One way to see that implicit bundling occurs is demonstrated in the Proposition
17.1. An intuitive way of considering the problem is to show that the discriminatory 
auction has some equivalence to the bundled auction when bj = bj V (s , i ) in equilib­
rium. As bj = bj the inverse bid functions are (pj (bj) = <fij (6 |), and because bj = bj 
the condition for bidder i to win one unit, 4>j (bj) < sj < 4>j (&£), becomes impossible. 
Graphically, the range of sj over which it is possible to win one unit collapses to a 
point, so bidder i wins either two or zero units, as shown in Figure 17.1.
i wins 2 i wins 0
(pj (bi) Sj
F i g u r e  1 7 .1 :  Im plic it bu ndlin g
Therefore the discriminatory auction leads to implicit bundling, as in equilibrium 
one bidder always wins both units. Efficiency is not an issue when bidders have 
constant marginal valuations as any realisation is efficient. A revenue comparison 
can be made to the first-price auction for the bundle, in which it is an equilibrium 
to bid bi = =  Si when a  =  1, so the bidder with the highest signal wins
both units and pays s*. In the discriminatory auction the bidder with the highest 
signal wins both units and pays bj +  bj = +  If =  Si. Therefore the discriminatory
auction generates the same actual revenue as the first-price auction for the bundle 
if bidders have constant marginal valuations. The expected revenue raised will be 
E [ R ] = E  [Max [ f  +  f  , ^  +  ^f]] =  E  [Max (s{ , Sj)] = §.
17.2 T he V ickrey A uction
For the Vickrey auction, Proposition 16.2 showed that the first order conditions for 
bids bj and bj are independent of bj and bj , providing the requirement bj > bj does not
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constrain bids in equilibrium. When bidders have constant marginal valuations it will 
be shown that although bj > b2 binds at the equilibrium bids, it does not constrain 
them, as in the discriminatory auction. This means that the auction can still be 
solved by assuming it decomposes into separate single-unit, second-price auctions in 
an equilibrium which also involves implicit bundling.
^ [si +  <)>] (&})] - b! <pf (t>!) =  o
P ro p o sitio n  17.2 When bidders have constant marginal valuations, in equilibrium 
the Vickrey auction has a symmetric equilibrium in continuous, increasing strategies 
in which bj = bj = Si and bj = b2 = Sj. As bj = bj V (s , i) implicit bundling occurs.
Proof. Assuming that it is never optimal to set bj < bj or bj < b2 then Proposi­
tion 16.2 implies that the Vickrey auction decomposes into two separate single-unit, 
second-price, sealed-bid auctions. When bidders have constant marginal valuations 
these auctions are symmetric. It can be verified that the proposed strategies form an 
equilibrium of the single-unit auctions as if b2 = Sj then 4>j{bj) = bj and the first order 
condition for bj becomes  ^ [s* — 6|] =  0. This is a global optimum as  ^ [sf — &*]
and therefore > 0 if h  < Si < 0 if bi > Si. By symmetry b2 = sj is the
equilibrium strategy for bidder j , and solving for bj and bj gives bj = bj = Si and 
bj = b2 = s j . This leads to implicit bundling as winning one unit when bj > b2 implies 
that b2 > bj also, so bidders always win both units or neither (as bids are continuous 
and increasing, the probability of ties is zero). Finally in these equilibria it is never 
optimal to set bj < bj or bj < b2, consistent with the assumption made at the start of 
the proof. ■
As with the discriminatory auction, the Vickrey auction leads to implicit bundling, 
as in equilibrium one bidder always wins both units. A revenue comparison can be 
made with the second-price auction for the bundle, in which it is an equilibrium to bid 
bi = (1 -f a) Si = 2Si when a  =  1, so the bidder with the highest signal wins both units 
and pays the opponent’s bid, 2sj .  In the Vickrey auction the bidder with the highest 
signal wins both units and pays the sum of the opponent’s bids bj+b2 = sj -1- sj = 2sj. 
Therefore the Vickrey auction generates the same actual revenue as the second-price 
auction for the bundle when bidders have constant marginal valuations. The expected 
revenue raised is E [ R ]  =  E  [Min [s* +  S i  , S j  +  S j ] ]  =  2E  [Min (s; , S j ) ]  =  | .
The condition that bj =  b2 = bi = Si follows from fully symmetric bidding strate­
gies, in the sense that the separate second-price auctions into which the Vickrey auction
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decomposes are symmetric. In the case of constant marginal valuations these single-
unit auctions also have equilibria of the form bj = Sx-^J- , b2 = -  2 1 , where 0 > 0, 
among others1. Although these are asymmetric equilibria of the single-unit auctions, 
they could form a symmetric equilibrium of the Vickrey auction where each bidderi6 # 
bids for a first unit and — ^  for a second unit. This is consistent with bj > b2 V
(s , i ) providing 0 < 6 < 1, and some of these equilibrium generate low revenues. Any
bid below ^  for a second unit is weakly dominated, so a lower bound on the revenue
in these equilibria is given by E[R] =
17.3 T he U niform  P rice A uction
When bidders have constant marginal valuations the uniform price auction in which 
bidders pay the highest losing bid has multiple equilibria in continuous strategies. Two 
extremes are the case of no demand reduction, where implicit bundling occurs, and 
full demand reduction, which generates no revenue. The first order conditions for the 
uniform price auction were derived in Equation 16.3.
b] \  [*  +  4>2j (6,1)] -  b] ^ / ( 6 ‘ ) = 0
5 [ * S  +  (6i)l -  6?1 (ft?) = (6i) " W (6?)
P ro p o sitio n  17.3 When bidders have constant marginal valuations the implicit bundling 
equilibrium of the Vickrey auction in which b\ = b2 = S{ and bj = b2 = Sj is also an 
equilibrium of the uniform price auction.
Proof. Proposition 17.2 demonstrates that there is a symmetric equilibrium of the 
Vickrey auction in which bj = b2 V (s , i). Proposition 16.3 shows that an equilibrium 
of the Vickrey auction in which bj =  bj V (s , i) is also an equilibrium of the uniform 
price auction. It is routine to verify Proposition 16.3 in this case by observing that if 
i bids bj =  b2 then (pj (b2 j^ =  <pj so (pj (b2^  -  cpj (bj'j =  0 and it follows that if 
this bidding strategy maximises expected surplus in the Vickrey auction then it also 
maximises expected surplus in the uniform price auction. ■
This equilibrium can be verified by substituting bj (s) = b2 (s) = Sj so that (pj (b) =  
4>2 (b) = b into the differentials of expected surplus with respect to bj and b2 which 
give  ^ [s* — 61] and  ^ [s* — 6?]. Therefore b j = b 2 = Si constitutes a local
maximum and by inspection also a global maximum. This equilibrium is equivalent to
'M ilgrom  (1981)
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the Vickrey auction, as when bj = b2 Sj, bidders always win either two units or zero 
units (implicit bundling) and there is zero probability that their bid for a second unit 
can dictate the price they pay for the first. Therefore there is no demand reduction in 
this equilibrium.
The revenue raised in this equilibrium of the uniform price auction is the same 
as in the Vickrey auction derived in Proposition 17.2. In the Vickrey auction the 
bidder with the highest signal wins both units and pays the sum of the opponent’s 
bids bj +bj = sj +  sj = 2sj. In the uniform price auction the bidder with the highest 
signal wins both units and pays double the highest losing bid 2bj =  2sj. Therefore 
this equilibrium of the uniform price auction generates the same actual revenue as 
the Vickrey auction and hence the second-price auction for the bundle. The expected 
revenue raised is E[R] = E  [M in  (2Si , 2^)] =
P ro p o sitio n  17.4 When bidders have constant marginal valuations it is a Nash equi­
librium of the highest losing bid uniform price auction for bidders to bid b\ = and 
bj = f or first units and b2 = b2 = 0 for second units.
Proof. Assume that bj (s j ) =  and b2 (Sj) = 0. As — b2 = fiTfi — 0 > 0 
V Si , s j , any bid bj for i which always wins the first unit is optimal. If bidder i bids 
0 for the second unit, both bidders receive a payoff of ^4^-. Any bid b2 that wins an 
additional unit always reduces bidder *’s payoff as 2 — bj'j =  Si — 1 < S%J^ S3. Any
positive bid b2 that does not win an additional unit is weakly dominated by b2 = 0 
as increasing b2 above 0 only increases the amount paid on the first unit, directly 
reducing surplus. Therefore b2 = 0 weakly dominates any b2 = 0 when the opponent 
bids bj (Sj) =  for a first unit. ■
This Nash equilibrium of the uniform price auction generates no revenue, as bid­
ders engage in full demand reduction, submitting zero bids for their second units so 
the highest losing bid is zero. An explanation that the revenue equivalence theorem 
does not hold is linked to the interim allocation and payments, which differ from the 
implicit bundling which arises in the other auctions considered in this section. As 
this equilibrium maximises expected surplus to bidders, it may be focal, making the 
uniform price auction undesirable. This may be especially important when bidders 
are boundedly rational, as it corresponds to the simple analogy of an equal division of 
the units. This will be discussed in Chapter Twenty-One.
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17.4 D iscussion
In the case of constant marginal valuations any allocation is efficient. The allocations 
arising in equilibrium always lead to the bidder with the highest signal receiving both 
units, with one exception: in the full demand reduction equilibrium of the uniform price 
auction, both bidders submit bids of zero for their second units and so each receives 
one unit regardless of their signals. This is equivalent to the low revenue equilibria 
discussed in Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Khan (1998) for the case when bidders have 
independent private values. In the other auctions bidders submit flat demand curves 
which are not supported empirically. Chapter 18 will show that downward sloping bid 
curves will arise when bidders have decreasing marginal valuations.
All of the auctions considered above have a symmetric equilibrium in which revenue 
equivalence holds, and these generate the same expected revenue as the auction for the 
bundle, E[R] = E  [2 max (^f)j =  §• The discriminatory price auction generates the 
same actual revenue as the first-price, sealed-bid auction for the bundle. The Vickrey 
auction and the equilibrium of the uniform price auction without demand reduction 
generate the same actual revenue as the second-price, sealed-bid auction for the bundle. 
However, it was shown that the Vickrey auction also has additional equilibria, both 
symmetric and asymmetric, which generate low revenues. The uniform price auction 
has a full demand reduction equilibrium in which bidders bid aggressively for a first 
unit and submit zero bids for a second unit, leading to zero revenue for the auctioneer.
These insights can be summarised in the following claims:
C laim  17.1 Efficiency: When a = 1 bidders have constant marginal valuations and 
as any allocation is efficient, any auction allocating both units to bidders is efficient.
C laim  17.2 Expected Revenue: When a = 1 bidders have constant marginal valu­
ations and the auctions can be ranked by the expected revenue they provide to the seller 
as follows:
E R  [first-price bundle] =  E R  [Discriminatory] >
E R  [second-price bundle] = E R  [ Vickrey] >
E R  [ Uniform]
The first inequality binds when the equilibrium of the Vickrey or second-price auction 
is fully symmetric. The second inequality binds in the equilibrium of the uniform price 
auction in which there is no demand reduction.
Chapter 18
Decreasing M arginal Valuations
The case of decreasing marginal valuations could be motivated by diminishing mar­
ginal utility for the object being auctioned.1 The first unit has a valuation of Sl~^Sj 
and the second unit is a constant proportion  ^ < a  < 1 of this, so the gross utility 
from winning both units is (1 -I- a) St^ Sj. Although bidders are symmetric, introduc­
ing diminishing marginal valuations creates asymmetry. To win a unit bidder i must 
compete against bidder j ’s bid on a second unit, for which j  has a lower marginal 
valuation. When bidders have constant and increasing marginal valuations, the dis­
criminatory and Vickrey auctions lead to implicit bundling because bj =  bj V (s , i) 
in equilibrium. This chapter will show that when marginal valuations are decreasing, 
these auctions decompose into multiple asymmetric single-unit auctions.
18.1 T he D iscrim inatory A uction
Proposition 16.1 demonstrated that providing bj > bj V (s , i) does not constrain the 
optimal bidding strategies in equilibrium, the discriminatory auction decomposes into 
two separate first-price, sealed-bid auctions for single units, where bidder i competes 
for a first unit against bidder j ’s bid for a second unit and vice versa. This can be 
observed as the first order conditions for bids bj and bj shown in Equations 18.1 and
18.2, which were derived in Proposition 16.1, are independent of bj and bj. This 
section will solve these first order conditions to find the equilibrium bidding strategies 
in the asymmetric single-unit auctions, and show that these also form a symmetric
'E ven  if the payoffs are constan t, these  could be m otivated  im plicitly  as the reduced form of risk 
aversion, or even reciprocity considerations.
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equilibrium of the discriminatory auction.
b}
bi 2  [a j  +  (6 ? ) ]  -  6 l l  * ! '  ( b j )  =  4>\ (6 ? )
(18.1)
(18.2)
P ro p o sitio n  18.1 When |  < a  < 1 bidders have diminishing marginal valuations 
and the discriminatory auction has a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which 
it decomposes into two asymmetric single-unit, first-price, sealed-bid auctions. In equi­
librium bids satisfy the closed form Equations 18.3 and 18.4.
P roof. Assume that b\ > 62 V (s , i) does not constrain the optimal bids in 
equilibrium, so following Proposition 16.1 the discriminatory auction decomposes into 
multiple single-unit, first-price, sealed-bid auctions. The auction for bidder i ’s first 
unit and bidder f  s second unit is solved as a single-unit asymmetric auction in Ap­
pendix C.l, giving a closed form solution shown in Equations 18.3 and 18.4. It is 
straightforward but tedious to verify that bids are global optima2 and that the condi­
tion that b\ >6? V (s , i) does not constrain the optimum bids, which is illustrated in 
Figure 18.1. ■
Although the overall setting is symmetric, the discriminatory auction decomposes 
into asymmetric single-unit auctions, because bidder i competes for a first unit against 
bidder j ’s second unit, so it is worth - -I,— to bidder i but only to bidder j .
The asymmetry affects bids directly because of the difference in player’s valuations. It 
also has an indirect effect since compared to a symmetric auction, the winner’s curse 
is amplified for bidder j , as winning a second unit conveys especially bad news about 
Si, bidder i ’s signal. For bidder i the winner’s curse is mitigated, as winning a first 
unit is not as bad news about Sj, as the unit is worth less to bidder j .
The equilibrium bidding strategies for bidder i are derived in Appendix C .l and 
are given in closed form in Equations 18.3 and 18.4.
b j a + ) T %
Si +  a “
2 — a — +  a 2
1 - 2  a  + „ a(l-a) gi
(2—a)  
(2a-l)
bj s, 1 +  a
\ f 1 — s* W~
biSi
a  (1 — a f
1 +  a  
a  (1 — a) '
( l - a )
( 1 - a )
(18.3)
(18.4)
2 It is possible to  show th at is positive  if til <  fej5* and negative if >  bj* V k , i  where b*'
satisfies the first order conditions below.
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Identical conditions apply for bj and bj by symmetry.
Figure 18.1 illustrates the equilibrium bids for The upper line shows 6],
bidder i ’s equilibrium bid for a first unit as a function of the signal s*. The lower line 
shows bf, bidder Vs equilibrium bid for a second unit. The support of both the bids
is 0 , l+a It is necessary for them to be the same, as in the equilibrium of each 
single-unit auction, bidder i ’s maximum bid for a first unit bj( 1) must equal bidder 
j ’s maximum bid for a second unit, bj( 1), otherwise one of the bidders could reduce 
their bid and still win with certainty. Therefore 6 j(l) =  bj (1) and bj (1) =  bj (1) by 
symmetry.
,24
l+a
Figure 18.1: Equilibrium bids in the discrim inatory auction  
with dim inishing marginal valuations when ot =  |
As a  — ► 1 the equilibrium bids tend towards bi(si) = bj(si) =  bf(si) =  the equi­
librium of the discriminatory auction when bidders have constant marginal valuations. 
This is illustrated in Figure 18.2. For each value of a  the upper line shows the equilib-
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rium bid for the first unit, while the lower line shows the equilibrium bid for a second 
unit.
0.5
 a  = 1
- - a = 0 .750.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Signal (&)
Figure 18.2: E quilib rium  bids in th e  d isc rim in a to ry  auc tion  
w ith  dim inishing m arg inal valuations for different a
In common value first-price auctions, bidders reduce their bids below the expected 
value of a unit for two reasons, firstly to avoid the winner’s curse and secondly to 
extract positive surplus. These concepts are interdependent in equilibrium as both 
affect the opponent’s optimal strategy, which in turn affects a bidder’s own strategy. 
In a Bayesian Nash equilibrium these effects are incorporated in bidder’s strategies, 
and the extent to which bids are reduced below expected values can be decomposed 
into two effects: surplus extraction and the winner’s curse. This is illustrated in Figure 
18.3 for the case when a  =  g.
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F ig u re  18.3: D e c o m p o s it io n  o f  b id  s h a d in g  fo r th e  f irs t  a n d  se c o n d  u n i ts
Figure 18.3 shows that the expected valuation conditional on winning at least one unit 
is strictly below the unconditional expected value of the first unit.3 The difference 
between the expected value and the expected value conditional on winning represents 
the adjustment necessary to avoid the winner’s curse in equilibrium, and is shown by
the shaded areas in this figure for both the first and second units. At very low signals
winning any units is bad news, so bidders avoid the winner’s curse by substantially 
reducing their bids on both units. If a bidder has a very high signal the winner’s 
curse has little effect, but bidders still reduce their bids to extract surplus. Figure 18.3 
shows that the greatest asymmetry in the impact of the winner’s curse arises when 
bidders have moderate signals, as it does not greatly affect bidding for a first unit but 
is substantial when bidding on a second unit. Chapter Twenty-One will reexamine 
this result, and discuss the experimental evidence that inexperienced bidders may fail 
to adjust their expectations fully to account for the winner’s curse.
18.2 The V ickrey A uction
Proposition 16.2 showed that the Vickrey auction could decompose into two asymmet­
ric single-unit auctions, as in equilibrium the first order conditions for bids bj and bj
3 Winning only  one unit is good news about value if a bidder has a high signal, so conditioning on 
this will raise the expected valuation. Although the model has been developed using the probabilities 
and expectations conditional on winning only one or only two units, conditioning on winning at least 
one unit and a second unit conditional on winning the first gives identical results.
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shown in Equations 18.5 and 18.6 are independent of bj and bj, providing bj > bj does 
not constrain the optimal bidding strategies.
b] :
bi
l [ s i +  $(6}) ]  < t > j ( b } ) = 0  (18.5)
Lf  [S3 +  <t>\ (tf)] -  h) <t>\' {h))  =  0 (18-6)
Proposition 18.2 When bidders have diminishing marginal valuations, in equilib­
rium the Vickrey auction decomposes into two single-unit, second-price, sealed-bid 
auctions. These auctions are asymmetric and in any undominated equilibrium in con­
tinuous, increasing strategies, each player receives one unit.
Proof. Consider the auction where bidder j  competes for a second unit against 
bidder z’s first unit. If bidder j  wins with positive probability then for some range 
the bid functions must overlap. W ithin this range it must be true that $}' (bj'j > 0 
and (ftj' (&J) > 0  so the first order conditions show that in equilibrium b must satisfy 
bj = |  [s; +  (&*)] and ^  — § sj +  However, it is impossible for b =
\  [4>l (b) +  $  (6)] =  f  [4>j (b) +  $  (6)] as a < 1. Therefore the bids cannot overlap 
and bidder i must always win, so that bj > bj V (s , i). In a symmetric equilibrium 
bj (s) = bj (s) V s and bj (s) = bj (s) V s so bj > bj V Si , sj implies bj > bj V s and 
bj > b jV  s which satisfies the requirements for the Vickrey auction to decompose into 
two single asymmetric auctions in equilibrium. ■
In a second-price auction the direct effect of the asymmetry when a < 1 is to 
reduce the winner’s curse for a player bidding for a first unit, and increase it for a 
player who is bidding on a second. This means that players can bid more aggressively 
for the first unit but must bid more conservatively on the second. However, given 
that the opponent is not only advantaged, but is also expected to bid aggressively, the 
winner’s curse becomes even more severe when bidding on a second unit, and so on. 
This indirect effect is powerful and means that each player wins one unit in equilibrium 
even if a  is close to l .4 In addition, these equilibria tend to generate low revenues.
Proposition 18.3 When players have diminishing marginal valuations it is an ex post 
equilibrium of the Vickrey auction for players to bid bj = for their first unit and 
bj = for a second unit.
Proof. Consider the auction where bidder j  competes for a second unit against 
bidder z’s first unit. As bj = = bj V Sj , Sj bidder i always wins. As
4 Klemperer (1998) shows that this effect can have a dramatic effect on the equilibrium in ascending 
auctions, where one player has a small additive advantage.
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3t 2 ^  — bj = ^ Sj -  q |  > 0 V 5, , Sj, any bid for i which always wins is optimal. 
Likewise as a — bj = a Si^ 3 — < q V S{ , sj, any bid which always loses
for bidder j  is optimal. It should be noted that any bid above on a first unit or 
below a |  o n a  second unit is weakly dominated, so these strategies put a lower bound 
on revenue for the auctioneer. The multi-unit auction decomposes as and
imply that tij > bj V s , i. ■
When players have diminishing marginal valuations then any equilibrium of the 
Vickrey auction leads to an efficient allocation, with each bidder receiving one unit, 
but expected revenue is low. A lower bound on revenue is given by the equilibrium 
in which bj = and bj = where E  [R] = E  +  §$2 ] =  while an upper 
bound occurs when bj = and , where E  [R] = E  ^
18.3 T he U niform  P rice  A u ction
The first order conditions of the uniform price auction, where bidders pay the highest 
losing bid, were derived in Proposition 16.3 and are shown in Equations 18.7 and 18.8. 
When bidders have diminishing marginal valuations and strategies are continuous, it 
is no longer an equilibrium for players to bid the same for their second unit as their 
first, as the asymmetries arising in the Vickrey auction force the equilibrium of the 
uniform price auction to full demand reduction, where bidders submit zero bids for 
their second units and the auctioneer receives no revenue.
dUj
d b j
d U j
dVj
\  h  +  (bi )] “  bi (b\ ) (18'?)
f  [SJ +  <t>\ (&*)] -  bj 4>jf (bj) +  <t>\ (bj) -  4>j (bj) (18.8)
P ro p o s itio n  18.4 When bidders have diminishing marginal valuations and use con­
tinuous, increasing strategies, then in the equilibrium of the highest losing bid uniform 
price action each bidder leceives one unit.
P roo f. If bidder j  wins a second unit with positive probability then for some 
range the bid functions bj and bij must overlap. Within this range it must be true that 
> 0 and <pj' (bj) >^ 0 so the first order conditions show that in equilibrium 
b must satisfy bj = ^ [s; +  (pj (bj)] and bj < |  sj +  (pj ^ j )  J  • The inequality arises 
due to a demand reduction effect, as bj > bj implies that (pj (bj) — (pj ( bj )  < 0 and
therefore ^  < 0 even when bj — |  sj -I- (pj (bj) Even in the case of no demand
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I'eduction, it is impossible for  ^ [0,1 (6) + (pj (6)] =  b < |  [0t- (6) + (6)] as a  < 1.
Therefore the bids cannot overlap and bidder i must always win, so that bj > bj V
st , sj. In a symmetric equilibrium bj (s) = bj (s) and bj (s) = bj (s) so b] > bj V
.s, , sj implies bj > bj V .s, , Sj and bj > bij V .s, , Sj which means that bj > bj V (.s , f)
never constrains the equilibrium. ■
An intuitive way to consider the uniform price auction is to take the limiting case, 
wffiere there is no demand reduction. This is equivalent to the Vickrey auction derived 
above, and decomposes into two separate asymmetric second-price auctions. Secondly, 
observe that with demand reduction, bij <c ^ Sj -j- <pj (*?)] , so the requirement that 
^ [(Z),1 (6) +  (pj (6)] =  b < j  \(pj (b) +  (pj (6)] is impossible even if a  =  1. In the second- 
price Vickrey auction, asymmetry alone is sufficient to generate an equilibrium in 
which each bidder wins one unit because of the way it interacts with the winner’s 
curse. If in addition bidders reduce their bids on the second unit because of demand 
reduction, this reinforces the asymmetry as winning with a reduced bid is even worse 
news.
P ro p o s itio n  18.5 When players have diminishing marginal valuations it is an ex post 
equilibrium of the highest losing bid uniform price auction for players to bid bj =  
for their first units and bj = 0 for their second units. This generates zero revenue for  
the auctioneer.
P ro o f. Consider the case when bidder j  competes for a second unit against bidder 
i 's first unit. As bj = > 0 =  bj V S{ , Sj bidder i always wins. As — bj =
- tr 1 — 0 > 0 V Si , Sj, any bid for i which always wins the first unit is optimal. 
Likewise as a 3' ^  — bj =  a 3* ^  < 0 V s* , Sj, it is optimal for bidder j  to bid
sufficiently low to always lose the second unit. Given that each bidder always wins one 
unit in equilibrium, the payoff to each bidder equals 3*~^3j — M ax (bj , bj'j. Any non­
zero bid for a second unit is weakly dominated by a strategy of bidding bj = bij = 0, 
so in equilibrium each bidder obtains a net payoff of and the auctioneer receives 
no revenue. In this case it is straightforward to confirm that bj > bj V sj as > q
The almost common value problem in the Vickrey auction0 extends to the uniform 
price auction when bidders pay the highest losing bid. In addition, as they never win 
a swond unit in equilibrium, it is a weakly dominant strategy for bidders to submit 
zero bids for a second unit. The effect of asymmetry forces the equilibrium to that of 
full demand reduction. The outcome of the highest losing bid uniform price auction is 
efficient, but generates zero revenue for the auctioneer.
’F irst d iscussed in B ihkchandani (1988).
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18.4 D iscussion
As bidders have diminishing marginal valuations the efficient outcome is to allocate 
one unit to each bidder. The uniform price and Vickrey auctions always allocate the 
units efficiently, while the bundled auction always allocates them inefficiently. The 
discriminatory auction is generally inefficient, although it is more likely to achieve 
an efficient outcome the lower the value of a . The equilibrium allocations in the 
discriminatory auction when a  =  |  are illustrated in Figure 18.4 for different values 
of S{ and Sj. The shaded region shows the efficient allocation (1 , 1) which occurs in 
equilibrium when bidders have similar, moderate signals.
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F ig u r e  18.4: E q u il ib r iu m  a llo c a t io n  o f  u n i ts  in  th e  d i s c r im in a to r y  a u c t io n
As the different auctions have different interim allocation rules, the expected revenue 
theorem does not hold. To motivate the revenue rankings, the expected total payment 
when “ = 5  made by a bidder with a signal Si is illustrated in Figure 18.5.
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Figure 18.5 illustrates two important points. Firstly, bidders with low signals 
expect to pay more in a discriminatory auction than in a first-price auction for the 
bundle because they are more likely to win a unit, while bidders with high signals 
expect to pay more in the bundled auction because they are more likely to win two 
units. Secondly this is reinforced by the effect of asymmetries on the winner’s curse. 
A bidder with a low signal bids more in total in the discriminatory price auction than 
in the auction for the bundle, so bj +  bf > b{ (bi is the bid for the bundle). A bidder 
with a high signal bids more in the auction for the bundle than the total bids in 
the discriminatory auction. Both the discriminatory and bundled auctions generate 
more revenue than the Vickrey and uniform price auctions. The second-price auctions, 
although they are efficient, generate low revenues as implicit asymmetries arise when 
the multi-unit auctions decompose into single-unit auctions. Even if a  is close to 1, 
they create an almost common values problem in which the impact of the winner’s 
curse is severe.
Focusing on the comparison of the auction for the bundle with the discriminatory 
auction, there are two fundamental influences on expected revenue. Firstly the asym­
metry between bidders reduces the competitiveness in the discriminatory auction,6
6 T his is because o f the w inner’s curse.
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reducing expected revenue compared to the symmetry of bundling. Secondly, bidders 
have higher valuations for their first units and the discriminatory auction may lead 
to an efficient outcome. The auctioneer can potentially receive some of the additional 
surplus when the units are allocated efficiently, as he receives the higher, first unit 
payments of each bidder. This efficiency effect dominates the asymmetry effect in the 
cases considered (a  > 0.5), as illustrated in Figure 18.6. Although the difference is 
slight, it is important as it contradicts a general intuition in the auction literature: 
when the number of buyers is small it is better to bundle the units. Palfrey (1983) 
demonstrated this for the case when values are additive (i.e. when bidders have con­
stant marginal valuations). The key difference in this model is that bidders have a 
common value which they do not know with certainty, and have diminishing marginal 
valuations. When the bidders have extremely decreasing marginal valuations, it is 
clear that bundling is optimal, as if the units are sold in a discriminatory auction 
there is no effective competition for second units.
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To summarise, Table 18.1 evaluates the expected revenues of all the auctions considered 
when a  =  g.
Auction Discriminatory Vickrey Uniform First-Price For Bundle
Expected Revenue 0.537 0.3 0 0.533
Table 18.1
C laim  18.1 Efficiency: When % < oc < 1 so bidders have diminishing marginal valua­
tions, the Vickrey and Uniform price auctions are efficient, allocating one unit to each
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bidder. The discriminatory auction is not efficient although it can allocate the units 
efficiently when both bidders receive similar, moderate signals. The bundled auction 
never allocates the units efficiently.
C laim  18.2 Expected Revenue: When |  < a  < 1 the auctions can be ranked by the 
expected revenue they provide to the seller as follows:
E R  [Discriminatory] >
E R  [First-Price Bundle] > E R  [second-price bundle]
> E R [ Vickrey]
> E R  [ Uniform]
The inequality binds when the equilibrium o f the second-price auction is symmetric.
C hapter 19
Increasing M arginal Valuations
Increasing marginal valuations lead to implicit bundling in a discriminatory auction 
(and in a Vickrey auction). It was assumed tha t bidders Eire constrained to submitting 
downward sloping bids so that bj > b? V (s , i), which are aggregated into a demand 
curve by the auctioneer. Even in this case, it will be demonstrated tha t in equilibrium 
the discriminatory and Vickrey auction lead to implicit bundling as bj = 62 always 
binds. The case of combinatorial bidding will be discussed at the end of this section, 
although for reasonable allocation rules in equilibrium h2 > b1 V s for both bidders, 
which is sufficient to generate implicit bundling anyway. It is assumed that 1 < a  < 2.
19.1 T h e D iscrim in atory  A u ction
When bidders are constrained to submit decreasing bid schedules, it was shown in 
Proposition 17.1 that the constraint bj > binds in the equilibrium of the discrimi­
natory auction with constant marginal valuations, leading to implicit bundling. This 
section will argue that this is also a constrained equilibrium of the discriminatory 
auction when bidders have increasing marginal valuations. In Proposition 16.1 the 
following first order conditions for the discriminatory auction were derived:
dUi
dbj
dUi
'1 [* +*3 Ml-ijJrfTW)-*?(«) (19.1)
(19.2)
P ro p o s itio n  19.1 When bidders have increasing marginal valuations the discrimina­
tory auction has a symmetric equilibrium in which bids are a continuous, increasing 
function o f signals where bj =  6? =  and bj =  b2- =  As bj =  62 V (s , i)
implicit bundling occurs.
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P roof. Assuming the opponent bids bj =  bij =  and that the constraint bj =
bij binds, then bidder t’s optimisation problem reduces to that of the first-price auction 
for the bundle derived in Proposition 16.4, where it was shown that b{ = bj +6? =  -MpSi 
is a global optimum, therefore in this case bj = bj = S{. It is necessary to show 
that for this to be an optimum <  O a n d f ^  > 0 for all signals, so that bj 
always binds. Substituting the equilibrium conditions into Equations 19.1 and 19.2 it 
is possible to show that ^  = 2s* < 0 V s* and =  2s* > 0 V S{. By
symmetry the same is true for bidder j  and the strategies constitute an equilibrium 
where implicit bundling occurs as winning one unit when bj > bij implies that bj > bj 
also, so bidders always win both units or neither (as bids sire continuous and increasing, 
the probability of ties is zero). ■
Therefore the discriminatory case leads to implicit bundling, as in equilibrium one 
bidder always wins both units. As bidders have increasing marginal valuations this is 
always efficient and the revenue raised is the same as that for the first-price auction 
for the bundle.
19.2 T h e V ickrey A u ctio n
In Chapter Sixteen, Proposition 16.2 demonstrated that the Vickrey auction generated 
the following first order conditions:
^ [s. +  4>] (M)] -  b\ <t>? (*<) =  0 
2  («?)=<>
(19.3)
(19.4)
P ro p o s itio n  19.2 When bidders have increasing marginal valuations, in equilibrium 
the Vickrey auction has a symmetric equilibrium in continuous, increasing strategies 
in which bj = bij = ^4pSj and bj =  bij — -Mps. As bj = bj V (s , i) implicit bundling 
occurs.
P ro o f. Assuming the opponent bids bj =  bj = and that the constraint
bj > bj binds, then bidder i ’s optimisation problem reduces to that of the second- 
price auction for the bundle in which bi = bj +  bij = (1 +  a) S{ is a Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium,1 therefore in this case bj = bj =  ^ps»- It is necessary to show that for 
this to be an optimum < Oand ^ > 0 for all signals, so that bj > bj always
*For bidder t, differentiating Ui gives +  <f)j (6i)] -  6i] 4>j (bi)  =  0. Assum ing bj =
(1 +  a )  Sj  so <f>j (b) =  then |  [s< — which is optimised at bi =  (1 +  a )  Si. This is a
global optimum as >  0 when bi <  (1 +  a )  Si and <  0 when bi >  (1 +  a )  Sj. The solution for 
bj =  (1 -f a )  Sj  follows from symmetry.
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binds. Substituting the equilibrium conditions into Equations 19.3 and 19.4 gives 
§6^ =  Si ( iT « ) — ^ ^  Si anc  ^ =  si ( ® ^  s*' symmetry the same is true 
for bidder j  and the strategies constitute an equilibrium. Implicit bundling occurs as 
winning one unit when bj > b? implies that bf > bj also, so bidders always win both 
units or neither (as bids are continuous and increasing, the probability of ties is zero). 
■
As with the discriminatory auction, the Vickrey auction leads to implicit bundling, 
as one bidder wins both units in equilibrium. A revenue comparison can be made to the 
second-price auction for the bundle, in which it is an equilibrium to bid 6* =  (1 +  a) s*. 
The bidder with the highest signal wins both units and pays the opponent’s bid, 
(1 +  a) sj. In the Vickrey auction the bidder with the highest signal wins both units 
and pays the sum of the opponent’s bids bj+ti* =  =  (1 4- a) Sj. Therefore
the Vickrey auction generates the same actual revenue as the second-price auction for 
the bundle if bidders have increasing marginal valuations.
The winner’s curse is very strong when bidding for a first unit but weak when 
bidding on a second unit. Therefore players bid aggressively for their second units, 
except in this case they are constrained to bidding bj — b?. In the case of constant 
marginal valuations it was shown tha t the Vickrey auction generates a continuum of 
symmetric equilibria. When marginal valuations are increasing, h* = bif restricts bids 
to the fully symmetric equilibrium, which is unique. There are additional asymmetric 
equilibria, corresponding to the asymmetric equilibria of the second-price, sealed-bid 
auction for the bundle.
19.3 T h e U niform  P rice  A u ction
The uniform price auction has multiple equilibria, just as when bidders have constant 
marginal valuations. The first corresponds to the second-price auction for the bundle, 
where in equilibrium b] =  V i , s* so a bidder never wins a single-unit.
This means that the second bid never affects the price paid for the first unit, so in 
equilibrium there is no demand reduction and the outcome corresponds to that of 
the Vickrey auction and the second-price auction for the bundle. The proof that 
this is an equilibrium follows from Proposition 19.2 which demonstrates that there 
is a symmetric equilibrium of the Vickrey auction in which 6) =  V (s , i ) and a 
straightforward extension of Proposition 16.3 which shows that an equilibrium of the 
Vickrey auction in which 6* =  6? V (s , i) is also an equilibrium of the uniform price 
auction.
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A second equilibrium is that of full demand reduction which occurs when players 
bid for a first unit and zero for a second unit.
Proposition  19.3 When bidders have increasing marginal valuations it is a Nash 
equilibrium of the highest losing bid uniform price auction for bidders to bid b] = 
and bj = for first units and bj = = 0 for second units providing a < 2.
P ro o f. Assume that fej (sj) =  ^ r -  and trj (s j ) = 0. As 3* ^  ~ = — 0 > 0
V S{ , Sj, any bid bj for i which always wins the first unit is optimal. If bidder i bids 
0 for the second unit, both bidders receive a payoff of ^ p 2-. Any bid bj tha t wins an 
additional unit always reduces bidder i ’s payoff as (1 4- a) Si^ Sj ~  26] =  (1 +  a) — 
sj — 1 < Si^ Sf providing a < 2  ^ )  V s. Any positive bid bj that does not win an
additional unit is weakly dominated by tij = 0 as increasing trj above 0 only increases 
the amount paid on the first unit, directly reducing surplus. Therefore bj = 0 weakly 
dominates any bj = 0 when the opponent bids 6] (s j ) = f°r a unit. ■
This Nash equilibrium of the uniform price auction generates no revenue for the 
auctioneer, as bidders engage in full demand reduction, submitting zero bids for the 
second unit and therefore the highest losing bid is zero. The revenue equivalence 
theorem does not hold in this case as the interim allocation and payments differ from 
the implicit bundling which arises in the other auctions considered in this section. 
As this equilibrium maximises expected surplus to bidders, it could be argued that 
it is focal, making the uniform price auction undesirable. This exists providing a < 
2 ( ^ ) V S{ and hence that 1 < a < 2 (by putting the maximum Si = 1 into 
the constraint). If a > 2 then this extreme case of demand reduction cannot be an 
equilibrium, as bidders with high signals would compete aggressively for the second 
unit.
19.4 D iscussion
When bidders have increasing marginal valuations it has been shown that in the Vick­
rey and discriminatory auctions the constraint 6) > bj binds for all bidders and signals. 
This is sufficient to generate implicit bundling, so many of the results in this chapter 
are similar to those in the constant marginal valuations case. It can be conjectured 
that in this simplified setting these results continue to hold even if bidders were free 
to submit combinatorial bids for the bundle, as providing bj < bj for both signals and 
bidders, implicit bundling still occurs and the equilibrium requirement is only that 
6] +  bj satisfies the equilibrium conditions for a single-unit auction of the bundle.
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Unlike in the case of constant marginal valuations, the Vickrey auction now has 
a unique symmetric equilibrium when bids are continuous, increasing functions of 
signals2. All equilibria of the Vickrey and discriminatory auctions involve implicit 
bundling which is efficient when marginal valuations are increasing. The symmetric 
equilibrium of the uniform, Vickrey and discriminatory auction are equivalent to the 
second- and first- price auctions for the bundle respectively, and are therefore revenue 
equivalent, generating E[R] = E  [2 max ( ( ^ p )  «»)] =  -^p- This provides an upper 
bound on the revenue generated in the asymmetric equilibria of the Vickrey auction.
The full demand reduction equilibrium of the uniform price auction, that was de­
veloped when bidders have constant marginal valuations, exists even when marginal 
valuations are increasing providing a  < 2. This is the only equilibrium of any auc­
tion discussed in this chapter which leads to an inefficient allocation, in which each 
bidder receives one unit. In addition, this generates zero revenue. When a > 2 this 
equilibrium is broken, as the gain from winning a second unit outweighs the effects of 
demand reduction and the auction has the same equilibrium as the Vickrey auction.
C la im  19.1 E ffic iency: When 1 < a  < 2 bidders have increasing marginal valua­
tions and the bundled, discriminatory and Vickrey auctions are efficient The uniform  
price auction has both efficient and inefficient equilibria.
C la im  19.2 E xpected R evenue: When 1 < a < 2 bidders have increasing marginal 
valuations and the auctions can be ranked by expected revenue as follows:
E R  [first-price bundle] = E R  [Discriminatory] >
E R  [second-price bundle] = E R  [ Vickrey] >
E R  [ Uniform]
The first inequality binds when the equilibrium of the Vickrey or second-price auction 
is symmetric. The second inequality binds in the equilibrium in which there is no 
demand reduction.
2 There remains a continuum o f asym metric equilibria corresponding to the asymmetric equilibria 
in the second-price sealed-bid auction for the bundle.
C hapter 20
R elation to  the M ulti-U nit 
A uction Literature
This chapter will relate the model to  the literature on multi-unit discriminatory, uni­
form price and Vickrey auctions, much of which focuses on the case of independent 
private valuations. An extension to the Ausubel auction will also be discussed.
U niform  P rice A uctions
The existence of demand reduction in uniform price auctions is well documented in 
continuous share auctions in which bidders compete for a share of a unit. Wilson (1979) 
shows that when bidders do not have private information, there is an infinite number of 
linear equilibria involving implicit collusion by the bidders. For example, two bidders 
could divide the object between them by each submitting high bids for the first half 
of the unit and bidding the reserve price on the marginal share. Bidding above the 
reserve price means raising the clearing price without increasing a bidder’s own share. 
This is related to the concept of market power: by submitting a very steep demand 
curve, a bidder makes the opponent a residual monopsonist over the remaining share. 
The opponent then has an incentive to submit a downward sloping demand curve in a 
Nash equilibrium. Back and Zender (1993) develop the framework when bidders have 
common values, by considering equilibria robust to supply uncertainty introduced by 
non-competitive bidders. These equilibria are independent of private signals and are 
non-linear. The presence of uncertainty reduces the scope for demand reduction. Back 
and Zender also consider the case where the seller can decrease supply after observing 
bids, potentially leading to high prices if bidders submit very steep demand curves and 
so curtailing collusive behaviour. This reduces, but does not eliminate the potential 
for implicit collusion. Li Calzi and Pavan (2002) show that declaring a supply schedule
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that is increasing in the price can reduce the steepness of the residual supply curve for 
any one bidder, encouraging more aggressive bidding and enhancing revenue.
Turning to the discrete case, Ausubel and Cramton (2002) show that when bidders 
have independent private values, in highest losing bid uniform price auctions it is a 
weakly dominant strategy to bid their valuation on the first unit. However, there is 
an incentive to reduce bids on additional units because there is a positive probability 
th a t these will set the price of all earlier units. This underlies the analysis of demand 
reduction developed in this thesis, which extends the result of Engelbrecht-Wiggans 
and Kahn (1998), where bidders may submit zero bids on their second units, to a 
situation where bidders have interdependent values. Ausubel and Cramton (1998) 
show that if bidders have constant marginal valuations and affiliated signals then 
there is an equilibrium in which they submit flat demand curves, consistent with 
the findings in Chapter Seventeen. In this case the linkage principle (Milgrom and 
Weber, 1982) holds and second price auctions generate more revenue than first-price 
auctions. A contribution of this thesis was to show that when bidders have diminishing 
marginal valuations, the opposite is true: low price equilibria axe unique among the 
class of continuous, weakly increasing equilibria because the auction decomposes into 
asymmetric single-unit auctions, creating an implicit almost common values problem. 
Therefore the winner’s curse is greatly amplified, leading to low expected revenue. 
Even slight diminishing marginal valuations leads to an extreme version of Ausubel’s
(2004) champion’s plague; when bidders have common values and affiliated signals a 
bidder’s expected value conditional on winning is decreasing in the number of units 
won.1
Generally these extreme theoretical results stand in contrast to the experimental 
evidence and empirical analysis of treasury auctions. Chapter Twenty-One will argue 
tha t bounded rationality may mitigate the theoretical results in some cases, but will 
reinforce them in others.
D iscrim inatory A uctions
Under constant marginal valuations the discriminatory auction model considered in 
Chapter Fifteen generates a unique equilibrium where bidders submit equal bids on all 
units; this result persists in the case of N  bidders, M  units and independent private 
valuations.2 As bid curves are flat each bidder either wins all or none of the units 
and it is necessary to condition on winning all the units to avoid the winner’s curse.
'A usubel (2004) assumes constant marginal valuations (up to a capacity constraint) so alm ost 
common values problems do not arise in his model.
2See Lebrun and Tremblay (2003), when in the M  unit case bidders have binary valuations.
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Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998) argue that while bidders submit demand curves 
which are steeper than their valuations in the uniform price auction, in the discrim­
inatory auction they minimise their expected payments by flattening their demands, 
aiming to submit bids just above the expected clearing price. Engelbrecht-Wiggans 
and Kahn show that when bidders have diminishing marginal valuations, bidders must 
submit the same bids for both units over some range of signals and different bids for 
other ranges. Intuitively this is because when bidders have independent private val­
uations the weaker bidder bids more aggressively. In contrast, in the common value 
model presented in this thesis the weaker bidder bids more conservatively because of 
the winner’s curse, so when bidders have diminishing marginal values demand curves 
slope downwards as 6* > 6? V (s , i).
V ickrey Auctions
When bidders have private valuations, the Vickrey auction gives an incentive for bid­
ders to reveal their true valuations and may increase bidder participation. It remains 
robust against demand reduction, as bidders never pay their own bids and so do not 
stand to benefit by reducing bids on later units, and is solvable by weakly dominant 
equilibrium strategies. Generally, the problems of multi-dimensional signals (see Jehiel 
and Moldovanu, 2001) do not extend to the formal model of this thesis.3 However, in 
the common values case with decreasing marginal valuations, it was shown in Chapter 
Eighteen that the Vickrey auction leads to low revenue, because of the almost common 
values problem which arises implicitly. As well as a lack of robustness to small payoff 
asymmetries in common value auctions, the Vickrey auction may be used less because 
bidders are reluctant to reveal private information they do not want disclosed in the 
final market, sacrificing information rent in secondary markets, or because they do not 
trust the auctioneer not to take advantage of this information.
A usubel A uctions
The analysis developed in this thesis can be extended to other multi-unit auctions. 
Ausubel (2004) argues that when bidders have common values and affiliated signals, 
the Linkage principle (Milgrom and Weber, 1982) means that ascending auctions gen­
erate the most revenue even in a multi-unit setting. In the auction Ausubel proposes, 
the price increases over time and people drop out so quantity demanded falls.4 When
3 If im plicit bundling occurs a single-crossing property holds. If bidders have dim inish ing m arginal 
valuations, the alm ost com m on values problem  leads to  an efficient outcom e.
4 W hen bidders have independent private va luations then bidding their valuation is a w eakly dom i­
nant stra tegy  in th e  A usubel auction  w hen bidders dropping o u t is not revealed, and survives iterated  
deletion  o f  w eakly dom inated  stra teg ies if  it is revealed.
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a bidder is guaranteed to win a unit it is clinched and the winner pays the price at 
which it was clinched.5 If an Ausubel auction was used in the two unit, two bidder case 
with diminishing marginal valuations, bidders would reduce their demand from two 
units to one unit at a low level to avoid the winner’s curse. This is consistent with the 
weaker bidder dropping out early in the almost common values auction (Klemperer, 
1997). This means that a unit is clinched for the opponent at a low price, and as 
bidders pay the price at which units are clinched, the Ausubel auction generates low 
revenue.
'F or exam ple suppose 3 un its are being  auctioned  to  3 bidders, w ith  dem ands at the g iven prices 
show n below:
D em and A B C
P  = 1 3 2 2
P - 2 2 1 1
T h e auctioneer increases the price un til it reaches P  =  2, at w hich point A w ins one un it w ith  
certainty, "clinch ing” it, and pays a price o f 2. T h e price then  continues to  rise to  clear th e  rem aining  
units.
C hapter 21
Empirical Literature, 
G eneralisations and Bounded  
R ationality
This thesis predicts that when bidders have common values and constant or increasing 
marginal valuations, they will submit flat demand curves in the Vickrey and discrim­
inatory auctions, and may engage in demand reduction in the uniform price auction, 
leading to low revenue. This section will argue that flat demand curves are not sup­
ported empirically, which could be explained if bidders have decreasing marginal val­
uations. Even if the payoffs are constant, these could be motivated implicitly as the 
reduced form of reciprocity considerations or risk aversion. Under decreasing marginal 
valuations, an implicit almost common values problem means that second price auc­
tions generate very low revenue and full demand reduction occurs in the uniform price 
auction, as bidders submit bids of zero for a second unit. This chapter will review some 
experimental and empirical results. Some of these might be explained by introducing 
more bidders or units, while others can only be explained by bounded rationality. It 
will be argued that bounded rationality could reinforce some of the theoretical results 
as the equilibrium strategy can be motivated by players who form simple analogies 
about how the game is played. Both the generalisations and the analysis of bounded 
rationality lend support to the Milgrom (2004) and Klemperer (2004) doctrine that 
the details of an auction design are extremely important.
21.1 E m pirical R esu lts
Much of the literature relating to treasury auctions is aimed at determining whether 
uniform price or discriminatory auctions raise more revenue. Following Friedman
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(1960) claims have been made tha t the effects of asymmetric information are reduced 
in the uniform price auction, leading to smaller, uninformed bidders entering and 
increasing competition.1 Several studies have been carried out comparing the expected 
revenue reused by discriminatory and uniform price treasury auctions. Fevrier et al 
(2002) consider French treasury auctions in 1995 and find tha t discriminatory auctions 
raise more revenue than uniform price auctions. In addition Hortacsu (2002) examines 
Turkish treasury auctions and finds tha t discriminatory auctions raise significantly 
more revenue. However, there is also evidence reporting ambiguous findings. Malvey 
and Archibald (1998) find that the switch from discriminatory to uniform price auction 
for the U.S. Treasury had an insignificant impact on revenue. Nyborg and Sundaresan 
(1998) find some under-pricing in discriminatory auctions but the difference in average 
mark ups between the discriminatory and uniform price auctions is insignificant. In 
treasury auctions, neither extreme low price equilibria of the uniform price auction 
nor flat demand curves are observed empirically.
There is a fairly large experimental literature on multi-unit auctions when bidders 
have independent private valuations. The most relevant to this thesis is Engelmann 
and Grimm (2006) who compare the different auction formats discussed in this thesis 
in the two unit, two bidder, constant marginal valuations case. In all the auctions, 
bidders submit downward sloping bids, in contrast to the equilibrium prediction in 
discriminatory auctions. This is consistent with demand reduction in the uniform 
price auction, although the equilibrium in which bid for a second unit are zero rarely 
occurs. The discriminatory auction raises the most revenue, although consistent with 
other experiments (Kagel and Levin, 2001, for example) they frequently find that 
bids for a first unit are greater than valuations in Vickrey and uniform price sealed- 
bid auctions, which is a weakly dominated strategy. Although models of bounded 
rationality have been proposed to explain this overbidding in multi-unit auctions, it 
seems likely that it is related to experimental studies of Vickrey auctions for a single 
unit, where bidders often bid above their valuations.2 For this reason, the Ausubel 
auction leads to greater efficiency than other mechanisms. In a field experiment, List 
and Lucking-Reiley (2000) find significantly higher first unit bids in uniform price 
auctions than in Vickrey auctions (although overbidding occurs in both).
Sade et al (2006) run an experiment with multi-unit demand and common values. 
However, there is no private information in their auction, as all bidders know the ex 
post value with certainty, twenty-four units are allocated to five bidders who submit
‘ Sherm an (2002) po in ts ou t th a t th is  could  lead to  free riding in uniform  price auctions, so d is­
crim inatory auction s m ight provide b etter  incentives for inform ation gathering.
2See K agel and Levin (2006).
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demands at four specific prices. In contrast to other experiments, they find that the 
discriminatory auction raises less revenue than the uniform price auction. Allowing 
the seller in uniform price auctions to reduce supply ex post does not have a statisti­
cally significant effect on revenue. Goswami et al (1996) find that bidders coordinate 
on underpricing equilibria in uniform price auctions when pre-play communication is 
possible. This appears to support the idea presented in this chapter that the existence 
of a simple, low price equilibrium is important for uniform price auctions to generate 
low revenue. In this paper, however, coordination is facilitated by a lack of private 
information.
Turning to the experimental evidence for common value auctions for a single unit, 
the winner’s curse is well established when bidders are inexperienced (Kagel and Levin, 
2006, provide a recent survey). The effect of almost common values are tested exper­
imentally by Avery and Kagel (1997) and Rose and Levin (2005); both find tha t bids 
respond only proportionally to the advantage. Avery and Kagel (1997) use a second- 
price sealed-bid auction and find overbidding even when bidders have common values, 
because they appear not to account for the winner’s curse. Both papers find tha t bids 
are closer to the expected value than they are to the equilibrium.3
21.2  G eneralisations
This section will investigate whether different information structures or additional 
bidders and units could explain the empirical results. Section 21.3 will argue that as 
well as having additional explanatory power, bounded rationality will become even 
more important when large numbers of bidders and units increases the complexity of 
the situation.
D ifferent Inform ation Structures
Although a modified wallet game was used to simplify the analytical model and cal­
culate expected revenue, many of the results in this thesis would generalise to other 
information structures when there are two bidders and two units. Equilibria involving 
flat demands when bidders have constant marginal valuations also occur when they 
have independent private values or common values with affiliated signals (see Chap­
ter Twenty). When bidders have decreasing marginal valuations, the almost common 
values problem occurs generally.
*Rose and Levin (2005) a ttem p t to  m odel heterogeneity  betw een bidders, but find firstly th at few  
bidders are so p h is tica ted  by their classification  (i.e. they  alw ays win when they  are advantaged and  
alw ays lose w hen they are d isadvantaged). In add ition , even these bidders are not very soph istica ted .
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A dditional B idders
When there are two units but more than two bidders the extreme almost common 
value theoretical prediction of very low revenue need not hold. Levin and Kagel
(2005) model almost common value single-unit auctions and show that introducing 
more than one disadvantaged bidder mitigates the result. The intuition is that when 
one disadvantaged bidder wins the auction, he may have tied against the other dis­
advantaged bidder, reducing the extreme effect of the winner’s curse. To some extent 
this may be offset because the winner’s curse becomes more powerful as more bidders 
are introduced (Bulow and Klemperer, 2002).
A dditional U nits
The model extends to the case where there are two bidders and more than two units. 
Implicit bundling will still occur in the discriminatory auction and the fully symmetric 
equilibrium of the Vickrey auction when marginal valuations are constant or increasing. 
However, the zero bid equilibrium of the uniform price auction will be broken when 
bidders compete symmetrically for the marginal unit (for example when there are 
two bidders and three units). When bidders have diminishing marginal valuations, 
a special case provides some intuition. The solution for the discriminatory auction 
in Proposition 18.1 can be applied when the value of additional units to each bidder 
takes the form of a harmonic series, so the first is worth s-l^y2, the second a
third Sl*2 2 and so on.4 In this case the discriminatory auction continues to generate 
a higher expected revenue than the bundled auction. The Vickrey auction will lead to 
low revenues as bidders compete aggressively for the first half of the units and submit 
low bids for the second half of the units. There is non-monotonicity in revenue as the 
number of units increases in the Vickrey auction, because more revenue is raised when 
there is an odd number of units as bidders compete on the margin. This effect leads to 
larger non-monotonicities in the uniform price auction, because if bidders compete for 
the marginal unit, this affects the price of all units. Submitting zero bids is no longer 
an equilibrium when the number of units is odd, although bids for the marginal unit 
would still be low because of demand reduction
4 T h is is because the m axim um  bid on th e  first and third un its are yy^  =  l+ 'jff' =  22  an<  ^ t *ie
m axim um  bid for the second un it are also  yyyy =  yy yj-y =  5 5 . M arginal bids are weakly constan t only  
if Si =  1 or Si — 0  and the auction  decom poses. If th is specia l case  does not hold, then bidders will 
subm it flat bid curves w ith  p ositive  probability , in w hich case the bundled auction  could well generate  
greater revenue.
5 In the harm onic structure listed  above bund le w ill generate str ictly  higher exp ected  revenue rev­
enue aS E  [RtruncUe\ ~  3  [jq “t” yy -f" Yi] ^  *1 [ 3  TT] ~  [f^margtnaJunit]
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Sum mary
The result that bidders submit flat demands when they have constant marginal val­
uations is robust to changes in both the number of bidders and the number of units 
and different information structures. Submitting a downward sloping demand curve 
only hedges against the winner’s curse i f  other bidders also submit downward sloping 
demand curves, which is not the case in the symmetric equilibria of the discriminatory 
and Vickrey auctions. One method of overcoming this is to introduce bounded ratio­
nality directly, while another is to assume decreasing marginal valuations. In the latter 
case, the theory suggests that considerable non-monotonicities may arise in uniform 
price auctions as the number of bidders and units changes. If bidders are symmetric, 
then when the number of units is perfectly divisible by the number of bidders, the 
uniform price auction is expected to generate low revenue. Introducing elements of 
bounded rationality would reinforce this result, as coordination in the uniform price 
auction would involve simple bidding strategies.
21.3  B ou n ded  R a tio n a lity
The rationality of bidders underlies the theoretical analysis of auction theory. Elements 
of bounded rationality can be introduced in two areas: firstly, in common values auc­
tions, bidders may fail to properly account for the winners curse when forming their 
bids. Secondly, even if bidders correctly condition their valuations on winning the 
objects, calculating their bids may be complex (especially as the opponent’s bidding 
strategy is uncertain). This is important in multi-unit auctions where the allocation 
and payment rules are complicated. Even a bidder who fully understands the mecha­
nism would bid differently if he thought that his opponent did not, so these issues are 
clearly important when designing a multi-unit auction.
C om plexity
Two papers which focus on different aspects of the complexity involved in bidding in 
multi-unit auctions are Goldreich (2004) and Kagel and Levin (2006). Goldreich (2004) 
provides some evidence of bounded rationality in Treasury auctions. Treasury auctions 
are framed in yield space, and the investors appear to use a yield bidding heuristic 
to calculate their optimal bids. This is suboptimal because yields are converted to 
price space, which is coarser. Frequently a situation arises where a bidder could have 
increased his yield (and improve his chance of winning) without increasing the price he 
would pay if his bid was marginal. Goldreich finds that 28% of bids in discriminatory 
and 52% of bids in uniform price auctions are dominated. As using dominated bids
21. Empirical L iterature, G eneralisations and Bounded R ationality  161
is less costly in uniform price auctions this could be seen as evidence that people 
behave more suboptimally when it is less costly to do so, and related to the notion of 
optimality based refinement in Chapter Ten.
In an experimental study, Kagel and Levin compare the Vickrey and Ausubel 
auctions when bidders have independent private valuations and multi-unit demands.6 
They find that bidding behaviour is significantly closer to the true equilibrium (bidding 
the true valuation) in the Ausubel auction when bidders are informed when their 
opponents drop out and when clinching occurs. They conclude that although the 
solution concept in this case is only iterated deletion of weakly dominant strategies, 
rather than dominant strategies, when drop-out information is provided the Ausubel 
auction is more transparent and boundedly rational bidders are able to submit bids 
tha t are closer to the equilibrium (their true valuations).
Complexity is closely linked to the analysis of the low price equilibria of the uniform 
price auction analysed in the previous section. When bidders are symmetric and the 
number of units is perfectly divisible by the number of bidders, it seems reasonable 
tha t they coordinate on a very simple equilibrium, in which each bidder receives an 
equal share. Levin (2004) proposes that bids above valuations for a first unit could 
reinforce an equilibrium of low bids for a second unit. Section 21.1 discussed Sade 
et al (2006) in which 24 units were auctioned between 5 bidders. Introducing supply 
certainty had a statistically insignificant effect on revenue. It could be conjectured 
tha t this is because there is sufficient strategic uncertainty already; if there were 25 
units (or 4 bidders) then an equal split of 5 units (or 6 units) each is not only focal, but 
also simple to implement. In this respect, introducing bounded rationality reinforces 
the analysis of the uniform price auction, and the importance of it being impossible 
to share the units evenly in raising revenue.
T he W inner’s Curse
Another explanation for submitting bids above valuations in the Vickrey and uniform 
price auctions is that bidders suffer from the winner’s curse.7 Eyster and Rabin (2005) 
introduce the concept of cursed equilibrium, in which bidders form correct beliefs about 
the opponent’s behaviour but do not fully appreciate that their opponent’s actions de­
pend on their private information. In the wallet game considered in this paper, a
6 T echnically only a single hum an bidder has m ulti un it dem and and com petes against four com ­
puters b idding equilibrium  strateg ies for single  un its.
' F igure 18.3 illustrates the adju stm ent necessary to  avoid th e  w inner’s curse in the d iscrim inatory  
auction . In contrast to  th e  results in second price auctions, in th is case  failure to  properly adjust for 
th e  w inner’s curse would lead to  overb idding at all signals.
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cursed equilibrium involves players calculating their valuations as V = 31 ~>~^1 2A^52+2 . 
A represents the extend of the curse; if A =  1 then the auction is fully cursed and
•Sl +  —bidders take the unconditional expected value of their opponent’s bids, so V  =  —g-2-. 
The standard Bayesian Nash equilibrium arises if A =  0. A problem with this ap­
proach is explaining how bidders learn sufficiently to have correct expectations about 
their opponent without also learning to avoid the winner’s curse. Jehiel and Koessler
(2006) propose an analogy-based alternative in which players bundle states into anal­
ogy classes and form average beliefs about their opponent’s behaviour in different 
states. The fully cursed equilibrium is equivalent to their private information analogy 
partition in which players assume tha t given their private information, their opponent 
behaves in the same way in all possible states. Allowing arbitrary analogy partitions 
could lead to players partially adapting to the winner’s curse if they form less coarse 
expectations about the opponent’s behaviour, rather than taking a convex combina­
tion of the full information and fully cursed equilibria. Unlike the approach proposed 
in Part Two of this thesis however, analogy classes would be given exogenously as part 
of the strategic environment.
Crawford and Iriberri (2006) propose an alternative concept of level-k thinking to 
explain the winner’s curse.8 Level-0 bidders submit random, uniformly distributed bids 
over the observed range.9 Level-1 bidders best respond to this behaviour, while Level-2 
bidders best respond to the level-Is. As level-0s bid randomly, level-Is will correspond 
to Eyster and Rabin’s fully cursed bidders (although the level-k approach differs as it 
is not based on an equilibrium). Using the second price auction experimental data of 
Avery and Kagel (1997), Crawford and Iriberri find that the majority of bidders are 
level-1. Applied to the information and payoff structure of the wallet game, level-Is 
will overbid conditional on a low signals and underbid when they receive a high signal.
If bidders do not take full account of the winner’s curse, the extreme effect of almost 
common values will be mitigated, as disadvantaged bidders may submit moderate bids 
even in second price auctions, increasing expected revenue. While this may be the 
case for the Vickrey auction (see List and Lucking-Reiley, 2000), in the uniform price 
auction, decreasing marginal valuations may still play an important role, even if the 
almost common values effect is proportional.10 This is because when the number of 
units is perfectly divisible by the number of bidders, decreasing marginal valuations 
may aid coordination by making an equal split even more focal.
8Stahl and W ilson (1994) introduce th is  approach in gam es o f  com plete  inform ation.
9T hey  also allow for a truthful level-0  ty p e  w ho bids his own valuation.
10A s in A very and K agel (1997) and R ose and L evin (2005), d iscussed  in Section  21.1.
21. Em pirical L iterature, G eneralisations and Bounded R ationality  163
N on-Strategic B idders
Even if most bidders are able to fully comprehend the multi-unit auction, overcoming 
both complexity and the winner’s curse, a few smaller bidders who do not may sig­
nificantly affect the ability to coordinate on an implicitly collusive equilibrium. The 
non-strategic bidders of Back and Zender (1993) could be motivated as being bound- 
edly rational, as submitting very high bids for n  units in a uniform price auction is 
strategically equivalent to a bidder choosing a priori to buy n units at the clearing 
price (which the auctioneer guarantees to sell). Therefore a few boundedly rational 
bidders could introduce the supply uncertainty necessary to avoid extreme implicit 
collusion and very low revenues.
C hapter 22
Conclusion
The theory of multi-unit demand, common value auctions is relatively underdeveloped. 
In this thesis a modified wallet game was used to analyse the two bidders, two units 
case. Both bidders derive the same utility VU =   ^ (s* +  Sj) from winning a single-unit 
and V^1 -I- V? =  (s* +  sj) from winning two units. Chapter Sixteen showed that
the discriminatory and Vickrey auctions can decompose into two single-unit auctions, 
as for either bidder to win a second unit, he competes against his opponent’s bid for a 
first unit. First order conditions were derived for the highest losing bid uniform price 
auction and the first-price, sealed-bid auction for the bundle of units.
The next chapters analysed the equilibria of these auctions for different values 
of a . In Chapter Seventeen, a  = 1 so bidders had constant marginal valuations as 
V* =  V'2 =  Si 2 ^  • When a  < 1, in Chapter Eighteen, bidders had diminishing mar­
ginal valuations as V? < V*. Finally in Chapter Nineteen, when a  >  1, bidders 
had increasing marginal valuations as V? > . Revenue rankings and efficiency im­
plications were analysed for each situation and auction mechanism. Under constant 
or increasing marginal valuations, equilibria of the Vickrey and discriminatory auc­
tions involved bidders submitting flat demand curves (bj =  t%). This led to implicit 
bundling, as the bidder with the highest signal would win all the units (an efficient al­
location), and revenue equivalence with the auction for the bundle. The uniform price 
auction had multiple equilibria, one of which corresponded to the implicit bundling 
equilibrium of the Vickrey auction, and another which involved full demand reduction, 
where bidders submitted high bids for their first unit and zero bids for a second.
As flat (or increasing) demand curves are not supported empirically, Chapter Eigh­
teen analysed the case of decreasing marginal valuations. The uniform price and Vick­
rey auctions allocated the units efficiently, one to each bidder, but decomposed into 
asymmetric single-unit auctions, creating an implicit almost common values problem
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in which the winner’s curse is severe, leading to low revenue. The discriminatory auc­
tion could lead to inefficient allocations, but generated greater expected revenue than 
the uniform price, Vickrey and bundled auctions. The latter result was because the 
impact of the winner’s curse meant that the possibility of capturing the additional 
gross surplus of an efficient allocation outweighed the increased competitiveness of the 
symmetric auction for the bundle.
Chapter Twenty-One considered some empirical results from experimental eco­
nomics and treasury auctions. The result that bidders with constant marginal valu­
ations submit flat demands was robust to changes in the information structure and 
number of bidders and units, which motivated decreasing marginal valuations.1 While 
some empirical results could be explained by introducing more units and bidders, oth­
ers, such as overbidding on first units, could only be explained by introducing bounded 
rationality. Bidders could fail to properly account for the winner’s curse or calculate 
optimal bids due to the uncertainty and complexity of the environment. Even if most 
bidders are able to fully comprehend the multi-unit auction, a few boundedly rational 
smaller bidders could introduce supply uncertainty which would significantly affect the 
ability of larger bidders to collude implicitly in the uniform price auction.2
Generalisation showed that expected revenue in the uniform price auction was 
non-monotonic as the number of bidders and units changed, as expected revenue was 
low when the number of units was perfectly divisible by the number of bidders. In­
troducing bounded rationality reinforced this result, as coordination involved simple 
bidding strategies, submitting high bids for an equal share of the units and low bids 
for the remainder. In situations where the number of units was not divisible by the 
number of bidders, both the formal theory and bounded rationality (because of greater 
complexity) suggested that revenue in the uniform price auction might be closer to 
that in the discriminatory auction, which had no low bid equilibrium nor an implicit 
almost common value problem. Both the generalisations and the analysis of bounded 
rationality lend support to the Milgrom (2004) and Klemperer (2004) argument that 
the details of an auction design are extremely important.
^ v e n  if payoffs are constan t, decreasing m arginal valuations could  be m otivated  im p lic itly  as the  
reduced form o f  reciprocity considerations or risk aversion.
2 T h is provides an a lternative  m otiva tion  for th e  non -strateg ic  bidders in Back and Zender (1993).
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C hapter 23
General Conclusion
This thesis has argued that introducing bounded rationality can provide additional 
insight in a range of microeconomic situations. In every part, bounded rationality is 
related to the way forming categories or analogies affects players’ beliefs. In the first 
part, a screening process was analysed using a model in which information acquisition 
constraints cause projects to be evaluated using coarse categories. This explained some 
empirical results on r6sum6 screening, which are particularly relevant as both coarse 
signals and screening are best motivated early in the search process. In the second part, 
players formed endogenous analogy-based expectations of their opponent’s behaviour. 
This could be used to explain why players pass for long periods and mix latterly in 
games of complete and perfect information such as the Centipede game. Finally, the 
third part found that decreasing marginal valuations can generate theoretical results 
consistent with the empirical observation that bidders submit downward sloping de­
mand curves in multi-unit auctions. Additional insights were provided by considering 
the case when players formed analogies that their opponent’s bidding strategy was 
independent of his private information. The theoretical results on low price equilib­
ria in uniform price auctions were reinforced if players were able to coordinate on an 
equilibrium using the analogy with the case of an equal division of the units.
This first part of the thesis introduced bounded rationality into a decision prob­
lem, by investigating how a decision maker might optimally screen projects to choose 
one that maximises expected utility. A screening heuristic was motivated early in the 
search process, where information acquisition constraints lead to coarse information 
and it is not yet optimal to use a more accurate but costly procedure involving se­
quential search or pairwise comparisons. It was shown that introducing asymmetry 
(or bias) in the screening process reduced the a priori expected cost of errors in the 
decision stage. Fully asymmetric screening was related to optimal sequential search,
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but required that projects be uniquely identifiable and a different threshold must 
be memorised for every one. In partially asymmetric screening, the decision maker 
used an exogenous characteristic to identify projects, and assessed projects in different 
groups using different thresholds. Optimal partially asymmetric screening used a lower 
screening threshold for the minority group. However, projects in the majority group 
had a higher probability of being chosen a priori, because conditional on passing they 
were chosen in preference to projects in the minority group in the decision stage.1 
This insight was related to biased screening models in the literature on the economics 
of discrimination. As well as demonstrating the optimality of asymmetry in a class of 
communication problems, this thesis shows minority discrimination could be optimal 
in a screening process without any initial exogenous differences between groups.
The second part of the thesis investigated how bounded rationality might lead 
to players forming analogies about how their opponents would move, which could 
overcome the finite horizon paradoxes that arise in a generalised Centipede game. In an 
analogy-based expectations equilibrium (Jehiel, 2005), players bundle nodes at which 
their opponents move into analogy classes, and form expectations that the opponents 
behave in the same way within each class. This thesis investigated which analogy- 
based expectations equilibria are robust if players formed analogy classes endogenously, 
so they are more likely to form analogies when the opponent’s behaviour is similar, 
and form analogies more carefully when suboptimal actions would prove costly. The 
first refinement is similar to the idea of consistency underlying the approach, while the 
second allowed the robustness of an analogy class to be linked to the payoffs specifying 
the game; both refinements reduced the set of robust analogy classes and led to similar 
restrictions on behavioural strategies. It was demonstrated that if passing were to be 
sustained in equilibrium, then analogy classes in which players expect their opponent 
to mix were dramatically more robust than those in which they use pure strategies, as 
one player would always observe his opponent take at a node in which he expected the 
opponent to pass with high probability. This intuition was extended to the case when 
players form multiple analogy classes, where this thesis proposed an intuitive solution 
to the finite horizon problem: an equilibrium consists of players passing for a given 
number of nodes and then both mixing towards the end of the game.
The final part of the thesis developed a theoretical model of common value auctions 
in which bidders have multi-unit demand. Bounded rationality helped to explain 
empirical and experimental results (multi-unit auctions are often complex) as well as 
reinforcing some of the theoretical results. When bidders had constant or increasing
1 If the grouping was endogenous, it was optim al to divide the projects into a majority and minority 
rather than two groups of equal sizes.
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marginal valuations the discriminatory, Vickrey and uniform price auctions had an 
equilibrium in which bidders submitted flat demand curves.2 This led to implicit 
bundling, as the bidder with the highest signal would win all the units (an efficient 
allocation), and revenue equivalence with the auction for the bundle. This is consistent 
with several other papers, but is not supported empirically, and this motivating the 
use of decreasing marginal valuations.3 In this case the uniform price and Vickrey 
auctions allocated the units efficiently, but decomposed into asymmetric single-unit 
auctions, creating an implicit almost common values problem leading to low revenue. 
The discriminatory auction could allocate the units inefficiently, but led to greater 
expected revenue than the uniform price, Vickrey and bundled auctions. While some 
empirical results could be explained by introducing more units and bidders, others, 
such as overbidding on first units, could only be explained by introducing bounded 
rationality. Bidders could fail to properly account for the winner’s curse or calculate 
optimal bids due to the uncertainty and complexity of the environment. Even a few 
boundedly rational, smaller bidders could introduce supply uncertainty which would 
significantly affect the ability of the larger bidders to collude implicitly in the uniform 
price auction.4 Generalisation of the model showed that expected revenue in the 
uniform price auction was non-monotonic as the number of bidders and units changed, 
as expected revenue was low when the number of units was perfectly divisible by 
the number of bidders. Introducing bounded rationality reinforced this result, as 
coordination involved simple bidding strategies, submitting high bids for an equal share 
of the units and low bids for the remainder. In situations where the number of units was 
not divisible by the number of bidders, both the formal theory and bounded rationality 
(because of greater complexity) suggested that revenue in the uniform price auction 
might be closer to that in the discriminatory auction, which had no low bid equilibrium 
nor an implicit almost common value problem. Both the generalisations and the 
analysis of bounded rationality lend support to the Milgrom (2004) and Klemperer 
(2004) argument that the details of an auction design are extremely important.
2 The uniform price auction also has an equilibrium of full demand reduction in which bidders 
subm it zero bids for their second units.
3Even if payoffs are constant, decreasing marginal valuations could be motivated implicitly as the 
reduced form of reciprocity considerations or risk aversion.
4 This provides an alternative m otivation for the non-strategic bidders in Back and Zender (1993).
Bibliography
[1] Aigner, D. and Cain, G. (1977) "Statistical Theories of Discrimination in the 
Labor Market", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 30, 175-187.
[2] Armitage, M. L. (2004) "IPO Auctions", MPhil. Thesis, University of Oxford.
[3] Arrow, K. J. (1973) "The Theory of Discrimination", in Discrimination in Labor 
Markets, Ashenfelter and Rees, Princeton University Press, 3-33.
[4] Arrow, K. J., Pesotchinsky, L. and Sobel, M. (1981) "On Partitioning a Sample 
With Binary-Type Questions in Lieu of Collecting Observations", Journal o f the 
American Statistical Association, 76(374), 402-409.
[5] Ausubel, L. M. (2004) "An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects", 
American Economic Review, 94(5), 1452-1475.
[6] Ausubel, L. M. and Cramton, P. C. (2002) "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency 
in Multi-Unit Auctions", Working Paper 96-07, University of Maryland.
[7] Avery, C. and Kagel, J. H. (1997) "Second-Price Auctions with Asymmetric 
Payoffs: An Experimental Investigation", Journal of Economics & Management 
Strategy, 6(3), 573-603.
[8] Back, K. and Zender, J. F. (1993) "Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale 
for the Treasury Experiment", Review of Financial Studies, 6, 733-764.
[9] Becker, G. (1957) "The economics of discrimination", Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
[10] Bertrand, M. and Mullainathan, S. (2004) "Are Emily and Greg More Employable 
than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination", 
NBER Working Paper, 9873.
[11] Bihkchandani, S. (1988) "Reputation in Repeated Second-Price Auctions", Jour­
nal of Economic Theory, 46, 97-119.
170
B IB L IO G R A P H Y 171
12] Bulow, J. and Klemperer, P. (2002) "Prices and the Winner’s Curse", RAND 
Journal of Economics, 33(1), 1-21.
13] Calvert, R. (1985) "The Value of Biased Information: A Rational Choice Model 
of Political Advice" Journal of Politics, 47, 530-555.
14] Cornell, B. and Welch, I. (1996) "Culture, Information, and Screening Discrimi­
nation", Journal of Political Economy, 104(3), 542-571.
15] Crawford, V. P. and Iriberri, N. (2006) "Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium 
Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner’s Curse and Overbidding in 
Private-Value Auctions?", Working Paper.
16] Crawford, V. P. and Sobel, J. (1982) "Strategic Information Transmission", 
Econometrica, 50(6), 1431-1451.
17] DeGroot, M. H. (1970) "Optimal Statistical Decisions", McGraw-Hill.
18] Dow, J. (1991) "Search Decisions with Limited Memory", Review of Economic 
Studies, 58, 1-14.
19] Dufwenberg, M. (2006) "Psychological Games", The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics (2nd edition).
20] Dulleck, U. and Oechssler, J. (1997) "The Absent-Minded Centipede", Economics 
Letters, 55(3), 309-315.
21] Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. and Kahn, C. M. (1998) "Multi-Unit Auctions with 
Uniform Prices", Journal of Economic Theory, 12(2), 227-258.
22] Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. and Kahn, C. M. (1998) "Multi-Unit Pay Your Bid 
Auctions With Variable Awards", Games and Economic Behavior, 23, 25-42.
23] Engelmann, D. and Grimm, V. (2004) "Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit Auctions 
- An Experimental Investigation", IVIE Working Paper, 2004-12.
24] Eyster, E. and Rabin, M. (2005) "Cursed Equilibrium", Econometrica, 73, 1623- 
1672.
25] Fevrier, P., Preget, R. and Visser, M. (2004) "Econometrics of Share Auctions", 
Working Paper, 2002-09, University of Chicago.
26] Friedman, M. (1960) "A Program for Monetary Stability", New York, Fordham 
University Press.
B IB L IO G R A P H Y 172
[27] Fryer, R. G. Jr. and Jackson, M. O. (2004) "A Categorical Model of Cognition 
and Biased Decision-Making", NBER Working Paper, 9579.
[28] Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D. K. (1993) "Self-Confirming Equilibrium", Economet­
rica, 61, 523-545.
[29] Goldreich, D. (2004) "Behavioral Biases of Dealers in U.S. Treasury Auctions", 
Working Paper, London Business School.
[30] Goswami, G., Noe, T. H. and Rebello, M. J. (1996) "Collusion in Uniform-Price 
Auctions: Experimental Evidence and Implications for Treasury Auctions", Re­
mew of Financial Studies, 9, 757-785.
[31] Hortacsu, A. (2001) "Mechanism Choice and Strategic Bidding in Divisible Goods 
Auctions: An Empirical Analysis of the Turkish Treasury Auction Market", 
Working Paper, University of Chicago.
[32] Jehiel, P. (2005) "Analogy- Based Expectation Equilibrium", Journal of Economic 
Theory, 123, 81-104.
[33] Jehiel, P. and Koessler, F. (2005) "Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information 
with Analogy-Based Expectations", THEM A Working Papers 2005-04, University 
de Cergy-Pontoise.
[34] Jehiel, P. and Moldovanu, B. (2001) "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valu­
ations", Econometrica, 69(5), 1237-1259.
[35] Levin, D. and Kagel, J. H. (2005) "Almost Common Values Auctions Revisited", 
European Economic Review, 49(5), 1125-1136.
[36] Kagel, J. H. and Levin, D. (2001) "Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: 
Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Auctions", Econometrica, 69(2), 
413 454.
[37] Kagel, J. H. and Levin, D. (2006) "Auctions: Experiments", New Palgrave Dic­
tionary of Economics.
[38] Kagel, J. H. and Levin, D. (2006) "Implementing Efficient Multi- 
Object Auction Institutions: An Experimental Study of the Perfor­
mance of Boundedly Rational Agents", available at http://www.econ.ohio- 
state.edu/kagel/KL_Vickrey.GEB.pdf.
[39] Klemperer, P. (2004) "Auctions: Theory and Practice", Princeton University 
Press.
B IB L IO G R A P H Y 173
[40] Klemperer, P. (1997) "Almost Common Value Auctions: The "Wallet Game" and 
Its Applications in Takeover Battles and PCS Auctions", Mimeo, Nuffeld College, 
Oxford University.
[41] Kreps, D., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. and Wilson, R. (1982) "Rational Cooperation 
in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma", Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 
245-52.
[42] Krishna, V. (2002) "Auction theory", San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
[43] Lebrun, B. and Tremblay, M. (2003) "Multi-Unit Pay-Your-Bid Auction with 
One-Dimensional Multi-Unit Demands", International Economic Review, 44(3), 
1135-1172.
[44] Lee, M. D., O’Connor, T. A. and Welsh, M. B. (2006) "Human Decision-Making 
on the Full Information Secretary Problem", Proceedings of the 26th Annual Con­
ference of the Cognitive Science Society.
[45] LiCalzi, M. and Pavan, A. (2003) "Tilting the Supply Schedule Enhances Com­
petition in Uniform Price Auctions", FEEM Working Paper, 22-2003.
[46] List, J. A. and Lucking-Reiley, D. (2000) "Demand Reduction in Multi-Unit Auc­
tions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment", American Economic Re­
mew, 90, 961-72.
[47] Lundberg, S. and Startz, R. (1983) "Private Discrimination and Social Interven­
tion in Competitive Labor Markets", American Economic Review, 73, 340-347.
[48] Malvey, P. F. and Archibald, C. M. (1998) "Uniform-Price Auctions: Update of 
the Treasury Experience", U.S. Treasury.
[49] Marschak, J. and Radner, R. (1972) "Economic Theory of Teams", New Haven: 
Yale University Press.
[50] McKelvey, R. and Palfrey, T. (1992) "An Experimental Study of the Centipede 
Game", Econometrica, 60, 803-836.
[51] McKelvey, R. and Palfrey, T. (1998) "Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive 
Form Games", Experimental Economics, 1, 9-41.
[52] Meyer, M. (1991) "Learning from Coarse Information: Biased Contests and Ca­
reer Profiles", Review of Economic Studies, 58, 15-41.
B IB L IO G R A P H Y 174
[53] Milgrom, P. and Weber, R. J. (1979) "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive 
Bidding”, Econometrica, 50, 1089-1122.
[54] Milgrom, P. (2004) "Putting Auction Theory to Work", Cambridge University 
Press.
[55] Moser, L. (1956) "On a Problem of Cayley", Scripta Mathematica, 22, 289-292.
[56] Neyman, A. (1985) "Bounded Complexity Justifies Cooperation in the Finitely 
Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma", Economic Letters, 19, 227-229.
[57] Nyborg, K. G. and Sundaresan, S. (1996) "Discriminatory versus uniform Trea­
sury auctions: Evidence from when-issued transactions", Journal of Financial 
Economics, 42(1), 63-104.
[58] Palfrey, T. R. (1983) "Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with 
Incomplete Information", Econometrica, 51, 463-483.
[59] Piccione, M. and Rubinstein, A. (1997) "On the Interpretation of Decision Prob­
lems with Imperfect Recall", Games and Economic Behavior, 20, 3-24.
[60] Phelps, E. (1972) "The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism", American 
Economic Review, 62(4), 659-661.
[61] Ponti, G. (2000) "Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game", Games and Eco­
nomic Behavior, 30(1), 115-141.
[62] Rabin, M. (1993) "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics", 
American Economic Review, 83(5), 1281-1302.
[63] Radner, R. (1980) "Collusive Behaviour in Noncooperative Epsilon-Equilibria of 
Oligopolies with Long but Finite Lives", Journal of Economic Theory, 22, 136 
154.
[64] Radner, R. (1993) "The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing", 
Econometrica, 61(5), 1109 1146.
[65] Reny, P. (1992) "Rationality in Extensive-Form Games", Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 6(4), 103-118.
[66] Rose, S. L. and Levin, D. (2005) "An Experimental Investigation of the Explosive 
Effect in Common Value Auctions", Mimeo, Ohio State University.
[67] Rosenthal, R. W. (1982) "Games of Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing, and 
the Chain-Store Paradox", Journal of Economic Theory, 25, 92-100.
B IB L IO G R A P H Y 175
[68] Rubinstein, A. (1998) "Modeling Bounded Rationality", MIT Press.
[69] Sade, 0 ., Schnitzlein, C. and Zender, J. (2006) "Competition and Cooperation in 
Divisible Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination", Review of Financial 
Studies, 19, 195-235.
[70] Sherman, A. E. (2002) "Global Trends in IPO Methods: Book Building vs. Auc­
tions", Working Paper, University of Notre Dame.
[71] Simon, H. A. (1955) "A Behavioural Model of Rational Choice", Quarterly Jour­
nal of Economics, 69, 99-118.
[72] Spiegler, R. (2002) "Equilibrium in Justifiable Strategies: A Model of Reason- 
Based Choice in Extensive-Form Games", The Review of Economic Studies, 69(3), 
691-706.
[73] Stahl, D. O. and Wilson, P. W. (1994) ”Experimental Evidence on Player’s Models 
of Other Players”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 25, 309-327.
[74] Van Zandt T. (1999) "Decentralized Information Processing in the Theory of Or­
ganizations", Contemporary Economic Issues Economic Design and Behavior, 
7, 125-160.
[75] Vickrey, W. (1961) "Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Ten­
ders", Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8-37.
[76] Wang, J. J. D. and Zender, J. F. (2002) "Auctioning Divisible Goods", Journal 
of Economic Theory, 19, 673-705.
[77] Wernerfelt B. (2004) "Organizational Languages", Journal of Economics and 
Management Strategy, 13(3), 461-472.
[78] Wilson, R. (1979) "Auctions of Shares", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 94, 
675-689.
A p p en d ix  A
A sym m etric Screening
A . l  O p tim al P a rtitio n s are Intervals
Appendix A .l sketches the proof that the decision maker should always use intervals 
rather than partitions. Consider the following partitions on a random variable Xi.
F ig u re  A .l
Here the signal communicated is that X  is moderate, D, or extreme, C. Assume 
that E  [C] > E  [D ] (the proof extends to the opposite case) and that the problem is 
not degenerate, so there are some signal profiles in which C  is chosen but D  would not 
be. This is equivalent to stating that Pr[Xj chosen | C\ > Pr[Xi chosen | D).
Following Dow (1991) the partition C  can be made into an interval by moving the 
probability mass from the lower section of the partition to the bottom of the upper 
end of the partition. This is illustrated in Figure A.2.
— i— 5 -----------1 c  i c — i------------
F igu re  A .2
Assume that conditional on the signal profile, the decision rule does not change 
(reoptimising may lead to further gains). The new partitions of Xi can be decomposed 
as in Figure A.3:
 t P-t p * i c ’ i c * i------------
Figure' A .3
Decomposing E  [F] over the partitions of Xi illustrated in Figure A.3 gives the 
same E  [F  | D *] and E  [V | C*] as in Figure A .l. Likewise, expected value conditional 
on Xi falling in the unchanged partitions above C* and below D' is the same. The 
change in expected value between the partitions illustrated in Figures A .l and A.3 will 
depend only on E  [V | D'] and E  [V \ C'].
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A E  [V } = E  [D’] Pr [£/] {Pr [Xi chosen | D] -  Pr [Xi chosen | C]}
+ E  [C] Pr [C'\ {Pr [Xi chosen | C] -  Pr [Xi chosen | D]}
=  Pr [C'] [Pr (Xi chosen | C) -  Pr (Xi chosen | D)\ [E [C] -  E  [D']]
because Pr [IX] =  Pr [C'\ by construction. This means that A E  [V] > 0 as 
Pr (Xi  chosen | C) > Pr (Xi chosen | D) and E  [C] > E  [D'\. Therefore this change 
increases E  [V].
A .2 D erivation  o f  O p tim al C om m u n ication  by M in im is­
in g  E x p ected  Error
Appendix A.2 gives the derivation of expected error in the case when b > a as an 
example of Proposition 3.2 which shows that minimising expected error is equivalent 
to maximising E  [V] directly because E  [V] =  E  [V *] — E[e\, where E  [V *] is the full 
information expected value (a constant) and E  [5 ] is the expected error. E[e \ s , e > 0] 
is simple to evaluate in the uniform case.
s Choice E[e | s , e > 0] Pr [e > 0 | 51 E[e | s,e > 0] Pr[e | a]
x l , yl Y E[X -  Y  | X,s] Pr [Y > X I - ] a3 a21
x l , y„ X E[Y -  X \ X> Y , s ] Pr [X > Y I * ] N /A 0
X h ,Yl Y E[X -  Y | Y  > X,a] Pr [Y > X 1 b —a3
b —a  b —a  1^ 
1—a  2
X h ,Yh Y E[Y -  X \ X>Y, 8 ] Pr [X > Y 1 s\ 1-63 1-6 1 1—a  2i-<> 1 - 1 / 1 1 a  2
T a b le  A 2 .1: P ro b a b ility  an d  e x p e c ted  errors un der a sy m m e tr ic  co m m u n ic a tio n
Composing E  [e] from the probabilities and conditional expectations in Table A2.1 
gives:
E\e] =  i  ra3 + ( 6 - a ) 3 +  ( l - 6 ) 3
O L
=  1 -  1  [1 +  a62 - a 2fc +  6 - 6 2]O i
=  E [ V ' ] - E [ V \
As E[V} = ^ [l -+* afe2 — a2b 4• b — h2] is derived in Proposition 3.4. Therefore first 
order conditions give the same conditions on a  and b:
dE[e]
da
dE[e\
db
= i  [3a2 -  3 (6 -  a)2] =   ^ [2a -  b]
= i  [3(6 -  a)2 -  3(1 -  6)2] = i ( l - a ) [ 2 6 - a - l ]
Alternatively if the restriction a =  b is applied: 
E[e] =  i [ a 3 +  ( l - a ) :
dE\e\
da
=  i  [3a2 - 3 ( 1  - a ) 2’
=  a " 2
Pr[s] 
ab 
a (l — b)
(1 — a)b 
— a)(l  — b)
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A .3  O p tim al Intervals U n d er  F ully  A sy m m etr ic  C om m u ­
n ication
When there are N  signals, under optimal fully asymmetric communication each signal 
X{ is partitioned into intervals by a threshold ai so that { X u  , X m  } =  {[0, a*) , [a*, 1]}. 
It is assumed that ai > 0 2  > 1 > ayy without loss of generality (as labelling the
projects is arbitrary in this case). E  [V] can be derived as follows:
E[V] = E [ X l \ X lH] P r ( X 1H) 
+ P r ( X 1L) E { X 2 \ X 2H} P r ( X 2H)
+ . . .  +
4  P r ( X lL) ... P r (X (* _ 1)L) E  [XN \ X NH} P r ( XNH)
+ Pt ( X i l ) . . . Pt ( X n l ) E { X 1 I X \ l\
1 -  a? 1 -  a\ , , 1 -  <£ a\= — + a i— ^ ^  4- ... 4  [aia2 ...an_ij —   h [a1a 2 ...an_ia„j —
The first order conditions can then be calculated: 
dE  [V]
da = i  [ -2 a i 4  1 -  o | 4  ... 4  [a2 ...an_i] ( l -  a2n) 4  2 [a2 ...an_ ia n] ai]
d E  [V^l flJ r n  r 1 / ,  2 \ r 1 1—-j— -  =  —  [~2a2 + ... 4  [a3 ...an_i] (1 -  an) 4  [a3 ...an- i a Tl]ai\
dE  [V] 
do{
dE  [V ] 
daT 1 
dE  [V] 
dam
a ia 2 ...Oi-i
2
a\a2...an _ 2
2
a\a2
2
[ 4  1 ”1“ ••• 4  [&i+l ...fln— l] ( l ®n) "h 2 [®i+l l®ri] ®l]
[—2an_ i  +  1 -  +  2anaij
[ 2 o n  4  f l j ]
Therefore the solution which maximises E  [V] will be characterised by Equations 
A .l, A.2 and A.3.
1 4  Oo 1 r , / * 1 \ai =  — -—  4  -  [aia2 ...an_ ianj (A .l)
=  l~ ^ Y ±1  (A-2)
an =  y  (A.3)
The first order conditions can be substituted back into the expression for E  [V] so
that when the partitions are formed optimally
E lV] =  \ ( l ~ a i 4  a i ( H o ? ) )
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A .4 S w itch in g  Intervals A b o u t a C om m on  B ou n d ary  D o es  
N o t C han ge E x p ec ted  U tility
Any set of intervals with an interval boundary that is common to the identically 
independently distributed project values X  and Y  (0 in Figures A.4 and A.5) will give 
the same expected value if the interval structure after 0 is switched between signals 
X  and Y . Therefore the two interval structures illustrated in Figures A.4 and A.5 will 
have the same expected payoffs.
— I— I--------1— i— x ------1----- 1--------- 1------ x
— I 1------------ 1--------  Y  1----------1----------1------- ( -  Y
<p <p
F igu re  A .4 F ig u re  A .5
This follows because the expected utility can be conditioned on X  and Y  relative 
to <p.
E[V] = E[V  I X  < 0 , y  < 0 ] P r [X < 0 , Y  < 0]
+E[V  | X  < 0 , Y  > 0] Pr [X < <t>, Y  >4>]
+E[V  | X  > 0 ,  Y  < 0] Pr [X > <}>, Y  <(j>\
+E[V  | X  > <f>, Y  > 0 ] P r [ *  > <t>, Y>4>]
The conditional expected values will be the same in all cases. Firstly, if both real­
isations are below <f> or both above 0 , switching realisations between projects will not 
affect E  [V ] because X  and Y  are independently identically distributed (so the inter­
vals are the same in Figures A.4 and A.5 anyway). Secondly if one realisation is below 
<P while the other is above 0 then the structure of intervals below 0 is irrelevant, as 
the higher value will be chosen (the decision is independent of irrelevant alternatives). 
This argument extends to any number of projects.
A .5 O p tim al Internal In tervals D o  N o t S tr ic tly  C onta in  
In tervals on  O ther P ro jec ts
The notation used when there are multiple intervals is that each interval over X and 
Y is labelled by its expectation. The probability of the realisation of X  (or Y)  lying 
in specific partition A ,B ,C .. .  is given by the lower case letter a, 6, c... respectively. 
Consider the case where an interval on one signal lies within the bounds of an interval 
on another signal. This is illustrated in Figure A.6 where interval S  falls within interval 
T  (also U falls within V).
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F ig u re  A .6
The intuition in Appendix A .l suggests this is suboptimal, as conditional on a 
realisation of signal profile [5, T] the expected values will be closer together than they 
would if the intervals overlapped. Formally the proof that this is suboptimal involves 
switching the interval boundaries above and including the upper threshold on S  from 
one signal to the other. This process is illustrated in Figure A.7. The intervals are 
used to construct the proof are finer than those used by the decision maker to partition 
signal space which are indicated by the thick black fines. So the decision maker could 
receive a signal that the realisation of X  lies in the set of [QuF] or that the realisation 
of Y  lies in the set of [C U R], but not that X  lies in Q directly.
B  D  O  F  H
 1— n-------- 1—  x
~ A  I C  d  E   ^ G  Y
<f> !
F ig u re  A .7
The a priori expected value can be calculated as follows:
=  . . .
4-E\V | Q UF ]  Pt[Q U F  highest]
+E[V | E) Pr[F highest]
+E[V | D\ Pr[Z) highest]
+E[V | C  U R] Pr[Cu R  highest]
+...
Consider the change from E[V i] to E [ \ 2 ] if every interval threshold U > <t> is 
switched between X  and Y.
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E[V2] = ...
+E[V  | F] P r[F  highest]
+E\V  | E U R ]  Pr[” E  or R ” highest]
+E[V  | DUQ]  Pr[”D or Q” highest]
+E[V  | C  ] Pr[C highest]
+ . . .
Appendix A.4 shows that if one realisation is higher than F  then independence of 
irrelevant alternatives means there is no change; if both realisations are lower than C  
then there is no change. Therefore the unexpressed terms will be equal so
E \y 2] -E [ V i]  = F f ( l - g )  + (eE + r R ) ( l - h - f )  (A.4)
-I- (dD +  qQ) ( 1 -  g — e — r) + C c ( l  — f  — h — q — d) 
~ (Qq +  F f )  (1 -  g) -  Ee  (1 — h — /  — q) 
- D d  (1 — g — e) — (Cc 4- rR) (1 — h — f  — q — d)
Observing in Figure A.7 tha t Q = R ,q  = r , a  + c = b + d and e +  g =  /  +  h reduces 
Equation A.4 to Equation A.5.
E[V2] -  E[Vi] =  qd[Q -  D] +  qe[E -  Q] > 0 as E  > Q > D  (A.5)
This proof can be extended to the case of more projects by holding the expected 
values constant in the decision stage (reoptimisation will lead to a larger improvement). 
If any interval strictly contains an interval on another project (and the situation is 
not degenerate, when a realisation lieing in neighbouring intervals would lead to the
same decision for all realisations of other project values) then it is always possible to
increase expected value with such a transformation. It is sufficient to examine local 
intervals because of independence from irrelevant alternatives.
A .6 O p tim al Internal In tervals D o  N o t W eakly C on ta in
Intervals on  O ther P ro jec ts
Continuing the notation of Appendix A.5, consider the change in expected utility from 
increasing one of the common interval partitions in Figure A.8 by a small amount, so 
that the interval Q will be grouped with the interval D  when communicating to the 
decision maker rather than grouped with F, as illustrated in Figure A.8. The change 
is small and made in a direction so the optimal choice given any signal combination 
remains the same. Note that a switch described in Appendix A.4 may be necessary so 
that increasing the partition unambiguously increases expected value.
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B D Q F H
A  C  E  G
F ig u re  A .8
The expected value can be decomposed as follows:
E[V] = E[V \ X  <Q]  + E[V | Q] +  E[V \ X  > Q]
As the change is small, E[V \ X  < Q) and E[V \ X  > Q] will be the same before 
and after Q is included in the signal with interval D  (there is no change the order of 
expected values). The change in expected value depends only on the effect on E[V | Q].
When Q is grouped with F:
E[Vi \Q] = E [ V \ F u Q  not chosen] Pr [F U  Q not chosen] +  Q Pr [ F  UQ  chosen]
After changing Q to be included with D:
E\V2  | Q] = E  [V | D U  Q not chosen] Pr [D U  Q not chosen] + Q P r [ D u Q  chosen]
Therefore:
E [vy -  E[Vi] =  q(E[V2 \ Q ] - E [ V l \Q])
=  qQ [Pr [DU Q chosen] — Pr [ F U Q  chosen]]
+qE [V | D  U  Q < some E[V] < F  U  Q] Pr [V | D  U  Q < some E \V )  < F  U  Q\ 
= q Q l ( l - 9 - e ) - ( l - g ) ]  + q[Ee] 
= q e ( E - Q )
As E  > Q this is always positive, and therefore increasing one interval by a small 
amount always improves the solution. This argument extends to the case when there 
are many projects. Note that the gain equals the expected error, as E  is now correctly 
chosen when before Q was chosen in error.
X
Y
A p p en d ix  B
Endogenous A nalogy Classes
B . l  O p tim a lity  B ased  R efin em en t o f  th e  C en tip ed e G am e  
w h en  N  =  2
Before optimality based refinement of mixed strategy analogy-based expectations equi­
libria of the Centipede game when N  = 2, it is useful to observe that the full infor­
mation expected payoffs are independent of the specific equilibrium. For player 1, the 
expected true payoff is:
U \ \ p  , q) =  lpi + 2(1  - p i ) ( l  ~ q i ) p 2 +  1(1 ~ P l) ( l  -<7i)(l ~P2)02 
+3(1 —P i)(l ~ 9 i) ( l  -P 2 ) ( l  - 9 2 )
=  Pi +  (1 - P i ) ( l  ~ 9 i)(l +  P2 )
=  1
For 2, the expected true payoff is:
U 2 \p , q] =  lp i +3(1  - p \ ) q \  +  2(1 - p i ) ( l  -  q \ ) p 2 +  4(1 - p i ) ( l  -  <7i) ( l  ~P2)<72 
+3(1 — P i)(l -  <7i)(l ~P2)(1 ~  9 2 )
=  pi +3(1 - p i ) q i  + 2 (1  - P i ) ( l  — 9i)(2 — P2 )
=  2
The optimality based refinement measures were specified in Definition 10.2 as 
UiUi]p f q for Player 1 and ’1^ Player 2- Following Proposition
10.1 some pure strategy p'  and cf must be optimal for each player. The payoffs from 
each pure strategy can be calculated for player 1 :
Pure Strategy pi Expected Payoff from pi, U\ [pi , q]
(1) Take, Take 1
(2) Pass, Take 2(1 — <71)
(3) Pass, Take (1 -  9 i) t e  +  3(1 -  ®)]
U\  [p . <?]-EA[p, <?]
V i \p  , q]—+1,2  
1 - 1
2 ( i- i i ) - i
( 1— ) 1*^ 2+ 3( 1—^2)]—1 
1
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For player 2:
Pure Strategy q1 Expected Payoff from </, U\ [p , q'] U^ \p i f ^
(4) Take, Take p x +  3(1 -  p i) Ei+.3I j_-p0 .r_j
(5) Pass, Take pi +  2 p2 ( l — Pi) +  4(1 -  P i)(l -  P2 ) Pl+2^ l~Pl^ ^ ~ ^ x^ 1~ ^ ~ 2
(6 ) Pass, Pass p\ -I- 2 p2 (l -  Pi) +  3(1 -  P i)(l -  P2 ) a+2p2 ^~P0+?1 j "PiK1
Condition 6  will never bind as (Pass, Take) always has a higher payoff for player 
2, which is another way of expressing tha t for optimality <72 =  1- Indirectly this rules 
out condition 3 ever binding, as the payoff from (Pass, Take) will be greater for player 
1 . Finally as <72 < T  condition 1 will never bind alone. This leaves the following 
conditions:
(2) h  = 1 -  2qx
(4) £2  =  1 -  2pi
(5) £2 =  2 -  3pi +  2p2 (pi  -  1)
These can be expressed as restrictions on p\ using the consistency requirements 
shown in Table 9.2 that q\ — 1 — 3 ^ l pi  ^ and P2  =  2 —3pi, giving the following measures 
of t\ and £2 :
2 
3(1 - P i )
-  2pi if Pi < 5
\7 p i -
This is illustrated in Figure 10.6
h (p  , q) | 7^  _  6 pJ -  2  if p! > i
B .2  O p tim ality  B ased  R efin em en t o f  th e  D ou b lin g  D ollar  
G am e W h en  N  =  2
For the Doubling Dollar game when N  =  2 in a mixed strategy analogy-based ex­
pectations equilibrium, as characterised in Table 9.2, player 1 has a true average 
payoff of 3  — pi and player 2 has a true average payoff of pi. As A =  Bi,i =  0 
in the Doubling Dollar game, £i =  U% \p %}- 1JPU7 ^  ~  1 for Player 1 and
£2 =  ’1 ^  =  ~   ^ o^r Player 2- Following Proposition 10.1 some pure
strategy p' and q* must be optimal for each player. The payoffs from each pure strategy 
can be calculated for player 1 :
Pure Strategy p' Expected Payoff from p', U \  [p' , q) — 1
(1) Take 1 -  1
5 - P I
(2) Pass, Take 2(1 -  qi) -  1
(3) Pass, Pass 4(1 — <7i )( l  — 9 2 ) 4(1~ |0 (1~<») _  1
3 P 1
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While for player 2:
Pure Strategy Expected Payoff from q1 ,U \\p  , q']
(4) Take 1 (1—pi)
(5) Pass, Take 2(1 -  p i)( l -  P2 )
(6 ) Pass, Pass 0
U*\P ' Hi _  l  U2\p\q) 1
Kl-Pl) _  I
2(l-piP)1( l-p a) _  j
l - iPi
As in Appendix B.l it is sufficient to examine conditions 2, 3 and 4 as conditions 
1, 3 and 6  will never bind. This leaves the following conditions:
=  2^ }  _  1 
t2 =  -  1* pi
(2) 
(4)
( 5 )  t 2  =  _  !
These can be expressed as restrictions on p\ using the consistency requirements 
shown in Table 9.2 that q\ =  1 — 3^ ! " ^  and P2  — 2 —3pi, giving the following measures 
of t\ and <2 :
hip , q) = (4 — 3p i) (1 — p i) 1
h(p , q)  = (ay.
This is illustrated in Figure 10.7.
pi
p i )(3p i - i ) _  1 if pi >  \
pi z
B .3  Som e P u re S tr a te g y  is a t L east W eakly O p tim al
Consider the game illustrated in Figure B .l, where Ai, B {,..., E{
1 1
n -p ,)-... .... v - q , r " ~ (I-p J O-qz)
Pi qi p2 R2
A3..
B i . i
A . . .
Bn
A l . 2
B l , 2
M l
b 2 .
A 2 . 2
B 2 2
F ig u re  B .l
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An expression for the "true” expected payoff for player 1 can be written:
E[ 7Ti] =  P i A U  +  (1 - P l ) 9 l ^ l , 2  +  (1 “ P i )  (1 -  9 l )P 2 ^ 2 , l
+  (1 -  P i )  (1 -  9 l )  (1 - P 2 ) 92^2,2 +  (1 -  P i )  (1 -  9 l)  (1 P2 ) (1 -  <72) A 3,i
=  Pi [4 l , l ]  +  (1 -  P i )P2 [91^1,2 +  (1 -
+  (1 ~  P i )  (1 ~  P2) [91^1,2 +  (1 “  9 l)  92^2,2 +  (1 -  9 l)  (1 — 92) ^ 3 ,l]
=  P\E[ni  | pi =  1 ]
+  (1 - P i ) P 2 ^ [ t t i  I P i =  0 , P2 =  1]
+  (1 -  p i )  (1 -  P 2 ) [ i t  1 | p i  =  0, P2 =  0]
Therefore payoffs from mixing will be a convex combination of the payoff from using
playing pure strategies. The same is true for player 2 by symmetry.
B .4  D erivation  o f  E q u ation  10.1 in P ro p o sitio n  10.6
If pn =  p V n the expected number of nodes X n, 2 observed is:
9
=  £
L n , 2 i= 1
+
( i=g \ N n — 1
( l - q ) s ~ l ( l - q g) I P 1 “ Pi) £ (1 — q)n~9~ l n
\ i = l  / - n=g+1 *=5+1
= £ [ ( i - « r - 1( i -p )" ’
n — 1
+  [ ( l _ , - ) » - 1 ( l - , s ) ( 1 - p ) » ]  Y ,  [(1 — q)n~9~l (1 — p)n~9~l 
= ( 1  - P )
N
n = g + 1
1 -  ( 1  -  <7)g (l - p ) f
_ 1 — (1 - 9 ) ( 1  - p )
+
' (l -  a)®-1 (i -  $) (i -  p)»'
O)1is:1O)111■^4 
__
1 1 -  (1 - ? ) ( i  - p )
1 - p  +  p [( l -  9 ) ( 1  - p ) } 9 
q + p - q p
This expression is decreasing in p, so minimising g maximises the number of times 
player 2  is expected to move in equilibrium.
A p p en d ix  C
Com m on Value M ulti-U nit 
A uctions
C .l  S o lu tion  for A sy m m etr ic  F irst-price , Sealed-b id  A u c­
tio n
Proposition 16.1 derived the first order conditions for the discriminatory auction in 
Equation 16.1 as:
b]
Appendix C.l derives a closed form solution to these first order conditions. It 
focuses on an asymmetric first-price auction for a single unit, where bidders have 
independent signals which are uniformly distributed over [ 0  , 1 ], and bidder i has a
valuation of ai^*2 while bidder j  has a valuation of ■ The superscripts are
dropped for simplicity. The differential equations can be solved analytically as they 
can be rewritten as in Equation C .l.
i  t o w + < M6)] =  t jw+bt j ib)
i  [<fc(6) +  4i(6)]*;(6) =  + (C .l)
These sum to give
\  1^,(6) +  <*>) + i  [(pi(b) + ^ (b ) \  4>’(b) =  4>jW + i<A>) +  ^  ^
Integrating both sides (the constant is 0 as =  <f>j(0) =  0) gives
b<f>j(b) 
4>i(b)
a (C.2)
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The upper bound on the support of the bids must be the same for both bidders:
i ( l  + l ) 2 =  61 1 +  -  ) =>6  =
a
a
4 \  a /  1 +  a
Therefore Equation C.2 can be rewritten as C.4 or C.5.
M b ) 2 +  M b )  ( 2^ ( 6) -  ^ )  +  (4>j(bf -  46^(6))
M b )<t>j(b) +  4>j(b) (2M b)  -  46) +  M b )  -  46 a
(C.3)
(C.4)
(C.5)
These have positive roots given in Equations C . 6  and C.7.
M b )  -  — -  4>j(b) +  2yb<pj(b) ^
^(b)  = 2 b ~ M b )  +  2jtxPi(b) 1 — Qa -hh2
(C.6 )
(C.7)
These can be substituted into the first order conditions to give two differential 
equations C . 8  and C.9 in terms of only one of the variables:
KHr)+ ir>w 
(^ )  '+  \ l b<t>i(b) ( - — -  1 + fc2 a
(C.8 )
(C.9)
Note that if a  =  1 then this reduces to b<j>\{b) =  4>{(b) for both i = 1 , 2  which 
integrates to give 0 (^6 ) =  kb, and a linear bidding function is sufficient to ensure a 
general optimum. Solving first for bidder i, with a valuation , Equation C . 8  
can be simplified using a change of variables of the form 0 ,(6 ) =  j^ —b fo ( 6 ) 2 — ll => 
0 i(6 ) =  [«i(<>)2 -  1 +  2 W f>K'.(6 )] for a  *  1 .
Ui(b)  [a -  1 +  <*£(6)] db
(2 -  a  -  «£,(6)) [^(6)* -  l p 1 b
Then expanding by partial fractions and integrating gives 
1 f  ( 2  — a) a  2 a  — 1 1 — a
- o ) 2  J  2  -  a  -  <(6) +  Mb) ~  1 ~ W f + i
(Mb)  - 1)(2° - ‘)
( 2  -  a  -  aM b))U -aHSi(b) +  l ) (1“ o)
( 1
= J *  (0.10,
= A62(1~a) (C .ll)
Substituting £;(6) =  \J  ~^4>i{b) +  1 an<i solving for A 1 using the condition on b
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given in Equation C.3 gives an implicit function as an analytical solution for bidder i
Q + ^/aQ -a ] ^ ( 6 ) + Q 2
(2- a )
(1 -a )
(C.12)
Similarly Equation C.9 for a bidder j  with a valuation q can be simpli­
fied using a change of variables of the form <t>Ab) =  f ' t j 1 L!  ^ — £ ,(6 )2] - > 0 (( 6 ) 
=  A  [ £  -  2 f<J (6 )4 '  (6 ) -  ? ,( 6 )2] for a  *  1 .
+  „  = db
(2 - i  - « # ) )  fo(*)2- i ]  2 b
Then expanding by partial fractions and integrating gives 
2q — 1 2 — a  1 — or
(C.13)
h +W + i - 2  i+€#)
[=-€#)]  [£-«#>*]
(a -1 )
-  / ’<*->?
=  A62(1_q)
Substituting £j(6 ) =  \J  a? ~  (^)TST solving for A using the condition on 6  given
in Equation C.3 gives an implicit function as an analytical solution for bidder j :
y j  1 -  + 1 -  2 a
( 2 a - 1)
60,(6) 1 +  Q
a  (1 — a ) “
( l - a )
(C.14)
C .2  H ighest L osing  B id  U niform  P rice  A u ction
In this uniform price auction the same price is paid for every unit won, tha t of the 
highest losing bid. As 6 ] >  brj V s if bidder i wins two units he will pay a price of
26]. If each bidder wins one unit then they will both pay M ax  ^6 \  , 6 ]^ . Bidders i 
will not know j ’s bids in advance, but can form expectations of the price they will pay 
conditional on winning either one or two units. The probabilities of winning one unit 
and paying 6 ? or 6 ] can be calculated as follows:
The probability of bidder i 
winning one unit only and 
paying i ’s second bid (6 ? > tij) :
The probability of bidder i 
winning one unit only and 
paying j ’s second bid (6 ] > %)■
P r  [6] >  6? >  6?1 
=  P r  [<p2 (6 ? )  >  a ,  >  ** (6 ? ) ]
=  0 2 (6 ?) -  (6 f)
Pr
= Pr [02 6  } ) > S j > 0 2 (6 ?)] 
=  0 2 (6 j )  -  $  (6?)
r-xpeetea price 
paid conditional on E  \j* | i r inl]  — 
winning one unit:
Expected total price 
paid conditional  011 
winning two units:
E 2  bj | t W n 2
0
b) ( j ' )dx
These  expected payments can he subst ituted into the expression for ex pec 
plus in Equation 15.1.
r,- =  e
Si S'
-  — b I wi n  1 Pr ( w i n l )
( s t +  s j ) — 2bj | w i n 2 Pr( wi n  2)
-  -  [2s, -f 0J (b]) +  0) (6;)] [oj  (b] ) -  Oj (b-
L .
1 -b a
C)1 (b2) - 2  /  bj ( . r )dx
2 '  2
0 j  [ 0 l )
L ^ it
Differentiating Equation ( ' .17 with respect to bj and bf  gives tin1 following 
tions for bitldor i to maximise expected  surplus:
o r ,
ub]
or,
<)lr
m
-  [*, + o )  (b;)] -  bf  o)> (bf )  +  0 ) (bf )  “ o j  (bf )
